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 "[O]urs is an epoch in which it is almost universally agreed that a
 profound realignment, if not revolution, is underway in our economy 
 and society." (Esping-Andersen 1990: 222) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is probably fair to say that only few would disagree with Esping-Andersens 
statement and that today, more than twenty years later, this statement appears to be 
even more true. However, from the perspective of the social sciences, the mere 
perception of change is hardly sufficient, but rather the starting point for analyzing, 
comparing and explaining social, political and economic developments around the 
world. Within the social sciences, welfare state research is a very good example of 
how research questions have been adapted to changing circumstances and realities 
and how analyses have consistently built on previously accumulated knowledge. In 
this manner, welfare state research has become more and more sensitive to the 
specific relation between the welfare state and the women who live in it, moving 
from research approaches that revolved around the typical male full-time worker to 
approaches that took the particular situation and needs of women and mothers into 
account. Yet, even feminist welfare state research is missing comprehensive welfare 
state comparisons that strictly focus on the very specific incentives created by 
welfare states to enhance female and especially maternal labor supply.  
 
The present study is based on 27 labor supply incentives from the fields of parental 
leave, early childhood education and care, school policy, employment law and 
taxation and allowances which are, for the most part, available for 22 OECD 
countries and which have been assembled in the FEMMES Dataset (Female and 
Maternal Employment Support) compiled for the purpose of the present study. 
Applying this selection of indicators to a comparison of welfare state incentives for 
maternal employment can be regarded as an attempt to overcome the shortcomings 
of existing gender-sensitive welfare state classifications in a variety of ways. On the 
one hand, existing feminist welfare state research has often contributed very detailed 
single or small-n country studies (cp. Peattie and Rein 1983; Shaver 1983; Lewis 
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1992 / 2001; Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1999; for an overview cp. Van der Lippe / Van 
Dijk 2002). On the other hand, existing gender-sensitive comparisons of a larger 
number of countries have often focused on indicators from the fields of parental 
leave and childcare and on very aggregate and condensed measures of these policies 
(Gornick et al. 1996a; Stier et al. 2001; Pettit and Hook 2005 / 2009). In turn, other 
studies have equated female welfare with family welfare by using the financial 
support of families as one of their main indicators which can be misleading since the 
dependence on public benefits is certainly less emancipating than the enablement of 
employment (cp. Siaroff 1994; Gauthier 1999). 
  
If the present study is considered an attempt to close existing research gaps, one 
question appears to be the most imposing: From a feminist perspective, why should 
welfare states be measured according to the effort they direct towards the support of 
maternal employment in the first place? And does the creation of incentives for labor 
force participation not imply exactly the form of commodification which has been 
established as a condition of which (the ideal-typical and male) worker has sought to 
be relieved from by means of the welfare state (cp. Esping-Andersen 1990)? Even 
though this objection is justified, it can be argued that it is exactly this process of 
commodification which will also enable women and mothers to demand the same 
rights of decommodification that their male counterparts are already entitled to (cp. 
Orloff 1993).  
 
Furthermore, in the prevailing absence of unconditional basic income guarantees, 
being employed is still the almost only possibility of maintaining a sufficient and 
independent standard of living for many individuals. Being able to supply labor to 
the market remains the most reliable way of gaining independence from the private 
and the public sphere, i.e. from the family, from husbands as the sole breadwinners 
and from public programs like social assistance. And even despite the overall 
increases in female and maternal employment whose remaining cross-national 
variation is still worth investigating, the social sciences have detected and discussed 
other emerging social developments, such as increasing family instabilities and the 
increasing need of more than one earner to support a family, in whose light female 
and maternal employment becomes even more important for individual and family 
well-being (cp. Lesthaeghe 1995; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Bonoli 2006). Existing 
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feminist research has shown in detail that, while being employed and being 
independent from family members, spouses and social welfare programs have always 
been more or less a given for men during their working age, the ability to maintain 
autonomous households has often been a problem for women and mothers. 
Therefore, the second chapter of this dissertation will start by an appreciation of the 
state of the art of welfare state research to trace back how it moved from ignoring the 
gender dimension to the consideration of the specific relationship between women 
and the welfare state.   
 
Welfare state comparisons have been a prominent part of the social sciences since the 
1960s. In their beginnings, these comparisons mainly addressed the causes of welfare 
state development and its cross-national variation. This early welfare state research 
was mainly based on three theoretical schools which either focused on structural, 
institutional or political determinants of welfare state emergence and differences (cp. 
Wilensky and Lebaux 1965; Wilensky 1975; Gough 1979; Korpi 1983; Orloff and 
Skocpol 1984; Korpi 1985; Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Skocpol 1995).  
 
This line of research was followed by welfare state comparisons which, on the one 
hand, sought to be more systematic by classifying welfare states into different types 
and, on the other hand, sought to be more in-depth by using more than mere social 
expenditure data which had been the most profound critique of the early welfare state 
research (cp. Gilbert and Moon 1988). The majority of the welfare state typologies 
have been developed in the last decade of the 20th century (cp. Arts and Gelissen 
2002 for an overview) and even though this line moved beyond using crude social 
expenditure data to a more comprehensive evaluation of social policies and the 
specific benefit design of welfare states, it has often been criticized for ignoring the 
gender perspective.  
 
As indicated above, feminist research contributed a range of studies which illustrate 
why the inclusion of a gendered perspective on the welfare state is important and 
how the traditional theoretical framework of welfare state research can be enhanced, 
mostly by means of single country studies. Feminist welfare state research has also 
contributed comparative studies that reassessed gender-insensitive typologies and 
established gender-sensitive welfare state comparisons. However, many of these 
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studies find that even applying an enhanced gender perspective on the welfare state 
does not necessarily lead to different welfare state types and they rarely go beyond 
using (aggregated) measures for parental leave, childcare and the financial side of 
family policy. The range of gender-sensitive welfare state comparisons and 
classifications shows that research has remained inconclusive on how and why 
countries can be assumed to cluster. Findings range from welfare state typologies 
with clusters that are very comparable to traditional regimes to the reassessment of 
the position of single countries (cp. Lewis 1992; Siaroff 1994; Gornick et al. 1996a; 
Gauthier 1999; Stier et al. 2001).  
 
When tracing back the development of welfare state research, it becomes apparent 
that the mere comparison of welfare states on the country level has only been the 
initial approach that was followed by studies moving beyond the mere treatment of 
the welfare state as the dependent variable. The second part of the theoretical chapter 
will therefore turn towards research that started to be interested in how the welfare 
state affects societies and the life of individuals instead of focusing on the factors 
that influenced welfare state development in the first place. Early studies dealing 
with the effect of welfare state policy mostly focused on aggregate economic well-
being like GDP per capita, but this line of research also started to apply more 
disaggregate measurements of well-being on the household level and on the 
individual level. Absolute and relative measures of poverty as well as measures of 
subjective poverty perception have been very prominent conceptualizations of the 
effect of welfare state policy (cp. Kangas and Palme 1998; Korpi and Palme 1998). 
But even though those studies started to take the outcomes of welfare state policies 
into account instead of conceiving the welfare state itself as the core subject of 
research, they have also been criticized for one short-coming: their predominant 
focus on poverty rates and income inequality as welfare state outcomes and the 
prevailing analysis of cash income instead of benefits in kind which are considered 
being just as important as cash benefits (Townsend and Gordon 2000).  
 
Again, feminist welfare state research has contributed to a more in-depth analysis of 
the effects of welfare state policy on the specific living situation of women and 
mothers. For the most part, these studies make recourse to the indicators that have 
been used before to evaluate and compare welfare states at the country level and 
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apply these various sets of policy indicators to analyses of the actual effects of 
welfare state policies on female and maternal labor force participation and a number 
of further individual outcomes (Gornick et al. 1996b, Platenga and Hansen 1999, 
Gornick and Meyers 2003, Pettit and Hook 2005 / 2009; for an overview cp. Van der 
Lippe / Van Dijk 2002). However, as indicated before, these indicators mostly cover 
parental leave and childcare schemes or much aggregated measures of policies that 
are considered beneficial for women and their employment situation. The last part of 
the second chapter will present the theoretical foundation of the present study and, in 
this manner, show why maternal labor supply can be related to policy fields beyond 
childcare and parental leave and how the selections of meaningful policy 
determinants of maternal labor supply that have been applied in earlier studies can be 
combined and extended. Since the present assumptions are based on labor supply 
theory and since the point of departure of this approach is the individual, no analysis 
of labor supply behavior can ignore individual characteristics, such as age, education, 
family composition and especially the wage and other forms of income that are not 
derived from individual market work. The basic assumption of labor supply theory 
refers to the relationship between market income and non-market income, stating that 
individuals will not supply labor to the market when their non-market income equals 
or exceeds their market wage. In turn, factors that increase the effective market wage 
are assumed to increase the probability of labor supply while factors that decrease the 
effective market wage tend to decrease its probability (cp. Blau 2006).  
 
While these explanatory factors are surely to be found among the afore-mentioned 
individual characteristics of women and mothers, they can also be found in the 
specific configuration of welfare states. While policy instruments from the field of 
parental leave, such as entitlements, length and payments, mainly regulate the 
relationship between employer and employee in the period after childbirth and 
function as a stabilizer of labor market attachment, labor supply incentives from the 
field of childcare cover legal, monetary and infrastructural aspects which can help 
mothers to carry out uninterrupted employment. Even though school policy can be 
understood as institutionalized de facto childcare for every child, the configuration of 
certain features of school education, such as school schedules, can differ across 
countries and can be assumed to influence the possibility of reconciliation of work 
and family life for parents of school-aged children. Policy instruments from the field 
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of employment law basically capture the extent of (temporal) flexibility and 
compensation at the workplace, such as overtime payments, vacation, working time 
and protection against the discrimination of part-time employees. Policy instruments 
from the field of taxes and allowances refer more directly to the influence of the 
welfare state on the financial situation of families, such as family cash benefits and 
family tax breaks.  
 
Understandably, the collection of any such a database requires a firm and 
comprehensive presentation of the single variables. Therefore, the third chapter is 
used to present the rationales behind and the coding of every single indicator from 
the five policy fields and will give detailed information on the respective data 
sources. Furthermore, this chapter will present information on the methodology and 
on the individual data used for the second part of the analysis which cover 15 
European countries and come from the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions 2005 (EU SILC). This dataset provides individual information for 
over 40.000 mothers and makes it possible to include data on the educational 
background, the age, the marital status, the number of children, the parenting status, 
the individual market wage and the non-labor income. 
 
Just as the theoretical chapter, the analysis is divided in several parts. In a first step, 
the present study applies the indicators for welfare state incentives for maternal labor 
supply to a comparison and classification of welfare states on the country level. To 
what extent do labor supply incentives differ across countries? And to what extent 
and why do countries cluster differently from traditional welfare state types when 
these incentives take center stage? This country-level analysis begins by presenting 
descriptive information on the cross-national variation of welfare state incentives for 
maternal labor supply across 22 OECD countries which already indicates that 
conventional welfare state types are likely not to be appropriate to classify countries 
according to their level of incentives for maternal labor supply. A subsequent cluster 
analysis reveals that countries are indeed likely to be classified in a way that is 
considerably different from traditional welfare state typologies. Analyses of variance 
are used to underline the inappropriateness of traditional welfare state types and the 
better suitability of the country groups established by means of the cluster analysis 
which differ according to the level and the policy focus of welfare state incentives 
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for maternal labor supply. In this way, for instance, France is found to cluster with a 
number of Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands show a high degree of similarity 
with welfare states in Southern Europe, Germany is found to group with countries 
from the liberal welfare regime and Canada is found to cluster with a number of 
conservative welfare states. Since this mere result will, however, not reveal enough 
about its causes, the country analysis concludes by presenting a number of more in-
depth country studies which will illustrate to what extent and why some countries 
show a rather unexpected policy configuration by means of the cases of Norway, 
Canada and Germany. Those three studies suggest that for every country, the specific 
historical and political conditions appear to be particular to an extent that it can be 
seen as an argument in favor of studies using qualitative historical data and that can 
even call the meaningfulness of country groups or a new typology into question.  
 
In a second step, the analysis turns towards the question which welfare state 
incentives are positively associated with maternal employment decisions. For the 
analysis of the effects of welfare state incentives on individual maternal labor supply, 
the individual level data come into play. Under control for a number of individual 
and country level characteristics, such as the general female labor market situation 
and the prevalence of traditional attitudes towards gender roles in society, the 
association of welfare state incentives and maternal labor supply decisions is 
analyzed by means of hierarchical logistic regressions. These analyses give further 
insight on how the relationship between incentives and maternal employment 
decisions is shaped, which welfare state incentives are most associated with maternal 
labor supply and how feminist welfare state research of welfare state effects can be 
made more conclusive and comprehensive. Using the average level of welfare state 
incentives across the single indicators for each of the five policy fields reveals that 
these aggregated measures seem to be prone to hide potential effects because they 
leave the average level of welfare state incentives in the field of parental leave to be 
the only policy area showing a significant and positive association with the odds of 
maternal employment.  
 
Therefore, the subsequent analyses use the single indicators from the five policy 
fields. On the one hand, these analyses help clarify previous inconsistencies with 
regard to parental leave regulations whose effects have certainly been the most 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
8 
 
ambiguously discussed in feminist welfare state research and show that it is mostly 
the existence of paternity leave and the length of the paid leave (in months and also 
as share of the total leave) that is positively associated with maternal labor supply as 
opposed to the legal entitlement to maternity leave and the overall length (without 
considering how much is covered by a replacement rate) which show no association 
with maternal labor supply. The analyses of the effects of the single indicators also 
show that using average levels seems to have concealed the effects of a number of 
single indicators from the field of childcare and employment law. The more detailed 
analyses show a significant and positive association of the continuity of the childcare 
day, of the actual childcare coverage rates and of the public childcare expenditures as 
a share of the GDP, indicating that the infrastructural and financial aspects of this 
policy field are more important than, for instance, an existing legal entitlement to 
care. In the field of employment law, the results show that the length of the standard 
workweek, the legal number of vacation days per year and the first premium for 
working overtime hours are positively associated with maternal labor supply, 
indicating that on the one hand, the aspect of temporal flexibility and, on the other 
hand, the compensation of arising additional costs due to working overtime are 
important factors for maternal employment decisions. In turn, all indicators from the 
field of school policy and from the field of taxation and allowances do not show 
significant associations with maternal labor supply. These findings can be interpreted 
as a confirmation of the main critique of welfare state research which has been 
directed towards the use of indicators for the financial support provided by the state. 
Furthermore, these findings suggest that crucial decisions about labor supply are 
already made before children reach school age and that the positive effect of a 
comprehensive school system only sets in when mothers have already been 
employed before.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
  
In its beginnings, welfare state research was primarily interested in explaining the 
welfare state itself, in explaining its emergence and in explaining its cross-national 
variation. Since the 1980s, theories of welfare state development have been joined by 
welfare state regime theories which have sought to cluster welfare states according to 
prevailing policy combinations, underlying patterns and common driving forces of  
welfare state development. Recent trends in welfare state research, however, go 
beyond the interest in explaining how welfare states emerged, why they differ from 
each other and which countries can be grouped into so-called regimes. They bear 
witness to considerations about the actual effects of welfare state policies on societal 
and individual outcomes. Furthermore, both theories dealing with welfare state 
development and theories dealing with welfare state effects have been criticized for 
their ignorance of the gender dimension and have therefore been increasingly 
directed towards the specific relationship between women and the welfare state. 
 
Since the present study means to tie in with the state of the art, these developments 
have to be taken into account when building its theoretical framework. When dealing 
with questions of maternal labor supply, the gender perspective has to be the center 
of interest. However, it is important to trace back the evolution of welfare state 
research to understand its movement from explaining welfare state development to 
explaining the influence of welfare state policies on societal and individual outcomes 
and to understand how the present study combines these two research purposes by 
choosing the same theoretical framework both to compare welfare state incentives 
for maternal labor supply across countries and to measure the effects of these 
incentives on actual maternal labor supply.  
 
This chapter will start by tracing back the line of welfare state research that has dealt 
with the development and the cross-national variation of welfare state policy. After 
briefly introducing the main schools of research with regard to welfare state 
development (including their achievements and limitations) and some of the central 
welfare state typologies, the feminist critique of this research will be presented. On 
the one hand, this will shed light on the question why it is important to include the 
gender dimension into welfare state research and why the relationship between 
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women and the welfare state is assumed to be different from the relationship between 
men and the welfare state. On the other hand, feminist welfare state research has not 
only provided a theoretical argumentation in favor of the inclusion of a gender 
dimension, but has although reviewed existing welfare state classifications and 
thereby provided more and more evidence for the assumption that countries would 
cluster in a way that is different from traditional regime types when the gender 
dimension is taken into consideration.  
 
The development of welfare state research has not only shown that the gender 
dimension is of particular importance for the evaluation of welfare states, but also 
that it is worth investigating the effects of welfare state policy on societal and 
individual outcomes. Therefore, the second part of this chapter deals with existing 
research on welfare state effects in general and on welfare state effects on the 
specific living conditions of women in particular. In a final step, the third part of this 
chapter discusses the theoretical framework for the present study. It illustrates the 
basic assumptions of labor supply theory and its application on welfare state 
incentives for maternal labor supply, incentives which are assumed to be found in the 
policy fields of parental leave, public childcare, school policy, employment law and 
taxation and allowances. This framework will both be applied to the comparison of 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply across countries and to the analysis 
of the relationship between those incentives and maternal employment decisions.  
 
 
2.1. The Welfare State as Explanandum  
 
2.1.1. Theories of Welfare State Development 
 
Initial theories of welfare state development focused merely on the determinants of 
welfare state emergence and treated the welfare state as a dependent variable. Those 
theories of welfare state development can be classified into three schools of research 
(cp. Lessenich 2000). While the first school of research considered economic forces 
and industrialization to be the determining elements driving welfare state expansion, 
the second school of research focused on political and institutional factors like the 
development of democratic institutions. The third school of research assumed power 
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resources and the degree of working class mobilization to be the explanatory factors 
for different levels of welfare state expansion and consolidation.  
 
The Systemic / Structuralist Approach 
This first approach focuses on systemic or structuralist characteristics of states and 
their economies. It is mainly the logic of industrialism that provides the basis for this 
argument, stating that “[…] industrialization made social policy both necessary and 
possible” (Esping-Andersen 1989: 14). On the one hand, social policy became 
necessary because industrialization, modernization and all the changes that came 
along with these developments, such as the increase in social mobility, urbanization 
and more individualistic ways of life, led to the disintegration of traditional forms of 
social security provided by families, communities and religious institutions. On the 
other hand, other developments which accompanied industrialization and 
modernization, such as the constitution and expansion of bureaucratic institutions, 
made social policy possible because those institutions were able to manage collective 
goods and because they were interested in promoting their own growth. Within the 
structuralist approach, the Marxist logic of capitalism that is assumed to have led to 
an expansion of welfare state policies rather focuses on the mode of production, 
arguing that “[c]apital accumulation creates contradictions that social reform can 
alleviate” (ibid.). 
 
However, many researchers in favor of the structuralist approach argue that without a 
certain level of economic development, welfare state expansion would not have been 
possible, by this means explaining why the expansion of social policy started 
somewhat belated and not directly at the outset of industrialization. Two prominent 
representatives of this approach of welfare state research are Harold Wilensky and 
Phillips Cutright. Cutright (1965) measures welfare state policy in terms of national 
social insurance program experience and social insurance program completion, 
showing that among more than sixty nations, social security coverage is highly 
correlated with the level of economic development. Cutright considers urbanization 
and industrialization to be the main reasons for the appearance of social insurance 
programs. For him, the reason for many social insurance programs to start with 
benefits in the case of work injuries was the increasing number of work accidents 
due to the expansion of industrial activity. After the introduction of accident 
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insurances, many countries passed on to establish additional social insurance 
programs against the risks of unemployment, sickness and old age.  
 
Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965) draw an even more comprehensive picture of the 
influence of industrialization. They analyze the relationship between the 
development of the urban-industrial society, the emergence of social problems and 
the supply and organization of social welfare in the United States. Between the Civil 
War and World War I, in the early phase of industrialization, the demands and needs 
of the industry changed and dominated the country’s social and political life. A huge 
part of the population that originally lived in the rural areas of the country was 
recruited and transformed for the labor in the industrial economy and the new factory 
system made demands on the workers that they did not experience before. They were 
confronted with new work routines and they found themselves being dependent on 
employers and the labor market. Furthermore, industrialization had a major influence 
on family life. The role of women and mothers changed considerably, their labor 
market participation increased and elderly care turned out to be a challenge as well 
since traditional structures of care provided by the family began to disappear. 
Finally, industrialization influenced the degree of social stratification as well because 
the distinction between the working class and the capitalist class became more 
extensive due to the new modes of industrial production (Wilensky and Lebeaux 
1965: 50 et seqq.). According to Wilensky and Lebeaux, “[t]he social problems that 
emerged from industrialization in a capitalist setting created the demand for social 
welfare […]” (ibid: 113).  
 
In his later work, Wilensky (1975) goes beyond the case study of the United States 
and tries to explain the origins and the development of welfare state across sixty-four 
countries. Here, Wilensky assumes that there is a general agreement concerning the 
main cause of the establishment of welfare state policies – industrialization and 
economic development accompanied by a variety of political and social changes. 
However, Wilensky points out that there is more uncertainty about the role of other 
nation-specific features, namely the level of economic growth, values and beliefs and 
the political system. He finds that an increasing level of economic growth is 
positively related to a broader level of social protection (in terms of eligibility and in 
terms of covered risks) while the political system seems to be a much weaker 
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explanatory factor for the level of welfare state development (Wilensky 1975: 20 et 
seqq.). Liberal democratic and totalitarian regimes have only a small effect on the 
level of social protection while authoritarian political institutions do not affect the 
extent of welfare state policies at all. Ideology, operationalized as economic 
individualism versus economic collectivism, does not seem to have an effect on the 
level of social protection either (ibid: 27 et seqq.). The only single cause beyond the 
level of economic development that Wilensky finds to be a predictor of welfare state 
spending is the proportion of elderly people in the population (ibid: 47). With this 
work, Wilensky supports Cutright’s findings which also indicate that the level of 
economic development is one central factor influencing the level of welfare state 
development while other factors like the character of political institutions or values 
and beliefs do not seem to play an important role.  
 
The Institutionalist Approach 
The second approach towards the causes of welfare state expansion focuses on the 
exact role of institutions that had been denied by the structuralist approach. Changes 
in the political system and the introduction of democratic institutions are at the heart 
of this approach which argues that separating the economic from the political and 
social sphere will have a negative effect on the society. Social policy is seen “[…] as 
one necessary condition for the re-integration of the social economy […]” and 
democracy is seen as an institution “[…] that cannot resist majoritarian demands 
[…]” (Esping-Andersen 1989: 15).  
 
Three of the most prominent representatives of the institutionalist approach are 
Theda Skocpol, Edwin Amenta and Ann Orloff. In Skocpol’s book Protecting 
Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States 
(1995), the author tries to explain why the United States has pursued a very different 
approach to social policy than many other developed nations. She points out that 
while at the beginning of the 20th century, many countries started to implement 
regulations and benefits for male wage earners and their dependents, the United 
States started to support soldiers and mothers instead. It was only in the 1930s that 
the United States changed their social policy orientation and did no longer 
exclusively focus on those two population groups (ibid: 525 et seqq.). Skocpol 
clearly argues in favor of an institutional perspective towards welfare state 
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development. She is not convinced that social policies simply develop along with 
capitalism, urbanization and industrialization or that the welfare state simply 
responds to the demands that emerging social classes formulate. Instead, she argues 
that “[g]overnmental institutions, electoral rules, political parties, and prior public 
policies – all of these, and their transformations over time, create many of the limits 
and opportunities within which social policies are devised and changed by politically 
involved actors over the course of a nation’s history […]” (ibid: 527.) 
 
Skocpol and Amenta (1986) compare previous approaches to explain welfare state 
development, such as the logic of industrialism and the logic of capitalism, with 
studies that focus on the independent impact of states on social policy making. They 
summarize approaches which consider democratic political processes, global 
economic interrelations, geopolitical competitions and international cultural 
modeling to be important determinants of welfare state development and explain the 
main aspects of a state-centered theory of social policymaking. They assume that the 
implementation of social policies might be shaped by different organizational 
structures and capacities of states and by the effects of policies that have been 
previously implemented (ibid: 147).  This can happen by policy initiatives of civil 
bureaucrats and state authorities and also the degree of (de-)centralization is 
supposed to play an important role. Furthermore, state structures also impact the 
possible courses of action of political parties and they refer to one of the earlier 
works by Orloff and Skocpol (1984) in which those authors show “[…] how various 
sequences and forms of democratization and state bureaucratization affected both the 
capacities of civil administrations and the orientations of working-class groups and 
middle-class reformers toward social spending policies in Britain, Canada, and the 
United States from the nineteenth century through the 1930s […]” (Skocpol and 
Amenta 1986: 149). Finally, the authors argue that existing social policies might as 
well reshape politics. They refer to two path breaking studies by Esping-Andersen 
(1978 / 1985) in which he shows how crucial the policy choices made by parties in 
power are. Esping-Andersen argues that policies shape the future success of those 
parties who implemented these very policies by either undermining or consolidating 
electoral coalitions.  
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The Power Resources Approach 
The third approach within the cluster of initial theories of welfare state development 
considers class struggle to be the decisive factor influencing the degree of welfare 
state development. Compared to the first two approaches, this approach focuses 
much more on agents in general, on social classes as the main agents of change in 
particular and on the balance of class power as the determinants of distributional 
outcomes. One of the first and path breaking studies within this approach is Korpi’s 
The Democratic Class Struggle (1983). Korpi analyses welfare state development in 
18 OECD countries with a particular focus on Sweden. He critically assesses two 
earlier approaches towards welfare state expansion – the logic of industrialism (as 
exposed above) and the logic of neo-corporatism (i.e. the way of organizing, 
representing and mediating conflicting interests) – and contrasts them with the power 
resources approach. According to Korpi, “[p]ower resources are characteristics 
which provide actors – individuals or collectivities – with the ability to punish or 
reward other actors […]” (ibid: 15). These power resources differ with regard to 
many different dimensions, such as their scope and their degree of essentiality for 
people’s lives and generally, it is assumed that power resources do not need to be 
actively used to influence other actors’ behavior. In this study, Korpi defines the two 
main power resources as capital (control over the means of production) and human 
capital (labor power, occupational skills and education). The latter is considered 
being more limited than the former and it is the possibility of collective action that 
can increase the effectiveness of human capital as a power resource. The union and 
left party movement are two central specifications of the idea of collective action and 
Korpi analyses the consequences of the strengths of such movements on social 
change. He wants to find out if “[…] the presence of reformist socialist parties in the 
government can bring public policies closer to wage-earner interests […]” and he 
assumes that “[…] the smaller the disadvantage in power resources of the labor 
movement and the stronger the left party hold over the government, the more likely 
are state representatives to side with labor in tripartite bargaining […]” (ibid: 25). 
With regard to the relationship between the distribution of power resources among 
the main collective actors in society and the level of welfare in a country, Korpi finds 
that the role of political struggle, parties and voters account for the orientation 
towards a rather institutional type (i.e. strongly intervening in the societal distribution 
of wealth) or rather marginal type (i.e. covering basic needs) of social policy.  
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Korpi (1985) presents a comparable definition of the two central power resources. 
The first power resource is the capital as a resource that is usually unequally 
distributed across society and market-based. The second power resource consists of 
the political rights to vote and to organize collective actions, a resource that is 
assumed to be equally distributed in democratic societies. Korpi and other 
researchers in favor of the power resources approach argue that the political struggle 
of the working class can help develop and secure social rights and that the workers 
have the capability to limit capitalist power (cp. Esping-Andersen 1990). However, 
researchers arguing in favor of this explanation of welfare state development 
acknowledge that the welfare state is also a power resource by itself. Members of the 
working class normally have to compete, their employment situation is insecure and 
they depend on decisions beyond their control. By providing social rights, income 
security and protection against poverty, the welfare state itself creates the 
preconditions for collective solidarity within the working class.  
 
Even within this approach, the role and importance of two of the main potential 
advocates of welfare state expansion, the organized working class and left parties, 
are not always assessed in a similar way. In his work Transition from Capitalism to 
Socialism, Stephens (1979) argues that left party strength in governments and the 
extent of working-class organization both influence the extension of the state’s role 
with regard to welfare and the chances of welfare reform. Stephens assumes that both 
mass labor movements and parliamentary presentation are important and he provides 
an empirical analysis that shows high correlations between both left party 
government and welfare expenditure and left party votes and union membership. In 
turn, Ian Gough argues that it is especially “[…] the degree of class conflict and […] 
the strength and form of the working class struggle […]” that shape public policy 
(Gough 1979: 64).  
 
Achievements and Limitations of Theories of Welfare State Development 
The characteristic that all these approaches have in common is not only that they try 
to explain welfare state development, i.e. that they consider the welfare state to be 
the dependent variable, but that in the majority of the cases, they operationalize 
welfare state policy by using crude social expenditure levels. This approach has been 
widely criticized (Mitchell 1991; Korpi 1980; Shalev 1983; cp. Johnson 2003). 
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Gilbert and Moon (1988) argue that studies which use social expenditure levels to 
operationalize welfare state policy make three assumptions that do not necessarily 
hold. The first two assumptions are normative, suggesting that higher levels of social 
expenditure mean that the level of social protection in a country is higher as well and 
that taxes do only play a minor role in assessing welfare state policy. Gilbert and 
Moon argue that mere expenditure data do not take actual need into account – high 
levels of expenditure for pensions or unemployment benefits do not necessarily stand 
for extraordinary welfare state generosity, but can simply reflect high shares of 
retirees or high shares of unemployed persons. Furthermore, they state that there is a 
risk of obtaining only an incomplete picture of the welfare state, because the share of 
the GDP that is spent on social programs has to be related to the taxes a country 
collects because it is the relation between tax revenues and social spending that 
reveals a state’s real commitment to welfare. When two states spend the same share 
of their GDP on social programs, but one of the countries has considerably smaller 
tax revenues, we can assume that this country is comparably more committed to 
welfare than the country that spends the same amount, but has higher tax revenues at 
its disposal. The third assumption of social expenditure approaches to the assessment 
of welfare state policy that is criticized by Gilbert and Moon is of a rather technical 
nature. They argue that by taking only public expenditures into account, research 
ignores the fact that a share of welfare also comes from voluntary and private sources 
which supplement the overall level of social protection.  
 
Further criticism has been formulated by Therborn (1987). He argues that a major 
part of the existing welfare state research shows significant weaknesses like, for 
instance, the assumption of linear growth, the ignorance of the actual efficiency of 
the welfare state and the social democratic welfare regime as the dominant ideal 
type. Furthermore, he goes into the problem of over-quantification of the welfare 
state, referring to the sizable amount of studies that use social expenditure and 
quantitative dimensions of social protection such as the proportion of the population 
which is covered by income replacement eligibility to capture welfare state policy. 
He advises to include qualitative dimensions of welfare provision like, for instance, 
information about social services, in future welfare state research.  
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Even though the use of social expenditure data has been widely criticized, it has also 
led to the emergence of some further path breaking studies. Here, the studies of 
Castles (1982) and Hicks and Swank (1984) are worth mentioning. Castles (1982) 
presents a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of the main components of 
public welfare expenditure. He wants to find out whether patterns of public 
expenditure among capitalist democracies converged or diverged, which role party 
politics played in the process leading to potentially lesser or greater expenditure and 
if specific features of the party system mediated the possible relationship between 
politics and public welfare expenditure. He pursues a cross-national analysis over 
eighteen developed capitalist democracies and includes the period between the early 
1960s and the mid-1970s. The aspects that distinguish his study from other studies 
using welfare expenditure as a dependent variable are not only the fact that he tries to 
establish stronger reasons to make causal inferences, but also that he uses a country 
sample whose units are far more comparable than the country samples that have been 
used in previous studies. Castles argues that “[…] it is inappropriate to draw 
conclusions based on the experience of those nations that have not yet achieved even 
minimal levels of educational, health and public income maintenance provision […]” 
and that the countries included should also show some basic political similarities, 
although he acknowledges that this precondition restricts his analysis to a sample of 
less than twenty countries (Castles 1992: 35). Furthermore, Castles focuses on a 
number of diverse categories of public welfare expenditures, such as total public 
expenditure, transfers and subsidies, education expenditure, public income 
maintenance expenditure and health expenditure. This allows for a more specific 
picture of the development of public welfare expenditures than previous studies have 
provided.  
 
Hicks and Swank (1984) analyze the influence of economic growth rates, party 
composition of governments and the political influence of civil society and 
corporations on the development of welfare state spending across eighteen capitalist 
democracies between 1960 and 1971. They concentrate on the determinants of direct 
cash transfer payments and like many other studies in this line of welfare state 
research, they measure the direct cash transfer payments as a share of the gross 
domestic product. By combing two sets of factors, types of collective action (such as 
right or left party government control, union and business lobbying and working 
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class protest) and economic growth, they analyze two competing explanations for 
welfare state development. Hicks and Swank find that right party government 
participation has a negative effect on welfare state transfers while government 
control by non-rightist parties does not have a similar effect. This finding is 
interesting because they cannot confirm that social democratic or other leftist parties 
drive welfare state expansion more effectively than other non-rightist parties and 
furthermore, the middle class seems to be as important for welfare state expansion as 
the working class. Finally, economic growth seems to be a relevant determinant of 
cash transfer payments as well (ibid: 105 et seqq.).  
 
 
2.1.2. Welfare State Regimes 
 
Just as the initial theories if welfare state development, welfare state regime theory 
continued to focus on the welfare state as a dependent variable. However, this line of 
research moved beyond using crude social expenditure data to a more comprehensive 
evaluation of social policies and the specific benefit design of welfare states. We can 
observe a shift of focus “[….] away from the black box of expenditures towards the 
contents of the welfare state and the instruments and means that produce welfare 
[…]” (Johnson 2003: 9). Many welfare state typologies have been developed in the 
last decade of the 20th century (cp. Arts and Gelissen 2002 for an overview). Those 
typologies not only take expenditure data into account, but consider specific welfare 
policy features like the quality and level of benefits and services, eligibility rules, the 
differentiation between a rather universal or a rather targeted character of the entire 
welfare system and the orientation towards the achievement of full employment.  
 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) is one of the earliest 
and most prominent examples of welfare state typologies. He uses the concept of 
decommodification, i.e."[...] the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold 
a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation [...]" 
(ibid: 37), the concept of stratification, i.e. the degree to which the social relations 
und structures are reproduced by the welfare state, and the role of state and market in 
the provision of welfare (ibid.: 23) to subdivide eighteen OECD countries into 
liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes. Esping-Andersen’s 
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typology has been followed by many other attempts to classify welfare states into 
regimes. Leibfried (1992) adds a fourth category of welfare regimes to the model and 
focuses on poverty, poverty policies and social insurance. Castles and Mitchell 
(1993) use not only welfare state expenditure, but also benefit quality and the system 
of taxation to establish a fourfold welfare regime typology. Ferrera (1996) analyses 
eligibility rules, benefit schemes, welfare state financing and organization across 
seventeen European countries, and Ferrera (1998) continues in applying these 
dimensions of the welfare state to examine whether welfare reform in Europe is 
characterized by developments of divergence or convergence. Bonoli’s welfare state 
typology (1997) is certainly the one that is very close to the initial theories of welfare 
state development in terms of the operationalization of welfare state policy since he 
mainly uses social expenditure as a percentage of the GDP. However, he also 
classifies welfare states according to their orientation towards the Bismarck or the 
Beveridge model of welfare, i.e. the orientation towards social insurance based 
welfare state policies or the orientation towards universal provision (ibid: 357).  
 
Johnson (2003) considers the work of Huber and Stephens (2001) to be part of this 
line of welfare state research as well. They analyze welfare state development during 
the so-called Golden Age and welfare state crisis during the potential era of 
retrenchment since the beginning of the 1980s. Huber and Stephens combine 
different approaches of the power resources theory – the classical theory of class 
power balance which was central to the power resources approach and often 
measured by votes for left parties, left party government participation and union 
membership, theories of state structures and state-society relations and theories of 
international economic and political relations. Huber and Stephens add Christian 
democratic government participation as another factor that is supposed to matter for 
welfare state development, institutional factors like the number of veto players 
within the political system and the mobilization of women to their model. Their goal 
is to explain long-term patterns of welfare state expansion and retrenchment and they 
assume that there are four different mechanisms which link partisan government to 
welfare state changes: structural limitations (i.e. the limitation of policy options by 
national power constellations at a given point in time), ideological hegemony (i.e. 
intentions and desires created by social and political struggles), regime legacies (i.e. 
influence of the distribution of actor preferences and opportunities by the existing 
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regime) and the policy ratchet effect (i.e. the abandonment of welfare cutbacks due to 
the massive popularity of welfare programs) (ibid: 29 et seqq.). One of their main 
findings is that even though differences between welfare state regimes remain, 
partisan effects on welfare state policy decreased because all political actors were 
confronted with severe financial constraints. On the one hand, rightist parties were 
not able to implement radical cuts and on the other hand, leftist parties were not able 
to avoid at least some cuts in welfare programs (ibid: 321). Furthermore, they find 
evidence for moderate path dependency in welfare state development and for a 
distribution of preferences which is “[…] caused by historical processes of 
organization and struggle that created different power distributions […]” instead of 
by cultural traditions (ibid: 345).  
 
 
2.1.3. Feminist Critique 
 
The Ignorance of the Gender Dimension 
Studies about the causes and consequences of welfare state development and welfare 
state variation have often been criticized for their ignorance of the gender dimension 
(cp. Korpi 2000). At the early stages of this critique stand a range of studies which 
illustrate why the inclusion of a gendered perspective on the welfare state is 
important and offer an enhancement of the traditional theoretical framework, mostly 
by means of single country studies. Peattie and Rein (1983) use the example of the 
United States and the historical perspective to point out that the situation of US-
American women has undergone considerable changes. According to their study, the 
relationship between state and women has changed in two different ways. On the one 
hand, the expansion of women’s rights has prevented from keeping women outside 
the state. On the other hand, the state has entered the private sphere as well. Peattie 
and Rein consider the relationship between women and the state to be very complex. 
The state acts as provider, as regulator and also as employer. The state provides by 
setting the rules for social programs organized according to the contribution principle 
or according to the concept of collective solidarity. Due to women’s disadvantaged 
position or their non-participation in the labor market, the contribution principle 
(which is often based on employment) can pose problems for women while welfare 
based on the concept of collective solidarity is often related to stigmatization (ibid: 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
22 
 
82 et seqq.). Furthermore, the state is regulating by passing and implementing laws, 
by performing administrative tasks and by the field of jurisdiction. All three areas of 
regulation can, depending on the issue, determine the welfare of women. Finally, the 
state also acts as an employer which is, according to Peattie and Rein, strongly 
connected to the role of the state as provider and regulator. Direct public 
employment as well as indirect public employment through, for instance, publicly 
funded social services, were responsible for a considerable part of the increase in 
female labor market participation. Sapiro (1986) examines the relationship between 
women’s welfare and general welfare by means of the example of the United States 
as well and she argues that the “[a]nalysis of the theory and practice of social policy 
has rarely taken full account of the relevance of gender, and often implicitly accepts 
without examination certain paternalistic and patriarchal assumptions about the 
nature of gender that are also embedded in the policies themselves […]” and that 
“[…] there is little understanding of how social policy affects women in particular 
[…]” (ibid: 224).   
 
Shaver (1983) takes a closer look at the situation in Australia and finds that although 
many benefits are theoretically designed in a gender-neutral way (or even in a way 
that favors women, for instance in the case of the family allowance), the Australian 
system of social security and taxation supports the consolidation of women’s 
subordination. From the family wage that intervened in the domestic sphere and in 
the division of paid and unpaid work within couples to the forms of redistribution 
that characterizes Australia’s social security system today (from persons in work to 
persons without, across generations or directed at individuals who are full-time 
engaged in housework and childcare), “[w]elfare and taxation come together in a 
circuit of oppression in which the state collects revenues from its taxpayers as 
individual citizens and returns it to them as bearers of patriarchal relations […]” 
(ibid: 161). Even though policy instruments like the family wage or the joint tax 
assessment of families might have improved the financial situation of families as a 
whole, these policies often lead to very low maternal labor supply or complete 
withdrawal from the labor market which, in turn, increase the financial dependence 
from the husband.  
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Ruggie (1984) analyses the situation of women workers by means of the Swedish 
and the British welfare state regime. She argues that the dramatic increase of female 
employment has changed the character of the work force and of family life and it is 
the responsibility of the state to facilitate female employment. Ruggie considers 
labor market policies, such as training and job placement and anti-discrimination 
enforcement with regard to placement, promotion and pay, and childcare policies, 
such as facilities for preschool children, to be particularly important. Sweden and 
Great Britain show much variation in the policy responses in those fields and Ruggie 
studies three potential explanations for the existing differences: economic 
determinants and constraints, women specific factors like the prevailing conceptions 
of women’s roles and the role of the state (weak vs. strong intervention in market 
forces and attitudes towards women). Ruggie concludes that an evaluation of these 
two countries can only lead to the assessment that Britain has rather focused on very 
selective measures which support women in particular while Sweden has chosen to 
implement a universal framework that not only takes special treatment of women, but 
also broader social and economic considerations into account (ibid: 17).  
 
Piven (1985) reviews the intellectual evaluation of the relationship between women 
and the welfare state. While, for instance, socialist feminists focus on the element of 
dependence executed by the state, she finds that women activists begin to recognize 
the state as an opportunity for political influence. However, Piven comes to the 
conclusion that there is no gender-neutral dependence on the welfare state and that 
the situation is in fact different for men and for women. Women depend on the 
welfare state as employer and as provider due to the erosion of familial structures 
and due to their disadvantaged labor market position. Therefore, they have a stronger 
need to exert political power to assure the future of the welfare state (ibid: 284).  
 
The study by Hernes (1987) focuses on the Nordic welfare states and on how the 
increase in women’s political power has influenced the development of Scandinavian 
welfare policy, showing that welfare state development and variation can hardly be 
explained without having a closer look on the role of women. Hernes traces the entry 
of women into the public sphere which, after decades and centuries of exclusion 
from social and political institutions, had been more explicit in Northern Europe than 
in other European countries. Her study is an analysis of the reasons for the gradual 
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political inclusion of women and the gradual consideration of their issues with the 
political agenda, such as structural changes of the economy and the feminist 
movement in combination with the so-called state feminism or women-friendliness 
of the Scandinavian welfare states.        
 
Gordon (1988) raises a comparable critique to Piven. She states that even the most 
radical analyses of the welfare state (which consider social policies as means to 
maintain social order and to support the accumulative and exploitative economic 
system) do not consider the gender dimension of welfare state programs, even if the 
analyses deal with programs that are mainly directed at women, and the gender 
dimension of determinants of welfare expansion, such as the women’s movement. 
She argues that “[…] the nature and functions of the welfare state cannot be 
adequately explained without an analysis of the sexual division of labor, the 
gendered system of domestic labor, and the dynamics of relations between the sexes 
[...]”  (ibid: 628).  
 
The study by Hobson (1990) is in line with the research of Gordon. She argues in 
favor of the inclusion of economic dependency within families in welfare states 
comparisons because traditional comparisons of inequality between societies do not 
consider that families are not necessarily units with shared interests about the 
distribution of income among their members, but bargaining units “[…] where 
negotiations can cover a wide range of decisions involving the allocation of money, 
time and the division of market and domestic work [...]” (ibid: 237). This can lead to 
wrong conclusions about the effects of redistributive policies. If these policies are 
based on or directed at family income, they might not necessarily improve the 
situation of women in the family and society, but could even decrease the bargaining 
power of women. Hence, policies which are supposed to successfully manage the 
redistribution of resources within the society might have a detrimental effect on the 
redistribution of resources within families. Therefore, welfare state research has to 
take the direct and indirect consequences of social policies for the economic 
dependency of women within the family into account. 
 
Ann Orloff (1993) also engages in a more gender-specific view of the welfare state. 
She particularly criticizes Esping-Andersen’s regime typology (1990) and his 
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gender-neutral power resources approach. As indicated in the foregoing section, 
Esping-Andersen uses three dimensions to evaluate welfare states: stratification, 
decommodification / social citizenship rights and the role of the state and the market 
in the provision of welfare. Orloff argues that while the stratification dimension is 
able to cover gender questions, the dimension of state-market relations needs to be 
extended by the family as another sphere that contributes to welfare. Finally, Esping-
Andersen’s decommodification dimension does not consider that political rights 
might not be as available to women as they are to men and it does not take into 
account the division of paid and unpaid labor. Therefore, Orloff suggests adding two 
further dimensions: the access to paid work and women’s capacity to form and 
maintain autonomous households (ibid: 322 et seqq.). She assumes that a more 
comprehensive and gender-aware understanding of welfare states will lead to a more 
systematic assessment of the actual effects of welfare state provision.  
 
O’Connor (1993) shares the view of her colleagues that traditional welfare state 
research lacks the gender perspective and that, in turn, gender-oriented welfare state 
research has hardly ever been comparative. Furthermore, she criticizes the gender-
neutral view of the concept of citizenship which usually focuses on class or race. 
Even though this concept has often served as the basis of traditional welfare state 
research, welfare state research did not acknowledge that the relationship between 
citizenship status and citizenship rights might not be the same for both men and 
women, meaning that “[…] formal citizenship does not always imply full social 
membership […]” (ibid: 504). By means of the example of the social democratic 
welfare regime, O’Connor shows that even in countries in which class differences 
have been more dispelled than in others, gender inequalities are still pervasive and 
worth investigating.  
 
Gender-Sensitive Welfare State Comparisons 
The foregoing section has presented a range of studies which provide reasonable 
arguments in favor of a consideration of the gender dimension in welfare state 
research. This early feminist work has often been criticized for being little 
comparative and the aforementioned studies are indeed characterized by a focus on 
single countries or single welfare state types. However, the feminist critique of 
traditional welfare state research has not only been directed at bringing forward proof 
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that welfare state research is incomplete without a look at the specific situation of 
women and at building theoretical frameworks for evaluating welfare states from a 
gendered perspective, but also at the reassessment of gender-insensitive typologies 
and the establishment of gender-sensitive welfare state comparisons.  
 
One of the earliest works in this line of research is the welfare state typology by 
Siaroff (1994). In contrast to traditional welfare state typologies, his welfare state 
classification specifically focuses on the gender dimension. Siaroff includes three 
different dimensions of gender equality - the female work desirability, the welfare 
orientation towards families and the payment of family benefits, to evaluate welfare 
state policy across 22 OECD countries. The dimension of female work desirability is 
constructed by combining information on female to male wage ratios and on the ratio 
of female to male employment-population ratios and male to female unemployment 
rates. The dimension of family welfare orientation includes information on the 
comparative extent of general social expenditures, family policy spending, maternity 
benefits and public childcare support. However, Siaroff acknowledges that 
information on family welfare is not necessarily an adequate indicator for female or 
maternal welfare. Therefore, it has to be considered to whom benefits are paid 
because "[...] only where the benefits are paid to the mother can high family welfare 
be said to translate in high female welfare [...]" (ibid: 93, emphasis in original). The 
analysis leads Siaroff to a subdivision of the country sample into four different types 
of countries - protestant liberal, advanced Christian democratic, protestant social 
democratic and late female mobilization welfare states. While the protestant liberal 
countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and USA) are indeed characterized 
by rather distinct gender equality with regard to labor force participation, the 
provided family welfare is minimal. In turn, the protestant social democratic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) explicitly support female 
employment whereas in advanced Christian democratic states (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands), there are no strong incentives for 
women to participate in the labor market. In the welfare states that belong to the late 
female mobilization type (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland), women’s rights are generally low and the incentives for women to 
allocate some time to the labor market are low as well.  
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This brief summary of Siaroffs work shows that the countries mainly seem to cluster 
along traditional welfare state regime lines, even though he applies a gender-
sensitive concept of the welfare state. However, subsequent research raises 
reasonable doubts that the traditional welfare state regimes can be maintained when 
the welfare state is evaluated from a gender perspective. Even before the publication 
of Siaroffs new typology, Lewis (1992) had formulated one of the most fundamental 
criticisms of previous welfare state research and argues for the indispensable 
consideration of the private or domestic sphere and the share of unpaid work that is 
done in this sphere. She asserts that recent welfare state studies analyze the 
relationship between state and economy or between work and welfare. However, 
those studies focus on paid work and thereby miss "[…] the problem of valuing the 
unpaid work that is done primarily by women in providing welfare, mainly within 
the family, and in securing those providers’ social entitlements […]" (ibid: 160). 
Hence, the worker that Esping-Andersen (1990) and others have in mind is male and 
his ability to mobilize for his rights does not only depend on decommodification 
provided by the welfare state, but also on the unpaid female household labor. She 
comes to the conclusion that from a gendered perspective on welfare states, countries 
have to be distinguished according to the strength of the male breadwinner model 
within the country in which married women are excluded from the labor market, 
"[…] subordinated to their husbands for the purposes of social security entitlements 
and tax, and expected to undertake the work of caring (for children and other 
dependents) at home without public support […]"(ibid: 162). In her reassessment of 
traditional typologies, Lewis evaluates Great Britain and Ireland as countries that are 
characterized by a strong male breadwinner model. In turn, she considers France as a 
case of a modified male breadwinner country that provides some support for working 
mothers while Sweden is the ideal-typical case of support for dual-earner 
households. In further analyses, Ostner and Lewis examine the case of Germany 
which they also assign a strong male breadwinner orientation (Ostner and Lewis 
1995).    
 
The study by Gornick, Meyers and Ross also investigates if there is evidence for 
country clusters that are somewhat different from the three traditional welfare state 
regimes defined by Esping-Andersen (1990). They illustrate which family policies 
are considered to facilitate maternal employment and develop a cross-national 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
28 
 
measurement of those policies. According to the assumption that "[...] the presence 
of children in the home will have an impact on a woman’s decision to work for pay 
and on her hours worked [...]", the authors decide to include eighteen indicators 
covering policy features from the fields of childcare, parental leave and public school 
schedules into their analysis (Gornick et al. 1996a: 3 et seqq., emphasis in original). 
The authors construct two indices from those indicators, one for policies that support 
the employment of mothers with children below school age and one for policies that 
support the employment of mothers with school-aged children. The index 
construction and analysis leads the authors to determine several clusters of countries, 
depending on which index is applied. The country clusters for the public support for 
mothers with children below the age of six are relatively consistent with the country 
clusters that result when this index is fragmented into two separate indices -  one 
index that measures public support for mothers of infants and another index that 
measures public support for mothers of preschoolers (ibid.: 20 et seqq.). 
Nevertheless, they observe some "[...] subtle differences in national policy emphases 
[...]" and a number of particular changes in national performances. They find Canada 
to be more supportive for female employment than other liberal welfare states and 
while Norway is situated in the medium country cluster of public support of infants’ 
mothers, it is situated in the lowest cluster of public support for mothers of 
preschoolers, thus providing less support than other social-democratic countries. In 
turn, Italy performs better than other traditional conservative welfare states when it 
comes to policies that support preschoolers’ mothers (ibid.: 21 et seqq.). The third 
index measuring public support for mothers with school-aged children only contains 
six countries and surprisingly shows a relatively high performance of the United 
States and the United Kingdom, two countries that were situated in the lower clusters 
on the other indices (ibid.: 22). These results lead the authors to conclude that the 
observed country clusters only partly correspond to the welfare state typology 
developed by Esping-Andersen. 
 
Gornick et al.’s (1996a) categorization of countries according to the level of their 
employment-supportive policies by has been picked up by Stier et al. (2001) who 
analyze the relationship between welfare regimes, family supporting policies and 
female employment along the life-course, especially with regard to changes in 
relation to the presence of children (such as complete exit from the labor market after 
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childbirth, part-time employment or a more or less direct return into full 
employment). Stier et al. argue that policies aimed at supporting mothers’ 
employment are positively associated with their labor market attachment und with 
their possibility to pursue continuous full-time employment. They find that within all 
welfare regimes, employment continuity is highest among countries that provide the 
most support for working mothers, i.e. among countries from both the social-
democratic (Sweden) and the conservative regime (Italy). However, in countries in 
which policies aimed at supporting mothers’ employment are less developed, 
employment interruptions are more prevalent and so are reduced earnings in the long 
run which result from part-time and discontinuous employment. Just as the countries 
with the highest support for working mothers belong to both the social-democratic 
and the conservative regime, countries with less support for working mothers also 
belong to the social-democratic (Norway) and the conservative welfare regime 
(Germany). According to Stier et al., the only group of countries which corresponds 
to traditional regime typologies is the one of the liberal welfare states which provides 
the least support of maternal employment. This finding is, however, not consistent 
with the findings of Siaroff and of Gornick et al. which attributed a comparably high 
performance with regard to employment support to the liberal welfare states. 
 
Gauthier (1999) analyses trends in family cash benefits (allowances and tax reliefs), 
maternity and parental leave and provision of and subsidies for public childcare in 
Western and Eastern European countries after World War II. Her main interest is the 
development of state support for families over time and she finds that family policy 
has been characterized by trends which are different from other social policies. On 
the one hand, family cash benefits have not grown as fast as other social 
expenditures. On the other hand, they have also been characterized by fewer 
cutbacks than other welfare state benefits. The duration of maternity leave and the 
wage replacement rate are characterized by overall growth. This indicator for family 
policy is especially significant because the labor market participation of women 
increased dramatically over the last decades which, in turn, made a larger number of 
women eligible for this benefit. Concerning the public support of childcare, Gauthier 
finds the most extensive cross-national differences. While the Nordic and Eastern 
European countries have always been characterized by a gradual expansion of these 
services, other Western European countries have been much more reluctant, with the 
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exception of France, Belgium and Italy. With regard to cross-national variation in 
state support of families, she points out that the average European trends hide major 
differences between countries and, more importantly, that "[...] no clear clusters of 
countries emerge from the analysis [...]", implying that conventional welfare state 
and family policy typologies need to be reassessed.  (ibid: 960).  
 
A study by O’Connor et al. (1999) focuses on the United States, Australia, Canada 
and Great Britain. They show that although these countries are usually characterized 
as liberal welfare states with a strong primacy of the market and the family over 
public intervention, significant differences can be observed when questions of gender 
equality take center stage. Their comparison of labor market and social policies, 
body and reproductive rights and women’s movements shows that for these 
countries, "[...] dimensions of variability based on gender relations do not correlate 
neatly with class-related dimensions [...]" (ibid: 26). Despite considerable 
similarities, the four countries show noteworthy differences with regard to childcare 
responsibilities and parental leave arrangements, public strategies against labor 
market inequalities and the degree of gender differentiation in income maintenance 
provision.     
 
The review of these gender-sensitive welfare state comparisons and classifications 
shows that research has remained inconclusive on how and why countries can be 
assumed to cluster. Findings range from welfare state typologies with clusters that 
are very comparable to traditional regimes to the reassessment of the position of 
countries to each other. Before turning to the conceptualization of welfare state 
incentives for maternal labor supply that is used for the present study, the second line 
of welfare state research which focuses on the effects of welfare state policy rather 
than on explaining welfare state variation will be reviewed.  
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2.2. The Welfare State as Explanans 
 
More recent welfare state research has moved beyond the mere treatment of the 
welfare state as a dependent variable. Researchers started to be interested in how the 
welfare state affects societies and the life of individuals instead of focusing on the 
factors that influenced welfare state development in the first place. A “[…] shift 
towards the results which the different regimes have produced in terms of poverty 
rates, social rights and income equality […]” can be observed, both within general 
welfare state research and in works that deal with the specific effect of welfare state 
policies on the living conditions of women (Johnson 2003: 10).  
 
 
2.2.1. Welfare State Effects   
 
Early studies dealing with the effect of welfare state policy mostly focused on 
aggregate economic well-being like GDP per capita, but this line of research also 
started to apply more disaggregate measurements of well-being on the household 
level and on the individual level. Absolute and relative measures of poverty as well 
as measures of subjective poverty perception have been very prominent 
conceptualizations of the effect of welfare state policy. Furthermore, studies also 
started to concentrate on more specific social indicators, such as human capital, life 
quality, level of living and social exclusion (ibid:27). But even though those studies 
started to take the outcomes of welfare state policies into account instead of 
conceiving the welfare state itself as the core of the idea of social policy, they have 
also been criticized for one short-coming: their predominant focus on poverty rates 
and income inequality as welfare state outcomes and the prevailing analysis of cash 
income instead of benefits in kind which are considered being just as important as 
cash benefits (Townsend and Gordon 2000).  
 
An example of a study that also takes the effects of the welfare state into account has 
been published by Korpi and Palme (1998). It is evident that this study might remind 
of the large amount of welfare state typologies. However, Korpi and Palme do not 
only take welfare state policies into account to classify welfare states. On the one 
hand, they examine the factors which potentially influence institutional welfare state 
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configurations, such as bases of entitlement, benefit schemes and organizational 
aspects of social insurance programs (here: old age pensions and sickness cash 
benefits) across eighteen OECD countries. On the other hand, they are also interested 
in the effect of those institutional aspects on interests, preferences and identities. 
Korpi and Palme argue that, by influencing the role of conflicts among interest 
groups and the formation of coalitions, institutions affect the degree of inequality and 
poverty in societies. Like many of their colleagues dealing with the welfare state 
regime approach, they conclude their analysis with a welfare state typology that 
distinguishes five different types of welfare regimes: the targeted, the voluntary state 
subsidized, the corporatist, the basic security and the encompassing model. However, 
they do not only evaluate and classify welfare states according to their social policies 
and institutional settings, but also find what they call the paradox of redistribution: 
“[…] The more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are 
with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce 
poverty and inequality. […]” (ibid: 681 et seqq.). From this finding, Korpi and Palme 
conclude that welfare state regimes can not only have unintended, but even perverted 
effects.  
 
Kangas and Palme (1998) state that poverty has preoccupied welfare state 
researchers since Rowntree’s study on the link between poverty, age and family 
formation over the life-cycle (Rowntree 1922). Although many modern welfare 
states have developed since the beginning of the 20th century, there is still 
considerable cross-national variation of social policies and Kangas and Palme intend 
to analyze whether the institutional variation might be the cause for variation in 
poverty rates across countries and time. They find that compared to the time of 
Rowntree’s study, improved social policies have certainly supported the decrease of 
poverty rates across nations and life cycle stages. However, they attribute the 
remaining differences in poverty rates to the cross-national policy variation in 
general and in specific policy fields in particular, such as pension policy and 
childcare (Kangas and Palme 1998: 16 et seqq.). The studies by Palme, Kangas and 
Korpi respectively are adequate examples of how welfare state research started to 
focus not only on conceptualization of the welfare state, but also on measuring the 
actual effects of different levels of welfare state policy. The following section shows 
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how the gender dimension and questions of female and maternal employment have 
been incorporated in the measurement of the welfare state and its effect.  
 
 
2.2.2. Welfare State Effects on the Living Conditions of Women 
 
Just as the gender-neutral lines of welfare state research, studies which take the 
gender dimension into account underwent a shift towards the consideration of not 
only the evaluation and comparison of welfare state policies, but also of welfare state 
effects, especially when it comes to female labor market participation. The afore-
mentioned study by Gornick et al. (1996a) not only compares welfare states with 
regard to their support of female employment, but also provides the basis for further 
studies by these authors. Gornick and her colleagues use the policy indices developed 
in their earlier work for the subsequent analysis of the relationship between those 
policies and actual maternal employment rates (Gornick et al. 1996b) and in a 
somewhat expanded analysis of several different policy indices and outcomes like 
child mortality, the prevalence of television watching among children and family 
poverty rates (Gornick / Meyers 2003: 236 et seqq.).  
 
Comparable analyses are carried out by Plantenga and Hansen (1999) who evaluate 
the welfare state performance of 15 EU member states in terms of female 
employment and gender equality (leading to four different country clusters with low, 
medium, medium/high and high performance). Since the implementation of equal 
opportunities for men and women is one central nominal goal of the European 
Union, they consider it to be important to effectively monitor national policy 
measures, to find valuable benchmarks for an assessment of national performances 
and to compare what they assume to be central determinants of variation in equal 
opportunity performance. They present a set of possible determinants that includes 
factors like economic growth and employment rates and attitudes towards female 
labor market participation, but also indicators from the fields of fiscal, working time, 
childcare and leave policy. They conclude that policies can affect equal opportunities 
in an either implicit or explicit way and that it is especially care policies that would 
help close gender gaps. Without childcare policies, it seems highly likely that “[…] 
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the unequal division of unpaid work will [continue to] translate into an unequal 
position of women on the labor market […]” (ibid: 378).  
 
Pettit and Hook (2005) analyze the influence of economic, demographic and 
institutional characteristics on female employment across nineteen countries. They 
argue that by all means, variation in social and family policy institutions can account 
for remaining variation in female labor force attachment and that female labor force 
attachment should be higher when welfare states provide support for working women 
and working mothers. They intend to improve existing research by examining the 
effect of institutional and demographic characteristics and by using specific policy 
conditions instead of general policy indices because those combined indices make it 
difficult to disentangle for whom and how certain policy conditions matter. 
Specifically, they want to find out if demographic and economic reasons for 
women’s employment differ with the national institutional context and if particular 
subgroups of women are affected by welfare state arrangements in different ways. 
Their independent variables are service sector growth and overall unemployment 
rates as economic determinants and length of maternity and parental leave and public 
childcare provision as policy determinants and they find that specific policy 
configurations do actually influence employment patterns of different groups of 
women. They generally confirm that female employment must be considered in 
relation to the high variation in institutional conditions and that, although evidence is 
limited for the length of maternity leave, parental leave has a positive effect on 
maternal employment as long as the length of the parental leave is taken into 
account. They find that parental leave seems to keep “[…] women with young 
children attached to the paid labor force, but [that] extended leave provisions are 
negatively associated with the effects of having young children on the probability of 
employment […]” (ibid: 796). Furthermore, publicly funded childcare fosters the 
employment of women. Public childcare provision is positively related to the effects 
of having young children and of being married on women’s employment. Pettit and 
Hook assume childcare for younger children to enable women to maintain 
attachment to the labor market which has, in turn, implications for their later labor 
market experience. 
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Pettit and Hook (2009) go into further detail with regard to female employment and 
gender equality in the labor market. They analyze gender inequality in the labor 
market across 21 OECD countries and they argue that the degree of this gender 
inequality depends on the way the inequality is measured. Even though the share of 
female labor market participation might be an appropriate single indicator, they 
include further information on working hours, occupational segregation and wage 
structure. They examine the relationship between those labor market outcomes on the 
aggregate level and specific policies and employment conditions, such as the length 
of parental leave, public childcare, the degree of unionization and the share of the 
part-time workforce and they assume that those national policies and conditions 
generate and reinforce gender inequalities in the workplace by relieving or 
concentrating the demands of unpaid work and care within households and, 
therefore, usually in the female sphere of responsibility (ibid: 19). Pettit and Hook 
conclude that gender inequality cannot only be measured by labor market inclusion, 
but by the specific conditions according to which women are included. Their very 
recent publication points to a very important development within research on female 
and maternal labor supply: the consideration of different types of inclusion and 
exclusion. However, all the studies presented in this subsection provide useful 
starting points for the development of a valid selection of political determinants of 
maternal labor supply and an appropriate basis for the conceptualization of welfare 
state incentives for maternal labor supply for the present study. 
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2.3. Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
2.3.1. Labor Supply Theory 
 
Generally, labor supply theory focuses on the individual as object of study. 
Individuals try to maximize their utility and this utility is derived from the 
consumption of commodities produced by a combination of time and market goods 
(whose purchase requires a certain amount of monetary income on hand). According 
to Blau et al. (2006), individuals have to decide how much time they want to allocate 
to market and non-market activities in order to maximize utility. Individuals are 
subject to a budget constraint that indicates the combinations of market goods and 
non-market time the individuals can choose from, given a certain amount of non-
labor income (the part of the income that is on hand without allocating any time to 
the labor market, such as the income of a spouse or interest) and labor market 
earnings (a given wage rate). Furthermore, individuals have indifference curves 
indicating the combinations of market goods and non-market time which provide 
them with the same amount of satisfaction. This is reasonable to assume because 
commodities differ according to their time and goods intensity in consumption and 
production. In this way, individuals who decide to decrease their non-market time 
will most likely opt for less time-intensive commodities in consumption and 
production, but choose goods-intensive ones instead and will still be able to reach the 
same amount of satisfaction. In turn, individual who decide to increase the time not 
spent in the labor market will most likely opt for more time-intensive and less goods-
intensive commodities in consumption and production and will also be able to reach 
the same amount of satisfaction. Figure 2.1. showing the budget constraint and the 
indifference curves illustrates the underlying principle in simplified terms. Segment 
AB in the budget constraint graph represents the non-labor income at zero hours of 
market work. On the horizontal axis, daily hours of market work are measured from 
the right to the left and daily hours of non-market time are measured from the left to 
the right (assuming that eight hours per day are spent on recovery). Each additional 
hour that is supplied to market work implies a waiver of an hour of non-market time, 
but, simultaneously, an increase in the total income available. 
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Figure 2.1. Budget Constraint and Indifference Curves 
 
Source: Blau et al. (2006: 97 et seqq.) 
 
 
A closer look on curve U2 on the indifference curves graph reveals all combinations 
of the ratio of market time and non-market time (point A, B and C) that lead to the 
same amount of utility. However, there might be combinations on other indifference 
curves that are less preferable (point E on curve U1) or more preferable (point D on 
curve U3) than the combinations on curve U2. 
 
Applying labor supply theory to questions of maternal employment means that this 
theoretical approach needs to combine labor supply assumptions about individual 
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behavior with assumptions about families as economic unit1. Starting with the path 
breaking works of Mincer (1962) and Becker (1965), labor supply theory began to 
acknowledge that labor supply decisions are not only made by individuals, but also 
in the context of families and that the decision on time allocation between the adult 
members of a household influences the maximization of utility or satisfaction of the 
whole family (cp. Blau et al. 2006; Bryant and Zick 2006). These adult members are 
assumed to be able to choose forms of specialization and exchange to maximize this 
utility. This means that one individual is likely to specialize in non-market work and 
the other individual is likely to specialize in market work if “[…] the ratio of the 
value of time spent at home to the value of time spent in the market is higher for one 
individual than for the other […]” (Blau et al. 2006: 38). It can nevertheless be the 
case that, “[…] as long as an extra hour of market work by both partners creates the 
ability to buy more goods and services than are required to compensate for their lost 
hour of household time […]” (Ehrenberg and Smith 2009: 217), both partners will 
opt for allocating some time to paid work to enhance their resources. But since the 
traditional understanding of gender roles and remaining gender differences in 
earnings still play a role in today’s societies, this possibility of specialization and 
exchange has to be considered when it comes to the influence of specific policy 
instruments on maternal labor supply and will therefore be explained in further detail 
with regard to the respective policies. Furthermore, it has to be taken into account 
that although the specialization within one field of production and the subsequent 
exchange of goods can seem useful for the maximization of utility in the short-run, 
this choice can have negative consequences and disadvantages in the long-run. A 
complete specialization on non-market work always implies that an individual 
foregoes labor market experience and continuous labor market attachment which can 
have negative effects on future earnings.  
 
The basic theoretical assumptions show that the labor supply decision affects the 
maximization of utility. The value of non-market time, also referred to as the 
reservation wage, as the non-labor income or as the slope of the indifference curve at 
zero hours of market work (WR), is compared to the value of the time in the market 
                                                 
1
 In the context of labor supply decisions within the household, research still focuses on heterosexual 
married couples. However, cohabiting heterosexual couples and cohabiting or married homosexual 
couples start to be taken into account as well in labor supply research (cp. Blau et al. 2006: 36).  
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that is given by their wage rate (W). When the market wage is larger than the 
reservation wage, the individual will supply labor to the market. In turn, when the 
reservation wage equals or is larger than the market wage, the individual will not 
supply labor to the market (cp. Blau et al. 2006; Franz 2006). 
 
 
    
  
 
 
Generally, factors that increase the market wage are assumed to increase the 
probability of labor supply, so that labor force participation is positively related to 
the market wage. In turn, factors that increase the reservation wage tend to decrease 
the probability of labor supply, so that labor force participation is negatively related 
to the reservation wage (Blau et al. 2006: 104). The following two subsections 
present a selection of individual and policy factors that can be assumed to influence 
market and reservation wage and therefore maternal labor supply. 
 
 
2.3.2. Individual Determinants of Maternal Labor Supply 
 
It can be derived from the afore-mentioned theoretical assumptions that the 
individual wage plays an important role for the labor supply decision. However, in 
labor supply theory, other micro-level factors influencing the individual labor market 
participation decision have been widely discussed as well. Besides the individual 
wage which is supposed to be positively associated with a person’s labor supply, the 
total disposable household income or, more specifically, the income of the potential 
partner, has to be taken into account as well. The income of the partner and other 
fractions of the household income are part of the so-called non-labor income of a 
person and labor supply theory assumes that there can be a trade-off between non-
labor income and income from employment. The one partner’s income from 
employment can decrease when the other partner decides to supply labor to the 
market as well. If both partners decide to allocate some time to the labor market, 
there is a possibility that they each supply less labor to the market than they would, 
W > WR  Labor supply 
WR ≥ W  No labor supply 
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individually, if the respective other partner would decide to specialize in non-market 
work. Therefore, it can be assumed that with increasing non-labor income, the trade-
off between supplying labor to the market and not supplying labor to the market 
increases as well and the employment probability decreases.  
 
The educational background of a person is often assumed to be a central determinant 
of a person’s market wage and therefore of a person’s labor supply (Mincer 1985). It 
is assumed that the decision to allocate some time to market work requires initial 
investment on the part of the person who wants to supply labor because the 
knowledge and skills acquired by this person “[…] generate a certain stock of 
productive capital […]” (Ehrenberg / Smith 2009: 279). In turn, these abilities 
determine the earnings of a person. If the average earnings would not rise with the 
level of education, investments in education would not be worthwhile and in terms of 
utility maximization, the incentive for these investments would vanish (ibid.: 293).  
 
Furthermore and especially in the case of mothers, we can expect certain additional 
individual factors to influence the labor market participation decision. With an 
increasing number of children in the household, the potential costs of childcare 
purchased outside the home rise. These rising costs can be understood as an effective 
decrease of or tax on the market wage and do therefore influence the labor supply 
decision. The same logic can be applied to the age of the children within the 
household. The younger the children, the higher is the probability that childcare has 
to be purchased because regular school schedules are not yet applicable which in turn 
may be understood as an effective market wage decrease.  
 
Additionally, the marital status of mother can influence the labor market 
participation decision as well. Here, the theoretical assumptions on household 
production and families as economic unit have to be taken into account. As indicated 
above, labor supply theory supposes that partners often decide to specialize in either 
market or domestic work and that they base their decision on their relative 
productivity at home and in the labor market. It is not impossible that both partners 
allocate some time to the labor market because goods produced at home can also be 
purchased (like food, cleaning or childcare etc.) and because it has been observed 
that a longer period with greater hours of household work seems to have long-term 
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consequences for future earnings (Ehrenberg / Smith 2009: 217). Nevertheless, lower 
wage rates for women and assumptions on socialization may increase the probability 
that the wife allocates more time to household work because she is considered being 
more productive in that field and the family forgoes less market goods than if the 
husband opts for household work (ibid.). In the case of separated, divorced, widowed 
or never married mothers (assuming that they take care of their family only by 
themselves), the individual model of labor supply can be applied, i.e. in this case, the 
considerations between two adult household members about a form of specialization 
and exchange do not necessarily have to be taken into account. It can be assumed 
nevertheless that the need for household time for mothers is higher than for women 
without children and that unmarried mothers have to allocate more time to household 
and childrearing tasks than childless women. But since they are in charge of both 
taking care of children and household and of earning money to purchase necessary 
goods and services, they are less likely to specialize in either market or non-market 
work and therefore supply more labor than married mothers.  
 
 
2.3.3. Welfare State Determinants of Maternal Labor Supply 
 
As indicated above, previous research suggests that not only individual 
characteristics, but also welfare state policies can influence the maternal decision on 
labor supply. In terms of labor supply theory, the focus has to be on policies that 
change the relationship of market wage and reservation wage, i.e. that increase or 
decrease them. Policies that increase the market wage and decrease the reservation 
wage respectively are expected to increase the maternal employment probability 
while policies that decrease the market wage and increase the reservation wage 
respectively are expected to effect the opposite. The following paragraphs will 
present a specific labor supply application for a number of policy fields: parental 
leave, public support and provision of childcare, school policy, employment law and 
family related benefits and taxation.  
 
Parental Leave 
The long-term effect of parental leave on female employment is often inconsistently 
discussed in the literature because particularly the provision of long leave periods 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
42 
 
can decrease women’s labor market attachment and downgrade their career options 
(Gornick et al. 1996a: 5; Pettit and Hook 2005; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). 
Nevertheless, the provision of a relatively short, but well compensated maternity 
leave is generally considered having a positive effect on female employment and 
ensuring a fast return to paid work (cp. Meyers et al. 1999: 121 et seqq.). As 
Trzcinski (1991) points out, there is not only a psychological, but also an economic 
need for parental and especially maternal leave. The right to parental leave facilitates 
a temporary withdrawal from the labor market without losing the attachment to the 
current job and the expected wage increase related to job tenure (Trzcinski 1991: 
210). It “[…] provides protection against unemployment when the caregiver is ready 
to return to work […]” and it can break down the “[…] structural barrier to women’s 
entry into the higher-paid male-dominated occupations […]” (ibid.). In the words of 
labor supply theory, a relatively short and well compensated parental leave with 
legislated job guarantee avoids a decrease of the value of market time due to the 
interruption of employment, even though the possibility of parental leave implies an 
actual employment discontinuity. 
  
Public provision and support of childcare 
The costs of childcare can be seen as a tax on the market income of a working 
mother. A decrease in childcare costs in terms of a public provision of affordable 
childcare and / or in terms of financial reliefs for childcare costs is seen as an 
equivalent to an effective increase in the wage rate and would therefore lead to an 
increase in female labor supply (Blau et al. 2006: 116 et seqq.). Furthermore, a 
decrease in childcare costs is also expected to affect maternal employment in the 
long run because fewer and shorter employment interruptions lead to “longer and 
more continuous labor market experience”, can have a “[…] favorable effect on 
types of jobs and earnings” and can “reinforce the tendency to spend more time on 
the labor market […]” (ibid.). The effect of public support and provision of childcare 
on maternal labor supply has been tested empirically and those empirical studies 
seem to confirm the theoretical assumptions (cp. Michalopoulos et al. 1991; 
Connelly 1992). In summary, the public provision and support of childcare is 
considered an incentive for maternal employment. Public childcare is considered 
“[…] an essential form of support for parents if they want to combine earning and 
caring [and] the availability and cost of child care are powerful predictors of 
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women’s labor market attachments […]” (Gornick and Meyers 2003: 185). Previous 
research suggests that “[…] care responsibilities constitute a major obstacle to (full) 
employment […]” (Plantenga / Hansen 1999: 370) and “[…] that having more 
attractive childcare options increases maternal employment […]” (Gornick et al. 
1996a: 5). 
 
School policy  
According to Gornick et al., “[…] public schools provide de facto childcare for 
mothers of school-aged children […]” (Gornick et al. 1996a: 6; emphasis in 
original). Therefore, the effect of encompassing public school schedules on maternal 
employment is comparable to the public provision and support of childcare for 
children below school age. When women mainly rely on school schedules for 
childcare (in terms of length of school days, school years and the continuity of school 
days, i.e. the surveillance of children at school during lunch time), it is reasonable to 
assume that public school policy influences the probability of maternal employment 
(ibid.). It can be assumed that longer and continuous school days and longer school 
years increase the value of market time and the probability that mothers decide to 
participate in the labor market. Public school schedules that correspond to usual 
employment schedules reduce the need for additional care and this, in turn, increases 
the actual market wage. The starting age of compulsory schooling can also play an 
important role. When school schedules facilitate employment by corresponding to 
usual employment schedules, it can have a positive effect on maternal employment 
when compulsory schooling starts as early as possible. However, when the opposite 
is the case, it can also be argued that the reconciliation of work and family life can 
even become more difficult when children reach school age (ibid.). Hence, an early 
school starting age will only have a positive effect on maternal employment when 
school schedules comprise as many hours per day and as many weeks per year as 
possible and when schools offer a continuous school day without breaks during lunch 
hour. If public school schedules are considered as free de facto childcare, mothers 
can allocate a part of their available time to the labor market without risking an 
effective real wage decrease due to emerging childcare costs. 
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Employment Law 
Working time policy involves different aspects such as standard weekly working 
hours, part-time regulations, non-standard hour work practices and vacation rights. 
The reason for including working time regulations in the evaluation of welfare states’ 
incentives for maternal labor supply lies in the consideration that parents should 
“[…] have the option to reduce their hours of paid work before their children reach 
school age and possibly throughout their children’s lives without risking great 
sacrifices in earnings, benefits and career opportunities […] (Gornick and Meyers 
2003: 147). A standard workweek between 35 and 39 hours (short full-time) can help 
mothers to make choices about allocating time between work and family 
responsibilities while standard workweeks of at least 40 or even more hours can 
inhibit such choices. However, if it is not possible for mothers to take up full-time 
employment, available and high-quality part-time work should ensure that job 
changes are not necessary. It is also important that part-time employees are not 
discriminated in terms of pay or social security benefits. The term of available and 
high-quality part-time employment is rather broad. A closer look at the ILO Part-
Time Work Convention reveals that possible discriminations of part-time employees 
can refer to wage, social security and maternity protection, termination of 
employment, paid leave, vacation and sick leave. Furthermore, the convention points 
out that countries should facilitate the access to part-time employment and the 
voluntary transfer from full-time to part-time employment (and vice versa) and that 
the threshold for exclusion from social security or other benefits schemes due to 
insufficient earnings should be as low as possible (ILO 1994). Gornick and Meyers 
take up those elements and argue that governments can support parents’ choice to 
work part-time by ensuring that they do not have to change jobs and that part-time 
workers are not treated less favorably than comparable full-time workers in terms of 
pay, social security, occupational benefits and training, promotion opportunities and 
collective bargaining (Gornick / Meyers 2003: 163 et seqq.).  Favorable conditions 
for non-standard hour work, such as the compensation for overtime hours, as well as 
legally warranted minimum vacation and holiday rights are also considered to 
support mothers’ reconciliation of work and family life (Gornick / Meyers 2003: 155 
et seqq.). When working time regulations facilitate the reconciliation of paid work 
and care responsibilities by providing for relatively flexible labor market 
participation, they can be expected to increase maternal labor supply. In turn, when 
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labor market participation requires immense costs because employment schedules do 
not at all correspond to childcare or public school schedules, maternal employment 
probability is expected to decrease. 
 
Family-related benefits and taxation 
Since it is assumed that the public provision and support of childcare increases the 
probability of maternal employment because it enhances the value of market time 
and decreases the value of non-market time, it can also be assumed that children’s 
allowances increase the value of non-market time or, more precisely, the amount of 
non-labor income that refers to the money an individual has at his or her disposal 
without devoting time to market activities. Children’s allowances are assumed to 
effectively increase a mother’s reservation wage, the value that "[…] an individual 
places on his or her time at home […]" (Blau et al. 2006: 104). A general rule of 
labor supply theory assumes that individuals choose to participate in the labor market 
when the market wage is higher than the reservation wage. By contrast, individuals 
choose not to participate when the market wage is lower than the reservation wage.  
 
Although it is reasonable to assume that high children’s allowances positively affect 
the economic situation of families and alleviate the risk of child poverty, it is only 
the possible effect of these cash benefits on female labor supply that is taken into 
account for the present purpose. However, in the case of children’s allowances, the 
receipt of these benefits does usually not depend on the maternal labor market status. 
The effect of certain child-rearing benefits or similar offers can, however, be 
assumed to be even more detrimental to maternal employment because they 
encourage mothers not to participate in the labor market, but provide them with a 
certain amount of money from the welfare state for taking care of their children at 
home. Here, the tradeoff between participating and not participating in the labor 
market is different because the decision to participate in the labor market actually 
implies a (partial) renouncement of the benefits. If the reservation wage (including 
child-rearing benefits) is higher than the market wage, the probability of a mother 
deciding to participate in the labor market can be assumed to decrease. 
 
When it is rather the couple or the family that is subject to taxation instead of the 
individual, "[…] married women, often regarded as secondary earners within the 
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family, face relatively high tax rates […]" on their labor market earnings (Blau et al. 
2006: 116). Labor supply theory assumes that certain modes of taxation, such as the 
so-called joint tax assessment of married couples, have a negative effect on maternal 
labor supply, at least when we assume that wives generally earn less than their 
husbands. Joint tax assessment implies that the incomes of spouses are summed up 
and distributed equally among them and that the respective tax rate is then applied to 
both spouses. It is evident that couples cannot expect an extensive tax advantage 
when both partners earn similar incomes. Therefore, joint tax assessment is 
considered being especially beneficial when partners earn very unequal incomes or 
when there is even only one breadwinner in the family. Taking into account that it is 
often the husband who earns the higher income, joint tax assessment can lead 
couples to make the decision that the labor supply of the wife should be relatively 
low because this is more beneficial for the family as a whole. This mechanism 
reflects the above-mentioned assumptions about specialization and exchange because 
in the case of joint tax assessment, the wife would give up some of her non-market 
time to join the labor force without a significant effect on utility maximization. In 
turn, the loss of non-market time might even decrease the satisfaction of the family. 
Despite the possible advantages for the family if the wife decides not to supply any 
labor, joint tax assessment implies a stronger dependency of the wife from the 
husband’s income. In turn, individual taxation can be expected to attenuate the 
influence of tax rates on women’s income and therefore increase their labor supply.  
 
Empirical studies support this assumption. For instance, Gustafsson (1992) has 
compared maternal employment in Sweden after the implementation of individual 
taxation and maternal employment in Germany which is characterized by a system of 
joint taxation of married couples. Gustafsson concludes that joint taxation "[…] 
decreases married women’s economic remunerations from participating in the labor 
force […]" (Gustafsson 1992: 82). The evidence from her empirical study suggests 
that "[…] German wives would increase labor force participation if faced with 
Swedish taxes and that Swedish women would decrease their participation if faced 
with German taxes […]" (ibid.). Those results are supported by Crossley and Jeon 
(2005) who find that joint taxation can effectively be considered as a determinant of 
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the labor supply of married women2 by using the 1988 Canadian federal tax reform 
as a natural experiment for a switch from joint to individual taxation. 
Disadvantageous taxation that leads to a disproportional decrease of market income 
can therefore be considered as a disincentive for maternal employment. 
 
Despite the theoretical considerations and the empirical evidence, information on the 
mode of taxation will not be included in the present analysis. On the one hand, the 
cross-national variation is rather small with Germany and Luxembourg being the 
only countries in the sample still applying the joint taxation of spouses. On the other 
hand, there is already an overall trend of abolishing this mode of taxation as the 
examples of United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal or Austria 
show (Bach et al. 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The effect is particularly important in the case of low-income women who are married to high-
income husbands.   
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
48 
 
3. VARIABLES, DATA AND METHODS 
 
The following chapter describes in more detail which variables are used in the 
subsequent analyses and where the data come from. The first subchapter presents the 
individual level variables which also include the dependent variable for the multi-
level analysis. The single macro level variables, which have been assembled in the 
FEMMES Dataset compiled for the present study, cover a wide range of policy fields 
and welfare state measures. Therefore, the used data sources are diverse and require 
some detailed explanation which will be presented in the second subchapter. The 
final section of this chapter will introduce the methods.  
 
 
3.1. Individual Level Variables and Data – The EU SILC Dataset 
 
The second chapter has clearly pointed out that in its beginnings, labor supply theory 
has focused on the individual. Therefore, it is necessary to include individual level 
determinants of labor supply into the analysis to control for their effects on the labor 
market participation decision. The micro data come from the 2005 European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC)3. The EU SILC provides 
individual and household level data on cross-sectional and on longitudinal basis and 
covers a wide range of social and economic issues, such as income, social exclusion, 
housing, education, employment and health. The subsample of the EU SILC 2005 
used for the present analysis consists of nearly 43.000 women from 15 European 
countries4, aged 25 to 54 and living in households with at least one dependent child. 
 
The foregoing chapter has illustrated why certain individual characteristics are 
important determinants of labor supply. Before turning to the explanatory variables 
on the individual level, it is reasonable to give some information about the central 
dependent variable. The present study tries to determine factors that influence 
maternal labor supply. For this purpose, maternal labor supply will be 
operationalized as the basic activity status. The original variable displays if an 
                                                 
3All information on the original variables comes from the EU SILC codebook provided by the 
European Commission (2008). 
4Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom 
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individual is employed, unemployed, in retirement or early retirement or if the 
individual is inactive for other reasons. For the purpose of the present study, the 
original variable is transformed into a dichotomous variable. Women in (early) 
retirement have been dropped from the sample and women who are unemployed or 
inactive have been summarized under the value 0. In turn, women who are employed 
have been assigned the value 1.  
 
According to labor supply, the market income of a person is one of the main 
determinants for the labor supply decision. The EU SILC provides information on 
the amount of the yearly gross cash income from the main employment position of 
the individuals for eleven of the fifteen countries in the sample. The gross cash 
income is measured in EUR and refers to the monetary component of the 
compensation of an employee. Social security contributions on the part of the 
employee and on the part of the employer as well as income taxes and other taxes 
have not yet been deducted. Cash income not only includes wages and salaries, but 
also, for instance, holiday and overtime payments, commissions and tips and thirteen 
month payments. For Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, the EU SILC does not 
provide information for the yearly gross cash income, but for the gross monthly 
earnings. The gross monthly earnings are basically defined in the same way as the 
yearly gross cash income. They refer to monthly cash income in EUR before the 
deduction of social security contributions and taxes and they include additional 
payments, such as overtime premiums, commissions and thirteen month payments. 
For the purpose of the present study, the yearly gross cash income has been broken 
down to a monthly value to make the income information available and comparable 
for all the fifteen countries in the sample. However, it cannot be ignored that 
especially variables like the gross cash income from employment or the gross 
monthly earnings from employment can only be measured if an individual is actually 
employed. Therefore, those variables are subject to a possible selection bias that can 
only be avoided if the information is estimated for the individuals who have no own 
income or earnings from employment at their disposal. Missing cash income and 
earnings  have therefore been calculated by means of the Heckman correction to 
estimate this information  for those women who do not have their own income from 
employment at their disposal andthis estimation had to be pursued for about 16.000 
women in the sample. The exact procedure of estimation will be presented in the 
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methodological subchapter. Furthermore, the variable has been linearly transformed 
by means of a division by 1000 to facilitate the interpretation.   
 
In a considerable number of cases, an individual’s income is or earnings from 
employment is only one of many different components of the total amount of money 
that is at their and their household’s disposal every month. While labor supply theory 
has elaborated on the positive effect of personal income on the labor market decision, 
it has also pointed out the potential negative effects of these other components, 
usually referred to as the so-called non-labor income. Non-labor income is the 
amount of money at an individual’s disposal without supplying labor to the market. It 
can consist of different financial resources, such as income from capital, social 
benefits and also of the income from employment that other members of the 
household contribute to the total household income. Labor supply theory assumes 
that there can be a trade-off between non-labor income and income from 
employment because some social benefits might be connected to not being 
employed. Furthermore, the one partner’s income from employment might decrease 
due to a reduction of market time when the other partner decides to supply labor to 
the market as well. Therefore, it can be assumed that with increasing non-labor 
income, the trade-off between supplying labor to the market and not supplying labor 
to the market increases as well, i.e. that the probability of supplying labor to the 
market decreases with an increasing amount on non-labor-income For the purpose of 
the present study, the EU SILC variable for the total disposable household income 
comes closest to the idea of the non-labor income, since it includes many different 
financial components, such as income from employment for all household members, 
income from capital and property and different kinds of social benefits. Just like the 
individual cash income, the information is measured in EUR. The information on the 
household income is provided on a yearly basis, so it has been broken down to a 
monthly value as well. Since the individual income from employment is included in 
the total household income, it has been subtracted from the household income to 
obtain a more accurate value of the non-labor income. Just as in the case of the 
individual labor market income, the information on the non-labor income has been 
linearly transformed by means of a division by 1000 to facilitate the interpretation.   
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Information on the age of the individuals is thoroughly provided by the EU SILC and 
the values of the original variable take on values between 0 and 80. However, 
individuals below and above a certain age limit are only of limited relevance for the 
present study. If the conclusions about labor supply behavior are to be as undistorted 
as possible, children, adolescents and younger individuals with higher probabilities 
of still being in education should be excluded from the sample as well as older 
individuals who have a lower probability of living with children of young age. 
Therefore, the dataset is reduced to women of working age between 25 and 54 years. 
 
Labor supply theory has widely elaborated on the meaning of education for the labor 
supply decision. Since it is assumed that average earnings rise with the level of 
education, individuals with a higher level of education are assumed to be more likely 
to supply labor to the market than individuals with a lower level of education. The 
original variable measures which level of the International Standard Classification of 
Education ISCED (UNESCO 1997) has currently been attained and it is subdivided 
into six categories. This classification of education levels has been developed since 
the 1970s and is technically subdividing educational degrees into seven categories. 
However, the EU SILC has summed up the last two categories (first stage of tertiary 
education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualification) and second 
stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification)) into one 
single category and assigned the value 5 to it. The remaining five categories have 
been adopted one-to-one by the EU SILC. Individuals with only pre-primary 
education are assigned the value 0 and individuals with primary education are 
assigned the value 1. If individuals have attained the lower secondary level of 
education, i.e. if they have finished the compulsory part of schooling, they are 
assigned the value 2. Individuals who have attained upper secondary education are 
assigned the value 3 and individuals with post-secondary non tertiary education have 
been assigned the value 4. For the purpose of the present study, the variable has been 
recoded into a dichotomous variable. All individuals who have not attained more 
than lower secondary education, i.e. who have no educational achievement beyond 
compulsory schooling, have been assigned the value 0. All individuals who have 
invested in their educational achievement beyond compulsory education have been 
assigned the value 1. 
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With regard to the number and age of children, the information covered by the EU 
SILC is not very straightforward in the sense that there are no variables which 
provide answers to these exact two questions. However, the EU SILC gives 
information on the composition of households. The original variable displays how 
many adults live in the household and in which age groups the adults are and it also 
gives information on the question if there are dependent children living in the 
household, dependent children being defined as household members aged 17 or less 
and household members aged between 18 and 24, but economically inactive and 
living with at least one parent. The original variable is subdivided into ten categories 
of which half of them are not essential for the research question of the present study. 
Individuals living in one person households and individuals living in households with 
two adults of working age or of retirement age and no dependent children have been 
excluded as well as other households (with no dependent children) and cases in 
which no information on the household type has been given. The household types 
that remain are two adult households with either one dependent child, two dependent 
children or three or more dependent children, single-parent households with at least 
one dependent child and other households with at least one dependent child. For the 
purpose of the present analysis, this variable has been transformed into a categorical 
variable with living in a household with at least one dependent child having been 
assigned the value 1, with living in a household with at least two dependent children 
having been assigned the value 2 and with living in a household with three or more 
dependent children having been assigned the value 3. Since the original variable also 
provides information on the number of adults in the household, it has also been used 
to construct a further variable on the parenting situation, namely if the household is a 
single mother household or if the household is run by more than one parent. 
Households with more than one adult have been assigned the value 0 while single 
mother households have been assigned the value 1.  
 
According to the assumptions that labor supply theory makes with regard to 
specialization and exchange between spouses, it is essential to include information 
about the marital status of an individual. In the EU SILC, the original variable 
subdivides individuals into those who have never been married, those who are 
married and those who are separated, divorced and widowed. Clearly, neither 
unmarried nor separated, divorced or widowed women are necessarily single. Also, 
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women who are separated, divorced or widowed have obviously been married before 
and have possibly chosen to specialize in non-market work during the time of their 
marriage with all the potential negative consequences for their human capital and for 
their labor market chances. But since labor supply theory assumes that married 
couples might be most likely and able to opt for specialization and exchange and 
since in this case, it is most likely that the wife focuses on non-market work and the 
husband focuses on market work, the main distinction has to be made between 
women living in a marriage relationship and women not living in a marriage 
relationship. For the purpose of the present study, the original variable has therefore 
been transformed into a dichotomous variable. Women who have never been married 
and women who are separated, divorced or widowed have been summarized to the 
category of women living without a partner. This category has been assigned the 
value 0 while the value 1 has been assigned to married women.  
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3.2. Country Level Variables and Data – The FEMMES Dataset 
 
The majority of the data in the FEMMES Dataset cover 22 OECD countries5 and the 
period from the mid- to late-2000s. The following section describes which specific 
instruments from the five afore-mentioned policy fields are included in the present 
study. However, the selection of particular policy variables not only follows labor 
supply rationales, but also tries to draw a comprehensive picture of welfare state 
incentives for maternal labor supply. Therefore, the selected variables cover different 
dimensions of welfare state intervention, such as rights and entitlements, benefits, 
allowances and services (cp. Kaufmann 2002 for a detailed overview of the different 
dimensions of welfare state intervention). Detailed tables containing the raw data can 
be found in Appendix B of this study.  
 
Coding 
Before the selection of variables from the different policy fields is presented, some 
general information about the handling and coding of the variables will be given. All 
variables take on values ranging from 0 to 1. Higher values always imply a higher 
degree of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply. This implies that some 
variables, such as, for instance, the level of childcare fees, had to be recoded to 
assign countries with a high level of private childcare costs a lower value than 
countries with a low level of private childcare costs. Another important example for 
which this kind of recoding had to be applied are family cash benefits, since low 
benefits are actually considered having a more incentivizing effect on labor supply 
than high family cash benefits. Providing a lower level of cash benefits is, hence, 
positively connoted and leads to ascribing higher values to countries which provide a 
lower level of benefits. The variables whose values were already ranging between 0 
and 1 (or 0 and 100 respectively) and where higher values already implied a higher 
level of welfare state incentives, such as, for instance, childcare coverage, were 
simply applied in their original form. When meaningful, some policies were recoded 
into categorical variables, for instance with regard to the information on entitlement 
and financial extent of parental leave. For other variables, the highest actual value 
                                                 
5
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States.  
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was used as a maximum and assigned the value 1 while the other values were 
transformed to a percentage share of it. This has been done to relate the values of the 
different countries to each other. For instance, the value 1 has been assigned to the 
country with the highest number of school days per year (212 days in Luxembourg). 
The fact that in other countries, the school year only comprises 175 days (Germany 
and Spain) does not mean that those countries do not provide any incentive at all in 
the field of school education as a form of de facto childcare. Since it could be 
considered as distortion if the value 0 would be assigned to those countries, the 
values of such a variable for the other countries are an expression of the percentage 
share of the maximum value.  
 
Parental Leave 
The variables from the policy field of parental leave mainly refer to legal 
entitlements. Policy instruments from this field regulate the relationship between 
employer and employee in the period after childbirth and when it comes to questions 
of caregiving for children. It has been argued before that parental leave with 
legislated job guarantee avoids the decrease of the value of market time that would 
normally be caused by the interruption of employment although parental leave 
implies an actual employment discontinuity. Consequently, a variable on the 
statutory entitlement to maternity leave is included in the analysis, taking into 
account if there is any existing statutory entitlement, if it is paid and to what extent it 
is paid. A statutory entitlement to maternity leave with a replacement rate of more 
than 50% should have a positive effect on maternal labor supply. Without this 
entitlement, mothers might tend to opt for a complete withdrawal from the labor 
market after childbirth and this can call their re-entry into question. If mothers have 
the possibility to take up a period of paid maternity leave, they can return to their 
workplace and they are not at risk for considerable financial losses during or after the 
employment break. Likewise, a variable on the statutory entitlement to paternity 
leave is included, assuming that the possibility for fathers to withdraw temporarily 
from the labor market has a positive effect on maternal labor supply as well. Existing 
paternity leave entitlements can shorten the period of time that mothers take off for 
caregiving which, in turn, strengthens their labor market attachment and reduces 
income losses. Just as the variable on maternity leave, the variable on paternity leave 
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takes into account as well if there is any existing statutory entitlement, if it is paid 
and to what extent it is paid.  
 
It has been indicated before that the effect of the actual length of parental leave 
periods has been inconsistently discussed in the literature (cp. Gornick et al. 1996a; 
Pettit and Hook 2005).  To shed more light on the question which element of leave 
duration has a positive effect on maternal labor supply, three different variables on 
the length of parental leave are included in the present study to explore which 
element of the length of parental leave affects maternal labor supply in a positive 
way. Besides the maximum number of months of parental leave, the maximum 
number of paid months of parental leave is taken into account as well. Finally, the 
maximum number of paid months as a share of the maximum number of months is 
included to analyze if, for instance, it is not the actual length of (paid) leave, but the 
share of the leave that is covered by wage replacement that affects maternal labor 
supply. 
 
Finally, the option of leave in case of sickness of a child is included. The variable 
captures information on the existence of statutory entitlements to sick child leave, on 
the replacement rate during sick child leave and on the extent of this leave 
arrangement, i.e. on the existence of additional leave entitlements covering a wider 
range of family members other than young children and/or situations of serious 
illness. The possibility of sick child leave can positively affect maternal labor supply 
because it anticipates the option of taking time off from work when necessary 
without the risk of financial losses.  
 
The data on parental leave entitlements and conditions come from a study by Moss 
and Wall (2007) who have edited an issue that reviews parental leave arrangements 
from an international perspective in the context of the Employment Relations 
Research Series published by the Employment Market Analysis and Research Group 
(which is affiliated to the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills). The 
study presents information and research on leave policies such as maternity leave, 
paternity leave and parental leave for 24 countries. For each country, the report 
includes information on statutory entitlements, on the existence, length and amount 
of income replacement rates during take-up, but also on additional leave in case that 
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children (or even other family members) become sick. Their information is based on 
detailed country studies reviewing the legal situation in each country which can be 
assumed to ensure a sufficient amount of comparability.  
  
Public Childcare 
Previous research has shown that childcare responsibilities are one of the main 
factors which prevent mothers from carrying out uninterrupted full-time employment 
(cp. Platenga and Hansen 1999). In the present study, the variables on public 
childcare cover the legal, the monetary and the infrastructural dimension of welfare 
state intervention. A legal entitlement to infant care and / or kindergarten / pre-
school care is assumed to affect maternal employment in the long run. An 
entitlement to childcare for children below school age can lead to fewer and shorter 
employment interruptions which, in turn, provide for more time spent in the labor 
market leading to more continuous labor market attachment and experience and it 
can also have a positive effect on the type of employment and the amount of earnings 
(Blau et al. 2006). However, a legal entitlement to public childcare does not 
necessarily make a clear statement about the actual provision of childcare. The 
provision rather falls into the category of the infrastructural welfare state intervention 
and two variables on childcare coverage, covering the percentage share of children 
below the age of three and the share of children aged three to five in childcare, are 
used to analyze the effect of actual welfare state provision on maternal labor supply. 
Information on the continuity of days in public childcare is included as well to 
approximate the actual support since a more comprehensive childcare day provides 
mothers with a better possibility to supply more than part-time labor. For the present 
purpose, the childcare day is categorized into mostly half-day, mostly full-day and a 
mixed category for countries in which neither half-day nor full-day prevail, assuming 
that when childcare is provided mostly full-time, this will have a positive effect on 
maternal labor supply. 
 
Since the private costs of childcare can be seen as a tax on the market income of a 
working mother, low childcare fees are seen as an equivalent to an effective increase 
in the wage rate and can therefore be expected to lead to an increase in female labor 
supply (Blau et al. 2006). Therefore, a variable on childcare fees as a percentage of 
the average wage is included. Here, it is assumed that a high level of welfare state 
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support with regard to the financial resources that go into public childcare, i.e. 
requiring as low private childcare costs as possible, has a positive effect on maternal 
labor supply. The inclusion of a variable on the public spending on childcare as a 
share of the GDP points in the same direction by indicating how much financial 
support the welfare state directed towards the provision of childcare which can, in 
turn, indicate how much of the financial burden is passed on to the parents. 
Furthermore, previous research has suggested that childcare quality indeed plays a 
role when parents make a decision about transferring a part of the caregiving task to 
childcare institutions and the parental decision about childcare can indirectly 
influence the labor supply decision. Therefore, the child-staff-ratio in childcare 
institutions for children below the age of three and for children aged three to five is 
included as a proxy for the quality of childcare institutions. 
 
The basic information on legal childcare entitlements comes from a paper by Bennett 
(2008) which has been published in the context of the UNICEF Innocenti Research 
Centre. The paper reviews current research and policies with regard to early 
childhood education and care in OECD countries. It provides an overview of 
entitlements to formal early childhood services by age and gives information about 
the legal rights to childcare services, the covered age span, the continuity and length 
of the childcare day, the duration of the entitlement and the childcare costs for 
families. For most of the data, Bennett makes recourse to information from the 
OECD (2006) which provides information on the state of early childhood education 
and care institutions for the mid-2000s.  
 
In general, the OECD has turned out to be one of the main providers of data on 
questions of work and family life reconciliation and childcare services. Under the 
title Babies and Bosses, the OECD has issued a series of publications that reviews 
policies to promote the compatibility of family and work by means of detailed 
country studies and a final study that compares and summarizes the findings (OECD 
2007). This last synthesizing study provides a large amount of comparative 
indicators for countries’ efforts to facilitate the reconciliation of work and family 
obligations. For the present purpose, this data source has been used to obtain 
information on the child-staff-ratio as a proxy for the quality of childcare institutions. 
It includes cross-national information on the average child-staff-ratio in formal 
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daycare services for children below the age of four and on the average child-staff-
ratio in kindergartens and other pre-primary education services for children aged 
three to six (OECD 2007: 144). This OECD study has also been used to obtain 
information on the public spending on formal childcare services including pre-
primary education services. The data are derived from the OECD Social Expenditure 
Database and they measure childcare expenditures as a share of the gross domestic 
product in 2003 (OECD 2007: 135). Furthermore, the OECD study also provides 
information on the length of the childcare day. However, information on part-time or 
full-time arrangements for childcare had to be compiled from different data sources, 
since the OECD study only covers Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Italy, Norway and Sweden with regard to this question (OECD 2007: 133 et 
seqq.). Therefore, the afore-mentioned study by Bennett (2008) has been used to fill 
the information gap for Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In turn, information for Germany and Greece come 
from the Eurydice Database which has also been used for data on school schedules 
and which will be described in more detail below. 
 
Another OECD source which provides detailed information on policies for the 
reconciliation of work and family obligations is the OECD Family Database (OECD 
2011). This database ties in with the Babies and Bosses series and provides further 
indicators on the situation of families and children, including family outcomes and 
family policies. The database compiles information from different OECD and non-
OECD databases and covers four main topics – the structure of families (fertility and 
marriage), the labor market situation of families (employment and working time), 
public policies for families and children (tax-benefit systems, parental leave and 
childcare) and child outcomes (health, poverty and education). For the purpose of the 
present study, the OECD Family Database has been used to derive information on 
the costs of childcare for families. Here, the OECD does not only provide 
information on childcare fees, but also calculates the net childcare costs for families. 
The use of full-time childcare for one child at the age of two and one child at the age 
of three in a typical daycare institution constitutes the basis of the calculation. Net 
childcare costs are defined as the childcare fees net of possible cash benefits, rebates 
and tax breaks. The use of net childcare costs is reasonable since subtracting varying 
kinds of reductions "[…] from the gross fee charged by the childcare provider gives 
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the net cost to parents, i.e. the "out-of-pocket" expenses resulting from the use of a 
formal childcare facility […]" (OECD 2010a).  
 
The afore-mentioned review by Moss and Wall (2007) also includes information on 
the coverage of childcare institutions. Their data on the share of children below the 
age of three and the share of children aged three to five who attend formal early 
childhood education and care services are from the beginning to mid-2000s and 
mainly come from the OECD Family Database. They also compare varying 
information about childcare coverage for children below the age of three across 
different data sources and unfortunately, the information for some countries is 
characterized by extensive differences. However, the decision is made in favor of the 
OECD data for children below the age of three in formal childcare because the data 
for the share of three to five year olds in formal childcare come from the OECD 
Family Database as well. Since Moss and Wall (2007) do not provide data for 
Austria, information by the Austrian Federal Bureau of Statistics has been used to fill 
the gap (Statistik Austria 2010).  
 
School Policy 
With regard to the effect of school schedules on maternal labor supply, this 
relationship can be compared to the relationship between public childcare and 
maternal labor supply. In a large part of the developed world, a certain amount of 
school years is compulsory for every child. In contrast to public childcare provision 
for children below school age, school education is normally institutionalized and 
available to every child without specific legal entitlement. However, the 
configuration of certain features of school education can be assumed to influence the 
reconciliation of work and family life for parents of school-aged children and in this 
way also affect the labor supply decision of mothers. Since the start of compulsory 
schooling somehow rings in the start of institutionalized and guaranteed de facto 
childcare, a variable on the school starting age is included, assuming that a low 
school starting age has a positive effect on maternal labor supply. Furthermore, 
information on the number of school hours per week (for school students in primary 
and secondary education) and on the number of school days per year is included to 
approximate the comprehensiveness of public school schedules. A high 
comprehensiveness of school week and school year decreases the need for childcare 
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beyond the regular school schedules which will, in turn, have a positive effect on 
maternal labor supply.  
 
The Eurydice Database (2010) has been used to gather information on school policy 
and school schedules, although it is in the very nature of this source that the data is 
only available for member states of the European Union. However, this will not lead 
to inconsistencies in the analysis since the Gower Dissimilarity Coefficient used for 
the later cluster analysis allows for missing values on single variables which makes it 
possible to include the non-European states in the procedure and to gain insights into 
the situation in these countries as well. Furthermore, the subsequent multi-level 
analysis uses micro data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions which, by definition, only focuses on European Union member states. 
The Eurydice Database provides information on education systems and education 
policy in Europe and it is affiliated to the Education, Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency (EACEA) of the European Commission which is responsible for 
the management of parts of the European Union’s programs in these policy fields. 
Eurydice primarily focuses on the structure and organization of education at all 
levels and across Europe. It collects detailed data and overviews of national 
education systems from pre-primary education to the entire school system to 
vocational and university education and lifelong learning. It provides indicators and 
statistics and the country studies are suitable for the purpose of the present study 
since they make comparable data available with regard to the start of compulsory 
schooling, the number of school hours per week at different levels of school 
education and the number of school weeks per year.  
 
Employment Law 
This policy field basically captures the (temporal) flexibility at the workplace and 
mostly refers to the legal form of welfare state intervention, even though its effects 
on the financial situation cannot be denied. Generally, working time policy protects 
the employee from inappropriately high working hours, regulates overtime 
conditions and compensation, provides for sufficient vacation and protects from 
discrimination. Working conditions can be assumed to affect maternal labor supply 
because they indicate the possibility of reconciliation of work and family life without 
substantial income losses. In this way, the length of the standard full-time workweek, 
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categorized in short full-time (less than 40 hours), normal full-time (40 hours) and 
long full-time (more than 40 hours) indicates at which rate mothers are enabled to 
pursue full-time employment and enjoy all social and earnings-related benefits that 
accompany this type of employment. Since long full-time employment can involve 
an increased need for childcare at rather atypical hours which, in turn, will decrease 
the effective market wage, short full-time is expected to have a positive effect on 
maternal labor supply.  
 
The amount of legally guaranteed vacation days per year as well as the number of 
mandatory paid holidays is an indication for the possibility of reconciling work and 
family life as well. Not only does it allow for some quality time within the family, 
but it also implies that parents have the possibility to take time off from work 
simultaneously with their children. This decreases the risk of additional childcare 
costs which will, in turn, increase the effective market wage. The need to work 
overtime can occur in many types of employment. For mothers, this case can be 
assumed to imply additional childcare costs which can decrease the effective market 
wage. Therefore, two variables on overtime premiums are included, one capturing the 
compensation for the first set of overtime hours and a second variable capturing the 
potential compensation for the second set of overtime hours (which does not exist in 
every country). These variables account for the welfare state incentives that are 
supposed to outweigh the potential costs of overtime work. Finally, if full-time 
employment is not available or feasible for mothers, it is important that the welfare 
state provides the possibility of part-time employment without the risk of 
discrimination. Two variables covering part time employee protection are included 
which deal with the security against discrimination regarding the benefits enjoyed by 
full-time workers, such as leaves, overtime premiums and social security and 
regarding the legal rights to advance notice and separation fees for the termination of 
the employment contract.  
 
The data on employment law primarily come from a database on labor regulation 
which has been put together by Botero et al. (2004). Most of the data are from the 
beginning of the 21st century and have been derived from primary legal sources, 
although the authors have used secondary sources to confirm their data. For Botero 
and his colleagues, employment law covers four different dimensions which are, in 
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turn, operationalized by a number of single variables: alternative employment 
contracts, the cost of increasing working hours, the cost of firing workers and 
dismissal procedures. For the purpose of the present study, the first two dimensions 
are considered particularly important. The dimension of alternative employment 
contracts measures the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard employment 
contract. This dimension covers, among others, information on the discrimination of 
part-time employees, both with regard to benefits and with regard to the termination 
of part-time employment contracts. Here, it is important to mention that in their 
operationalization of anti-discrimination of part-time employees, Botero et al. not 
only code those variables with the value 1 if there is no discrimination, but also if the 
option of part-time employment is completely prohibited by labor law. The rationale 
behind that is most likely that if the opportunity of part-time contracts does not exist, 
there cannot be any discrimination with regard to benefits or with regard to the 
termination of contracts. Since it is assumed that measures to protect part-time 
employees against discrimination are a crucial element in encouraging maternal labor 
supply, it would be unfortunate if every country which has been assigned the value 1 
would actually be characterized by a prohibition of part-time employment instead of 
an anti-discrimination policy. However, all countries in the sample are either a 
member of the European Union or of the International Labor Organization or a 
member of both entities. Both these organizations have passed laws or conventions 
that require the introduction of the opportunity of part-time work on the part of their 
member states (cp. ILO 1994; EU 1997). Hence, it can be assumed that in the 
majority of cases, countries which have been assigned the value 1 on both variables 
are most likely to be countries in which anti-discrimination protection of part-time 
employees exists and not to be countries in which part-time employment is 
prohibited by labor law.  
 
Measuring the cost of an increase in the number of working hours refers to various 
single variables on the number of paid mandatory holidays per year, on the 
maximum duration of the regular work week (working hours per week without 
overtime) and overtime payments, i.e. the premiums for overtime (ratio of the 
overtime wage over the normal wage). The variable on overtime premium is 
subdivided in information on the premium for the first set of overtime hours per 
week and the premium for the second set of overtime hours per week because 
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employment laws generally provide for a two tiered system of overtime payments. 
This dimension of employment law also covers information on the number of 
minimum vacation days per year. However, by definition, Botero et al. (2004) only 
refer to the days of annual leave with pay in the manufacturing sector after twenty 
years of employment. Therefore, most of the information on yearly minimum 
vacation comes from the ILO TRAVAIL Database of Conditions of Work and 
Employment Laws (1996 – 2011). This database provides information on the 
regulatory environment of working time, minimum wages and maternity protection 
across more than 100 countries. It contains comprehensive legal data and does not 
only focus on one specific economic sector with regard to the duration of annual 
leave. Therefore, this database has been selected as the source of information for the 
minimum vacation days per year for a majority of the countries. Since TRAVAIL did 
not include information for Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Switzerland, the data by Botero et al. (2004) have been used to fill the information 
gap for these five countries.  
 
Family Allowances and Modes of Taxation  
Since in most cases, earnings from employment are the kind of income that is subject 
to taxation (compared to, for instance, some social benefits), family tax breaks are an 
important policy instrument to increase the effective market wage of a working 
mother. Therefore, the present study includes a variable on tax breaks as a share of 
the GDP. The main intention of family cash benefits is certainly not related to 
questions of labor supply. It is evident that family cash benefits imply an important 
financial relief for many families and that they can prevent the risk of extensive 
poverty. However, when the logic of labor supply theory is applied, family cash 
benefits can actually have a negative effect on maternal labor supply by increasing 
the reservation wage. For the present purpose, family cash benefits will therefore be 
understood as a disincentive to labor supply and the level of welfare state incentives 
for maternal labor supply will be rated higher when the share of the GDP spent on 
family cash benefits is lower. Furthermore, for many countries, we find combinations 
of relatively high spending on family benefits in kind (cp. the public spending on 
childcare) and relatively low spending on family cash benefits. This suggests that 
countries spending less on cash benefits might simply follow a different order of 
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priority than countries spending more on cash benefits instead of assuming that low 
family cash benefits generally imply low welfare state provisions for families. 
 
The Babies and Bosses study has been used to derive data on family cash benefits 
and tax breaks. Public social spending as a share of the gross domestic product or 
public social spending as a share of total government spending usually covers more 
than the spending on family policy. The OECD provides data on family spending 
that explicitly refers to public support for families, such as child payments and 
parental leave benefits. Furthermore, the OECD also gives information on family tax 
breaks which are considered being one key measure of financial support for working 
parents (OECD 2007: 72). Information on joint or individual modes of taxation will 
not be included due to small cross-national variation and the overall trend to 
introduce individual taxation (cp. page 47). 
 
Country Level Control Variables 
When analyzing questions of labor supply, the possible influence of the general 
national employment situation cannot be disregarded. Hence, the main and most 
obvious indicator for the purpose of the present study is the overall female 
employment rate. The indicator comes from the OECD Factbook (OECD 2010b) and 
gives, just like the individual data and the majority of the policy data, information on 
the situation in the year 2005. It would be distorting to use the simple unemployment 
rate, since the unemployment rate only measures the ratio of those individuals in a 
country which are unemployed compared to the national labor force. However, it is 
by all means possible that a considerable number of individuals is neither employed 
nor unemployed, i.e. that a considerable number of individuals is not a part of the 
labor force. Therefore, it is advisable to use information on the employment-
population ratio. The employment-population ratio "[…] relates the level of 
employment to the working-age population (those aged 15 – 64), regardless of 
whether or not (individual) people are officially considered to be in the labor force 
[…]" (Siaroff 1994: 86; Leon 1981). It is assumed that the female employment-
population ratio is a valid indicator for the general economic and labor market 
situation of a country. If a large share of the women of working-age has no trouble 
finding employment, women with children are not likely to be excluded from this 
favorable labor market situation.  
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Research dealing with the public support of maternal employment is often associated 
with questions of culture, traditions and attitudes towards the role of women and 
mothers which can influence maternal labor supply decisions as well (cp. Pfau-
Effinger 2000; Leira 2002; Pfau-Effinger 2004). Even though the present study 
generally assumes that these attitudes can also be influenced and shaped by the 
degree of state support for female employment, the relationship between public and 
private attitudes can also be subject to reverse causality, implying that the state aligns 
its own policies with the traditions and attitudes that are prevalent in its society to, 
for instance, ensure the support of voters. Therefore, the present study includes a 
control variable that measures to which extent traditional attitudes towards the role of 
women and mothers are still prevalent across countries. Since the EU SILC 2005 
does not provide this information, the corresponding data have been gathered from 
the European Values Study 2008. The European Values Study has been initiated to 
collect information about attitudes across Europe and about the convergence, 
divergence or change of values across countries with an overall focus on questions of 
religion. Until today, there have been conducted four waves in the years 1981, 1990, 
1999 and 2008. The EVS 2008 is the one that comes closest to the general time 
frame of the present study and it provides a variable that asks for the relationship 
between working mothers and their children or, more specifically, if the respondents 
think that working mothers can establish a relationship with her children that is just 
as warm and secure as the relationship that stay-at-home mothers can potentially 
establish with their children. For the purpose of the present study, the respondents 
who (strongly) disagreed with that statement have been summarized and are used as 
a representation of the share of the population that holds more conservative values 
towards the role of mothers.  
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3.3. Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Country Level Analysis 
 
Analysis of Variance 
The analysis of the country level data is performed by means of different 
methodological approaches. The appropriateness of conventional country clusters 
and of the country clusters that will be established in the course of the study will be 
tested by means of analyses of variance which are, ultimately, single regression 
analyses with the respective average levels of welfare state incentives in the single 
policy fields being the dependent variables and the country groups being the 
independent variables. For these regressions, the country groups have been 
transformed into dummy variables. This procedure implies that one country group is 
treated as reference category. The mean of the reference group is the regression 
constant while the coefficients of the other country groups indicate the difference of 
their mean compared to the mean of the reference group. Just like other regression 
analyses, these regressions report the amount of explained variance. Since analyses 
of variance are applied to conventional country clusters and to the classification 
established in the course of the present study, the differences in the amount of 
explained variance can be used to compare the appropriateness of the different 
typologies.  
 
Cluster Analysis 
The first step of the cluster analysis is the calculation of a dissimilarity matrix by 
which the countries’ performances are compared. The distances between the different 
countries give some first indication about possible country clusters. Since the dataset 
contains binary and continuous variables, the Gower dissimilarity coefficient is the 
dissimilarity measure of choice which has the further advantage of not excluding 
observations with missing values on single variables. In the following formula of the 
Gower coefficient, the inclusion of binary variables and the consideration of missing 
values for the calculation of the distances d are represented by δ. The Gower 
coefficient calculates pairwise dissimilarities between the observations in the data 
set. The distance d between two units i and j is the sum of all variable specific 
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distances. When values are missing for either one unit or both units under 
comparison or when the values of both units i and j equal 0, δ equals 1.  
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The dissimilarities calculated by means of the Gower coefficient are commonly used 
as inputs to cluster analysis. In the present study, cluster analysis is applied to attain a 
more specific picture of potential country clusters. Cluster analysis is a method of 
numerical classification of cases and pattern recognition. From the different available 
ways of cluster analysis, the agglomerative hierarchical form is chosen which does 
not require the prior determination of a certain number of clusters. Agglomerative 
hierarchical clustering proceeds by grouping single observations and by enlarging 
those groups to bigger clusters until the entire sample is included. The underlying 
principle is the achievement of maximal homogeneity within the single clusters and 
the achievement of maximal heterogeneity between the single clusters (cp. 
Wiedenbeck / Züll 2010). Within the method of agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering, the procedure of choice is Ward’s Algorithm which groups the 
observations that only minimally increase the variance within one cluster (cp. 
Backhaus et al. 2000). Compared to other agglomerative hierarchical cluster 
procedures, Ward’s Algorithm tends to produce more stable results.  
 
 
3.3.2. Multi-Level Analysis  
 
Hierarchical Logistic Regression 
The present study is not only interested in comparing welfare state incentives for 
maternal labor supply on the country level, but also in analyzing the effects of these 
incentives on individual maternal labor supply. Since the outcome variable (being 
employed or not being employed) is an individual characteristic and since it has been 
shown that the basic assumptions of labor supply theory refer to individual 
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characteristics, these individual determinants have to be included in the analysis to 
control for these associations. This turns the analysis into one which considers 
individual and country level factors. Furthermore, the dependent variable is binary (0 
= not being employed, 1 = being employed), so that the models of choice are 
hierarchical logistic regressions to estimate the impact of welfare state incentives on 
the odds of maternal labor force participation while controlling for individual level 
determinants.  
 
The application of hierarchical logistic regressions allows to determine beforehand 
how much of the variance is located on the country level. This is done by using the 
first model as an intercept-only-model including the dependent variable employedij, 
the average intercept γ00 and the residual error variances on the country level u0j.  
Neither the intercept-only-model nor the following individual- and country-level 
models contain the usual error term e because in contrast to linear multi-level 
models, this error variance is implied by the choice of the logistic distribution and 
equals π2 / 3. Furthermore, in this and all the following models, the subscripts i and j 
refer to individual mothers i in countries j.  
   
Intercept Only Model:  
logit (employedij ) = γ00  + uoj 
 
The residual error variances on the individual and on the country level are used to 
calculate the so-called intra-class correlation coefficient ρ. The intra-class correlation 
coefficient is used to determine if individuals from the same country are more alike 
than individuals from different countries. If this is the case, it is assumed that the 
explanatory variables on the country level can indeed be held accountable for the 
variation between the countries. The intra-class correlation coefficient ranges from 0 
to 1 with higher values implying a higher share of the variance being located on the 
country level. In the case of hierarchical logistic regressions, the calculation of the 
intra class correlation coefficient includes the intercept variance τ00 and the error 
variance of the logistic model π2 / 3 (cp. Snijders/Bosker 1999; Hox 2010).  
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In the next step, the explanatory variables on the individual level are added to the 
model. The individual level model estimates the effects of the individual level 
variables on the odds of maternal labor force participation and these effects are 
allowed to be random, i.e. to vary across countries, since it cannot necessarily be 
assumed that their impact is equal across countries. Furthermore, the three 
continuous individual variables diff, age and wage are centered on their grand mean. 
 
 
Individual-Level Model                         
logit (employedij )= γ00 + γ10 * (ageij – 012333333..) + γ20 * marriedij +  
γ30 * educationij + γ40 * childrenij + γ50 * singleij + 
γ60 * (wageij – =01233333333..) + γ70 * (diffij - ABB3333333..) +  
u1j * (ageij – 012333333..) + u2j * marriedij +u3j * educationij + 
u4j * childrenij +u5j * singleij + u6j (wageij – =01233333333..) +  
u7j * (diffij - ABB3333333..) + uoj 
    
 
The individual-level model contains the dependent variable employedij, the average 
intercept γ00 and the constant regression coefficients for all seven explanatory 
variables on the individual level used in the present study (γ10 through γ70).  The error 
terms u1j
  
through u7j account for the possible country-dependent variation of the 
influence of the individual-level variables on the probability of maternal labor force 
participation, indicated by the subscript j denoting to which country it belongs. 
In the multi-level models, the explanatory variables and the control variables on the 
country level are added to the model to explain cross-national differences in the 
average employment probability of mothers. While the country-level control 
variables culture and employment are included in every multi-level model, the 
explanatory variables are added to the model separately and one by one. There will 
be five models calculating the influence of the average levels of welfare state 
incentives in all five policy fields, six models for the single indicators from the field 
of parental leave, eight models for the single indicators from the field of childcare, 
seven models for the field of employment law, four models for the field of school 
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policy and two models for the single indicators from the field of taxation and 
allowances. These single variables are indicated by the term γ03 * Zj.  
 
Multi-Level Model 
logit (employedij )= γ00 + γ10 * (ageij – 012333333..) + γ20 * marriedij +  
γ30 * educationij + γ40 * childrenij + γ50 * singleij + 
γ60 * (wageij – =01233333333..) + γ70 * (diffij - ABB3333333..) +  
γ01 * culturej  + γ02 * employmentj + γ03 * Zj + 
u1j * (ageij – 012333333..) + u2j * marriedij +u3j * educationij + 
u4j * childrenij +u5j * singleij + u6j (wageij – =01233333333..) +  
u7j * (diffij - ABB3333333..) + uoj 
 
 
 
Heckman Correction 
The theoretical remarks and the formula of the individual level estimation presented 
above have shown that the individual market wage is assumed to be one central 
predictor of the labor supply decision and that it is used as one of the main individual 
independent variables. Unfortunately, information on individual wages often falls 
prey to so-called incidental truncation because this information normally depends on 
another variable, namely the employment status. The wage can only be observed 
when a person is working and it cannot be observed when a person does not 
participate in the labor market. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the missing 
wages by means of the so-called Heckman estimation method to correct for the 
selection bias in a preparative step. This method, developed by James J. Heckman 
(1979), has established itself as the most common way of estimating missing wages 
in labor supply research, even though it is not free from critique (cp. Puhani 2000). 
The estimation of missing wages is possible in the case of the present study because 
all the variables that are assumed to determine the wage and the selection bias can be 
observed for each individual. The Heckman correction suggests adding a selection 
equation to the model (cp. Wooldridge 2002: 560). 
 
y = xβ + u, E (u|x) = 0 
s = 1 [zγ + v ≥ 0] 
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Here, it is important that any x is also an element of z while some elements of z are 
not supposed to be in x. For the present purpose, the available micro data have 
already been reduced to women living in households with dependent children, thus 
the wages of the employed individuals provide the basis for the estimation of the 
wages of the unemployed individuals. The first equation uses the gross cash income 
as the dependent variable and comprises two determinants of the salary, namely the 
age and the level of education. The selection equation additionally includes 
information on the number of children, the marital status and the parenting status. 
Adding these three variables to the selection equation is based on the assumption that 
these three factors are most likely to cause the selection bias.  
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The fourth chapter presents the results of the country-level and the multi-level 
analysis. Starting with a discussion of the cross-national variation of welfare state 
incentives for maternal labor supply, the first part of this chapter presents an attempt 
to establish a classification of countries according to their extent and emphases of 
those welfare state incentives. This chapter reviews the adequacy of traditional 
country clusters and presents a new suggestion of country clusters which are more 
appropriately corresponding to the cross-national variation of welfare state incentives 
for maternal labor supply. It starts by comparing single welfare state incentives from 
all five policy fields included in the present study and by comparing average levels 
of welfare state incentives across all indicators from each policy field across 
countries. Those cross-national comparisons will provide a first indication for the 
performance of welfare states and for the appropriateness of existing gender-
sensitive typologies. However, the subsequent analyses of variance for the 
conventional country clusters and for the new country clusters established by means 
of a cluster analysis using all indicators included in the present study will reveal that 
the here established country clusters are more appropriate to group countries 
according to the effort they direct towards maternal labor supply. As a final step of 
the country-level analysis, three specific countries not displaying the expected 
performance will be studied in more detail. By means of three more in-depth studies 
of the cases of Norway, Canada and Germany, possible causes for the different 
allocation of these countries in the new country clusters will be traced.  
 
The second part of this chapter presents the results of hierarchical logistic regressions 
testing for the association of the welfare state incentives with individual maternal 
labor supply under control for the economic situation and for the common individual 
determinants of labor supply. Since the country-level analysis will show that labor 
supply incentives are partly characterized by considerable cross-national differences, 
it is worth investigating if this variation is reflected by the labor supply decisions of 
mothers, i.e. if higher levels of welfare state incentives are associated with a higher 
probability of maternal labor supply. The second part will present descriptive 
information of the association between the maternal employment rate, the average 
levels of welfare state incentives and the individual and country-level control 
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variables. Subsequently, it will present six hierarchical logistic regressions to analyze 
the influence of the average levels of welfare state incentives across all five policy 
fields and of all the single indicators from each of the five policy fields on maternal 
labor supply.  
 
4.1. Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply – Starting Point for 
a New Welfare State Typology?  
 
4.1.1. Cross-National Variation of Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor     
Supply 
 
Cross-National Variation of Single Welfare State Incentives 
How are welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply shaped across countries? 
Is the degree and focus of employment supportive policies dissimilar across 
countries? And, if countries turn out to perform differently, are they varying in ways 
that are comparable to established typologies or are the traditional welfare state types 
not appropriate to explain cross-national variation of welfare state incentives for 
maternal labor supply? 
 
Table 4.1. Cross-National Variation of Single Welfare State Incentives (2004 – 2010) 
Length of Paid 
Leave in Months 
(2007) 
Childcare Costs in 
% of Average 
Family Net Income 
(2004) 
 
Minimum Vacation 
Days per Year 
(2004) 
Length of the 
School Year in 
Days 
(2010) 
Tax Breaks as % 
of GDP 
(2007) 
US 0 BE 4 US 0 GR 175 SE 0,00 
GR 2 PT 4 JP 10 ES 175 DK 0,00 
NL 2,5 GR 5 CA 14 SE 178 FL 0,00 
ES 3,5 SE 6 NZ 14 AT 180 IT 0,00 
PT 4 LU 6 IE 15 FR 180 GR 0,00 
IE 4,5 ES 7 BE 20 PT 180 CH 0,00 
UK 6 FL 7 DE 20 IE 181 LU 0,00 
BE 9,5 NO 8 NL 20 BE 182 NZ 0,00 
DK 10,5 DK 8 CH 20 NO 190 AU 0,10 
CA 11,5 DE 8 GR 20 FL 190 CA 0,10 
NO 12 AU 8 PT 24 UK 195 AT 0,10 
IT 13,5 FR 11 FL 24 DE 198 NO 0,20 
DE 14 NL 12 LU 25 NL 200 PT 0,20 
SE 16 IT 13 NO 25 DK 200 ES 0,20 
AT 24 JP 14 DK 25 IT 200 IE 0,20 
FR 36 AT 15 SE 25 LU 212 UK 0,40 
FL 36 CA 22 UK 28   NL 0,40 
  NZ 28 AU 28   JP 0,40 
  USA 28 IT 28   BE 0,50 
  IE 29 AT 30   US 0,60 
  CH 30 FR 30   FR 0,70 
  UK 33 ES 30   DE 1,00 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
Note:  Raw data for one single incentive per policy field in ascending order. 
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A first look at the level of certain single incentives across countries already indicates 
that there is considerable variation and that the incentives do not necessarily vary 
along traditional welfare state types. Table 4.1. shows the levels of five policies for 
all the countries for which data were available, one policy from each field of 
incentives respectively. For this illustration, the raw data of the actual policies have 
been used and the countries are arranged in order of size of the corresponding 
indicator. On the one hand, this illustration reveals that the cross-national differences 
of welfare state support for maternal employment are considerable. And since the 
countries are ranked according to the level of the respective incentive, it also reveals 
that, on the other hand, countries do mostly not group as existing typologies would 
expect them to. From the field of parental leave, the variation within the length of 
paid leave in months illustrates very well that the provision across countries is very 
different. There are countries which only provide six or less months of paid parental 
leave, such as the United States, the Netherlands or Portugal, and there are countries 
which provide between nine and sixteen months of parental leave, such as Canada, 
Germany or Sweden. At the upper limit, countries like Austria, France and Finland 
provide two years or more of paid parental leave and this loose ranking reveals that 
especially the group with medium paid leave provision combines countries from the 
traditional liberal, the social-democratic, the conservative and the Southern European 
welfare regime.  
 
In the field of early childhood education and care, the variation in childcare costs for 
families, measured as the percentage of the average net family income, is similarly 
high. No country provides childcare facilities for free, but in five countries, families 
have to invest six percent or less of their income in childcare. Not surprisingly, 
Sweden is among these countries, but also Southern European welfare states like 
Portugal, Spain and Belgium. In the other Scandinavian countries, the childcare costs 
for families are slightly higher, just as they are for families in Germany and 
Australia. Families in countries like France, Japan and Austria have to invest 
between eleven and fifteen percent of their income in childcare. The selection of 
countries in which the costs are considerably higher, ranging between 22 and 33 
percent of the average net family income, mostly consists of liberal welfare states.  
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Within the policy field of employment law, many liberal welfare states provide 
fifteen or less vacation days per year. Among the countries which provide 20 to 24 
vacation days per year are conservative welfare states like Belgium and the 
Netherlands, Southern European states like Greece and Portugal and Finland as a 
social democratic welfare state. The group of countries providing between 25 and 28 
vacation days per year is similarly diverse, comprising states such as Denmark and 
Sweden, Italy, the United Kingdom and Australia. Finally, the group of countries 
with the maximum number of legally guaranteed vacation days per year contains 
Austria, France and Spain. 
 
From the field of school policy, the indicator on the number of school days per year 
has been chosen to give an idea on cross-national variation. The indicator varies from 
less than 180 school days per year to more than 200. The group with the lowest 
number of school days per year consists of Greece, Spain and Sweden. The second 
group, providing 180 or more school days per year, consists of countries like France, 
Portugal and Ireland. The third group of countries, providing 190 or more school 
days per year, comprises two further Scandinavian countries (Norway and Finland), 
the United Kingdom and Germany. The final group of countries with at least 200 
school days per year consists of countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy.  
 
In the policy field of taxation and allowances, the variation of the indicator on family 
tax breaks as a percentage of the GDP gives further insight into cross-national 
differences. The level of tax breaks generally ranges between no tax breaks at all and 
tax breaks which constitute one percent of the GDP. A considerable number of 
countries does not provide tax breaks at all, such as the majority of Scandinavian 
welfare states, but also Italy, Greece and New Zealand. The remaining Scandinavian 
welfare state, Norway, finds itself in the group of countries which provides tax 
breaks at the 0.10 to 0.20 percent level of the GDP in conjunction with liberal 
welfare states like Australia and Canada and Southern European welfare states like 
Portugal and Spain. The third group of countries provides tax breaks at the 0.40 to 
0.50 percent level and combines the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan and 
Belgium while the last group of countries with family tax breaks of at least 0.60 
percent consists of the United States, France and Germany, Germany being the only 
country with tax breaks of one percent of the GDP.  
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Cross-National Average Levels of Welfare State Incentives 
Since the look at single indicators from the different policy fields already gives an 
idea of the extent and the way in which welfare states vary, the averages across all 
indicators of each policy field and countries will be examined in a next step.  
 
 
Table 4.2. Variation of Average Levels of Welfare State Incentives across Countries and Policy  
                  Fields (2004 – 2010) 
Country Parental 
Leave 
(2007) 
Childcare 
(2007 – 2008) 
School 
Policy 
(2010) 
Employment 
Law 
(2004) 
Taxation and 
Allowances 
(2007) 
 
 
 
Protestant Social Democratic Welfare States 
 
Norway 0,67 0,67 0,66 0,56 0,23 
Sweden 0,77 0,88 0,71 0,80 0,13 
Denmark 0,60 0,93 0,49 0,69 0,13 
Finland 0,83 0,79 0,57 0,86 0,25 
  
Protestant Liberal Welfare States 
 
UK 0,43 0,55 0,82 0,49 0,20 
Australia - 0,47 - 0,87 0,05 
Canada 0,57 0,62 - 0,61 0,48 
New Zealand - - - 0,53 0,00 
USA 0,00 0,47 - 0,50 0,80 
 
 
 
Advanced Christian Democratic Welfare States 
 
Austria 0,72 0,31 0,68 0,79 0,05 
Belgium 0,63 0,63 0,75 0,69 0,38 
Germany 0,59 0,49 0,71 0,55 0,60 
France 0,92 0,61 0,67 0,58 0,75 
Luxembourg - - 1,00 - 0,00 
Netherlands 0,60 0,59 0,76 0,66 0,58 
 
 
 
Late Female Mobilization Welfare States 
 
Portugal 0,70 0,48 0,66 0,84 0,48 
Spain 0,66 0,41 0,68 0,61 0,60 
Italy 0,50 0,55 0,72 0,45 0,38 
Greece 0,50 0,35 0,82 0,67 0,38 
Ireland 0,42 0,50 0,74 0,59 0,10 
Switzerland - 0,35 - 0,54 0,25 
Japan - 0,52 - 0,33 0,70 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
Note:  Countries are arranged according to the typology by Siaroff (1994). Averages for each 
policy field are generated from the values of the single indicators in each policy field. 
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National averages have been calculated for those policy fields for which enough data 
on the single policy indicators were available to construct meaningful and 
comparable means. Here, the countries are ranked according to the afore-mentioned 
typology by Siaroff to facilitate the overview. Calling in mind which conclusions 
Siaroff made about the different degrees of support for female employment within 
the different welfare state types, the protestant social democratic countries are 
expected to explicitly support female labor force participation. Although the 
provided family welfare is considered minimal in the protestant liberal countries, 
they are also assumed to be characterized by rather distinct gender equality with 
regard to labor force participation. In turn, there should be no strong incentives for 
women to participate in the labor market in advanced Christian democratic states. In 
the welfare states that belong to the late female mobilization type, women’s rights 
are generally expected to be low and the incentives for women to allocate some time 
to the labor market are expected to be low as well.  
 
However, a closer look at the average levels of welfare state incentives across policy 
fields and countries reveals that these assumptions only partly hold when the explicit 
focus of analysis are labor supply incentives. On the one hand, the levels are mostly 
characterized by high intra-group variation and on the other hand, they do partly not 
correspond to the degree of support for female employment that would have been 
expected from previous research. In the protestant social democratic welfare states, 
the average level of welfare state incentives in the field of parental leave ranks from 
0.60 in Denmark to 0.83 in Finland in. The average levels are considerably lower in 
the protestant liberal countries, comprising the exceptional case of the United States 
with no parental leave provision at all and average levels of welfare state incentives 
of 0.43 in the United Kingdom and of 0.57 in Canada. In turn, the average levels of 
welfare state incentives in the field of parental leave across the Christian democratic 
countries is higher than in the protestant liberal countries, ranking from 0.59 in 
France to 0.92 in Germany which characterizes the latter country by an even higher 
incentive level than the protestant social democratic welfare states. The values for 
late female mobilization countries are, in turn, comparable with those in the 
protestant liberal welfare states.  
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In the field of early childhood education and care, the extent of support seems to be 
more consistent with existing gender-sensitive typologies, but the in-group variation 
remains considerable. In the protestant social democratic countries, the average 
levels of welfare state incentives are comparably high, ranking from 0.67 in Norway 
to 0.93 in Denmark. In all other country groups, the maximum average level is lower 
than the minimum average level in the protestant social democratic countries. The 
average levels of welfare state incentives in the protestant liberal welfare states rank 
from 0.47 in Australia and the United States to 0.63 in Canada. Across the advanced 
Christian democratic countries, Belgium shares the maximum values with Canada, 
but with 0.31 in Austria, the minimum value is considerably lower than in the 
protestant liberal welfare states. Comparable values can be found in the late female 
mobilization countries which rank from 0.35 in Greece and Switzerland to a 
maximum of only 0.55 in Italy. 
 
Turning to the field of school policy, the picture becomes again less consistent with 
existing gender-sensitive typologies. Here, the Scandinavian countries generally 
show lower average levels of welfare state incentives than in the policy fields of 
parental leave and early childhood education and care. The values rank between 0.49 
in Denmark to 0.71 in Sweden. Since the data on school policy are only available for 
the European countries in the sample, it is difficult to formulate a statement about the 
situation in the liberal welfare states. However, it can be considered noteworthy that 
after Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, as the only liberal welfare state with 
information on school schedules in the sample, provides the second highest average 
level of welfare state incentives in the field of school policy along with Greece. This 
information already indicates that also in the advanced Christian democratic and late 
female mobilization welfare states, the average level is not as low as it would have 
been expected from previous research. Although the differences between the single 
countries are very distinct within the advanced Christian democratic welfare state 
type, the minimum value amounts to an average of 0.67 in Germany and the 
maximum value amounts to 1.00 in Luxembourg. The variation is a little less 
pronounced in the late female mobilization countries with a minimum average level 
of welfare state incentives in the field of school policy of 0.66 in Portugal and a 
maximum average level of 0.82 in Greece. 
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In the field of employment law, the protestant social democratic, the protestant 
liberal and the advanced Christian democratic welfare states are very similar. The 
average level of incentives is very diverse in all three groups. Among the protestant 
social democratic welfare states, the values rank from 0.56 in Norway to 0.86 in 
Finland. Among the protestant liberal welfare states, the values rank from 0.49 in the 
United Kingdom to 0.87 in Australia and the variation is a shade less distinct in the 
advanced Christian democratic countries which rank from 0.55 in France to 0.79 in 
Austria. The situation is different among the late female mobilization countries in 
which the minimum average level of welfare state incentives in the field of 
employment law amounts to 0.33 in Japan and the maximum average level amounts 
to 0.84 in Portugal.  
 
Lastly, even more pronounced variation and differences from conventional gender-
sensitive welfare state comparisons can be observed within the field of allowances 
and taxation. Indeed, the differences among the protestant social democratic welfare 
states are less distinct, with an average ranging from 0.13 in Sweden and Norway to 
0.25 in Finland. However, with these values, the Scandinavian countries are located 
at the lower end of the average incentive levels. Although some countries of the other 
welfare state types are also characterized by relatively low average incentive levels 
in this policy field, there are more cases providing a higher level of incentives in 
these groups than among the protestant social democratic welfare states. Among the 
liberal welfare states, New Zealand provides a minimum average level of welfare 
state incentives of 0.00 while the maximum average level amounts to 0.80 in the 
United States. Among the advanced Christian democratic countries, Austria provides 
a minimum average level of welfare state incentives of only 0.05 while the maximum 
average level amounts to 0.75 in France. A similar picture can be detected among the 
late female mobilization countries, with average levels of incentives ranging from 
0.10 in Ireland to a maximum value of 0.70 in Japan.  
 
These mere comparisons do not allow for concluding statements about the 
performance of welfare states and the appropriateness of conventional gender-
sensitive welfare state typologies. However, they provide a first indication for what 
can be expected from a welfare state comparison which focuses on incentives for 
maternal labor supply. On the one hand, the average levels of welfare state incentives 
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in the respective policy fields often differ considerably among countries that are 
supposed to belong to the same welfare state type. This has, for instance, been 
detected in the case of France and Germany with regard to parental leave provision, 
in the case of Norway and Denmark with regard to early childhood education and 
care or in the case of Denmark and Sweden in the field of school policy. Similar 
variation has, for instance, been observed for the average levels of incentives in the 
field of employment law in the case of Japan and Portugal which are both supposed 
to belong to the late female mobilization welfare state type and for the average levels 
of incentives in the field of taxation and benefits in the case of New Zealand and the 
United States. On the other hand, it is not only the variation within the traditional 
country groups, but also the general levels of performance that create doubts about 
the suitability of existing welfare state typologies. It cannot be detected that the 
protestant social democratic countries are always characterized by the highest level 
of incentives, followed by the protestant liberal, the advanced Christian democratic 
and the late female mobilization welfare state type. The only policy field that is more 
or less consistent with this assumption is the one of early childhood education and 
care. With regard to the remaining policy fields, the picture is far less consistent. For 
instance, the advanced Christian democratic countries are characterized by a level of 
incentives in the field of parental leave that is very comparable to the one of the 
protestant social democratic countries. In turn, the level of incentives in the field of 
school policy and taxation and benefits is lower than expected in the protestant social 
democratic countries.  
 
Analysis of Variance 
The foregoing presentation of the variation of a selection of welfare state incentives 
for maternal labor supply in their original state and of the variation of averages 
across policy fields has already shed some light on differences between countries and 
also on the potential inappropriateness of conventional country clusters. However, 
this variance can be analyzed in further detail to examine how much of the cross-
national variance in the policy fields can actually be explained by the conventional 
country clusters. Table 4.3. shows the means of the country groups for every policy 
field and the results of an analysis of variance by means of single regressions of 
dummies for the country groups on the respective average level of welfare state 
incentives in the single policy fields.  
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Table 4.3. Analysis of Variance for Conventional Country Clusters 
Countries Parental Leave Childcare School 
Schedules 
Employment 
Law 
Taxation 
and 
Allowances 
 
Mean β Mean β Me
an 
β Mean β Mea
n 
β 
 
Protestant 
Liberal 
Welfare States 
(Reference 
Group) 
Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
UK 
USA 
 
 
 
 
 
.33 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.53 
 
  
 
 
 
.82 
  
  
 
 
 
.6 
 
  
 
 
 
.31 
 
 
 
Advanced 
Christian 
Democratic 
Welfare States 
Austria 
Belgium  
Germany 
France 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.359* 
 
 
 
 
.52 
 
 
 
 
 
-.003 
 
 
 
 
.76 
 
 
 
 
 
-.058 
 
 
 
 
.65 
 
 
 
 
 
.054 
 
 
 
 
 
.39 
 
 
 
 
 
.087 
 
Protestant 
Social 
Democratic 
Welfare States 
Sweden 
Norway 
Denmark 
Finland 
 
 
 
 
.72 
 
 
 
 
.384*** 
 
 
 
.82 
 
 
 
 
.29*** 
 
 
 
 
.61 
 
 
 
-.212* 
 
 
 
.73 
 
 
 
.127 
 
 
 
 
.18 
 
 
 
 
-.121 
 
Late Female 
Mobilization 
Welfare States 
Portugal 
Spain 
Italy 
Greece 
Ireland 
Switzerland 
Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
.56 
 
 
 
 
.223** 
 
 
 
 
.45 
 
 
 
 
-.076 
 
 
 
 
.72 
 
 
 
 
-.096 
 
 
 
 
.57 
 
 
 
 
-.024 
 
 
 
 
 
.41 
 
 
 
 
.107 
Constant .333*** .527*** .82*** .6*** .306** 
 
R² 
 
 
.485 
 
.687 
 
 
.373 
 
.16 
 
.116 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
Note:  Countries are arranged according to the typology by Siaroff (1994). Averages for each 
policy field are generated from the values of the single indicators in each policy field. 
*** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
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The welfare state typology by Siaroff (1994) suggests four groups of countries, 
leading to the creation of four country group dummies of which the first group, i.e. 
the liberal or protestant liberal welfare states (UK, USA, New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada), is used as a reference category. The mean of the reference group is the 
regression constant while the coefficients of the other country groups indicate the 
difference of their mean compared to the mean of the reference group. The last row 
of table 4.3. shows the amount of explained variance for the single regressions. These 
values show indeed that the conventional country clusters are not completely 
inappropriate to explain the variance of welfare state incentives for maternal labor 
supply across countries. An R2 of 0.49 for the field of parental leave and an R2 of 
0.69 for the field of childcare can by all means be considered a convincing result and 
an argument in favor of conventional gender-sensitive typologies. However, the 
results for the fields of employment law and taxation and allowances are less 
powerful. In combination with the foregoing descriptive comparisons of countries’ 
performances which have also shown that different country clusters might actually be 
more adequate to explain the cross-national variance of welfare state incentives, 
there is sufficient reason to examine if a different and potentially more appropriate 
classification of countries can be established.  
 
 
4.1.2. Determination of New Country Clusters 
 
Cluster Analysis 
While the first descriptive results in the foregoing section have already given some 
indication on cross-national differences and similarities of welfare state incentives 
for maternal labor supply, this section presents the results of a cluster analysis that 
has been run for the sample of 22 countries and across all policy fields6. As described 
in the methodological subchapter, cluster analysis is a method of numerical 
classification of cases and pattern recognition and requires the preliminary 
computation of a dissimilarity matrix that takes all the variables into account. The 
obtained distances between the single countries give some first indication about 
                                                 
6
 The indicators for school policy are only available for the 15 European countries in the sample. 
Therefore, statements about the similarities or dissimilarities with regard to this policy field cannot be 
made for the non-European states. However, the Gower Dissimilarity Coefficient allows for missing 
values on single variables which made it possible to include the non-European states in the analysis.  
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possible country clusters. Since the dataset contains binary and continuous variables, 
the Gower dissimilarity coefficient is the dissimilarity measure of choice which has 
the further advantage of not excluding observations with missing values on single 
variables. The matrix is shown in figure 4.1. and a closer look at the degree of 
dissimilarity between single pairs of countries reveals a potential underlying 
structure. Higher numbers imply higher dissimilarity and it can be seen that, for 
instance, Denmark and Sweden and are comparably little dissimilar. The same 
applies to Portugal and Spain and to the United Kingdom and New Zealand. By 
contrast, the United States and countries like Finland, France and Sweden show a 
comparably high degree of dissimilarity.   
 
Figure 4.1. Distances between the Countries across all Policy Indicators (Gower Dissimilarity Coefficient) 
 
 
 AU AT BE CA DK FI FR DE GR IE IT JP LU NL NZ NO PT ES SE CH UK US 
AU 0                      
AT .221 0                     
BE .182 .289 0                    
CA .334 .293 .212 0                   
DK .401 .445 .221 .286 0                  
FI .239 .406 .295 .391 .242 0                 
FR .432 .407 .302 .427 .345 .308 0                
DE .333 .298 .296 .290 .464 .389 .374 0               
GR .183 .399 .269 .285 .382 .363 .410 .332 0              
IE .284 .263 .308 .256 .436 .451 .512 .222 .334 0             
IT .323 .337 .234 .251 .397 .402 .399 .269 .337 .351 0            
JP .487 .437 .399 .351 .447 .473 .444 .363 .323 .411 .302 0           
LU .129 .335 .339 .484 .253 .356 .470 .454 .381 .452 .352 .522 0          
NL .285 .381 .277 .255 .377 .348 .371 .238 .198 .270 .338 .251 .355 0         
NZ .342 .353 .340 .257 .350 .379 .592 .340 .341 .208 .280 .408 .324 .298 0        
NO .264 .290 .287 .299 .322 .327 .393 .295 .422 .345 .309 .366 .261 .343 .361 0       
PT .223 .294 .252 .304 .418 .311 .349 .247 .237 .296 .363 .479 .379 .195 .454 .291 0      
ES .311 .325 .262 .339 .404 .359 .338 .246 .263 .307 .264 .347 .550 .244 .223 .299 .160 0     
SE .273 .387 .209 .290 .161 .209 .357 .407 .311 .362 .390 .499 .348 .343 .295 .305 .319 .339 0    
CH .296 .318 .332 .311 .487 .343 .383 .248 .239 .219 .319 .3839 .407 .243 .303 .421 .342 .311 .365 0   
UK .347 .388 .319 .284 .379 .425 .415 .297 .351 .264 .315 .320 .266 .217 .187 .387 .340 .281 .444 .363 0  
US .373 .466 .386 .336 .476 .561 .631 .389 .371 .324 .451 .226 .664 .335 .372 .493 .443 .423 .555 .423 .311 0 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B), own calculations. 
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However, the consideration of the mere distances appears to be an insufficient and 
ambiguous way to determine which countries can be grouped together according to 
their welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply. When hierarchical cluster 
analysis is applied to the dissimilarity matrix, it is possible to obtain a more 
conclusive picture of the groups of countries that show the least degree of 
dissimilarity. The underlying principle of cluster analyses is the achievement of 
maximal homogeneity within the single clusters and the achievement of maximal 
heterogeneity between the single clusters (cp. Wiedenbeck / Züll 2010). Within the 
method of agglomerative hierarchical clustering, the procedure of choice is the 
Ward’s Algorithm which groups the observations that only minimally increase the 
variance within one cluster and which also tends to produce more stable results. 
Hierarchical clustering begins with as many clusters as there are countries and 
gradually combines the cases that show the smallest dissimilarities until those 
countries find themselves all in one cluster. The dendrogram, which is the standard 
tree diagram of cluster analysis, is displayed in figure 4.2. and shows this process of 
aggregation. The determination of the number of clusters that represents the structure 
of the data best is often considered being a critical issue. The lengths of the vertical 
lines which link the clusters show how dissimilar the merged clusters are. 
Consequently, lengthier lines indicate greater dissimilarity (cp. Powell / Barrientos 
2004).  
 
In the case of the present analysis, the structure of the data is best captured by six 
country clusters because after the value of 0.4 in the vertical scale on the left, further 
mergers lead to very dissimilar clusters. These six clusters group countries that, in 
the majority of the cases, seem to be very different from what is known from 
traditional welfare state typologies. However, the dendrogram only indicates the 
degree of dissimilarity and does not give any indication about the extent of welfare 
incentives or their emphases of certain policy fields. Clearly, it appears to be less 
surprising to see France grouped together with Denmark, Sweden and Finland or to 
detect a cluster which contains Greece, Portugal and Spain. However, most of the 
other country groups consist of cases that would normally not be expected to be 
comparably little dissimilar.  
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Figure 4.2. Results of the Cluster Analysis for the Dissimilarity Matrix (Dendrogram) 
 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B), own calculations. 
Note:  The lengths of the vertical lines indicate the degree of dissimilarity. Shorter lines 
indicate less dissimilarity.  
 
 
Therefore, there is a need to examine what it is exactly that makes the countries 
within the clusters less dissimilar from each other than from the countries in the other 
clusters. A closer look at the raw macro data reveals that the countries in the single 
clusters are indeed characterized by different degrees and different emphases of 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply. An overview of the structure of 
the different country clusters and their ranking according to their average levels of 
welfare state incentives can be found in table 4.4. The table also shows that the 
variation with regard to school policy is rather narrow and on a very comparable 
level in every cluster and that the last two country clusters put considerably less 
effort on the field of employment-related measures than the other country groups. 
Furthermore, it is noticeable that many country groups are characterized by a very 
low level of incentives in the field of taxation and allowances, a field in which the 
sixth country cluster seems to be an irregular exception considering its overall level 
of incentives. Since table 4.4. only displays averages, a closer look at the raw data 
gives more information on the importance of single policy measures in each cluster, 
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on the extent of similarity between the countries in the clusters and on the level of 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4. Structure of the Six Country Clusters 
Cluster Mean across all 
Policy Fields 
and Countries 
in the Cluster 
Policy Fields Means for the Single Policy Fields across 
all Countries in the Cluster 
    
Cluster 1 
France 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Finland 
 
 
0.64 
Parental Leave   0.78 
Childcare   0.80 
School Policy   0.61 
Employment Law   0.73 
Taxation and Allowances   0.28 
 
Cluster 2 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Greece 
 
 
0.60 
Parental Leave   0.62 
Childcare   0.45 
School Policy   0.73 
Employment Law   0.69 
Taxation and Allowances   0.51 
 
Cluster 3 
Belgium 
Italy 
Canada 
 
 
0.58 
Parental Leave   0.57 
Childcare   0.60 
School Policy   0.73 
Employment Law   0.58 
Taxation and Allowances   0.41 
 
Cluster 4 
Australia 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Norway 
 
 
0.55 
Parental Leave   0.69 
Childcare   0.48 
School Policy   0.78 
Employment Law   0.74 
Taxation and Allowances   0.08 
 
Cluster 5 
Germany 
Ireland 
UK 
New Zealand 
Switzerland 
 
 
0.50 
Parental Leave                          0.48 
Childcare                              0.47 
School Policy            0.76 
Employment Law                        0.54 
Taxation and Allowances                                            0.26 
  
 
Cluster 6 
Japan 
USA 
 
 
0.41 
Parental Leave      0 
Childcare   0.49 
School Policy   
Employment Law   0.41 
Taxation and Allowances   0.75 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B), own calculations.  
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The first cluster (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and France) consists of countries which 
provide the highest level of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply and the 
comparison of mean values has already shown that they are distinguished from all 
the other country clusters by their particularly high effort in the field of public 
childcare. These countries offer legal entitlements to childcare, they provide full day 
care; they are characterized by low private and high public spending and by a 
comparably high coverage for both age groups and favorable child-staff ratios, 
especially for young children below the age of three. Apart from that, the level of 
incentives is comparably high in the two policy fields of employment law and 
parental leave. The countries provide full maternity and paternity leave and they pay 
the full length of the leave, even though not all the countries provide full sick child 
leave. The countries are characterized by high part-time benefits protection, medium 
to high first and second overtime premiums, high minimum vacation and a medium 
to low length of the workweek. With Denmark and France, this cluster encloses the 
two countries with the lowest number of maximum working hours per week. The 
level of welfare state incentives in the other policy fields is, however, comparably 
low. The school starting age is rather late and the length of school week and school 
year is mostly shorter than in the other country clusters. The level of cash benefits is 
rather low which is considered an incentive, but the level of tax breaks is low as well.  
 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands compose the second country cluster 
which is characterized by a lower average level of welfare state incentives for 
maternal labor supply. Compared to the first country cluster, its average level of 
incentives is considerably lower in the field of parental leave and childcare, but it is 
similar or even higher in the three remaining policy fields. The countries provide 
maternity, paternity and sick child leave, but only a relatively low share of the leave 
is paid and there is no full legal entitlement public childcare. Furthermore, the 
childcare facilities mostly offer part-time care and the public childcare spending is 
low as well. However, the countries provide high part-time benefits and contract 
termination protection, a comparably high number of paid holidays, a medium 
number of maximum working hours per week and medium to high minimum 
vacation. While the level of cash benefits is low (which is an incentive for labor 
supply), the tax breaks range at a medium level. Finally the school starting age is 
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relatively early and the length of school week and school year range at a medium 
level.  
 
The third cluster (Belgium, Italy and Canada) is, for the most part, characterized by a 
slightly lower average level of welfare state incentives than the foregoing cluster. 
The countries provide fully paid maternity leave, but at low length. There is no full 
legal entitlement to public childcare and the public childcare expenditures are rather 
low, although the coverage for children between the age of three and five is 
comparably high. The school starting age is rather late, but the length of the school 
week for children in primary education is high, while it is only at a medium level for 
older children and with regard to the length of the school year. The part-time contract 
termination protection is high, the standard workweek is at medium length and the 
provided minimum vacation is partly low. Just as in the second country cluster, 
family cash benefits are low, but family tax breaks are low as well.  
 
In the fourth country cluster (Australia, Luxembourg, Austria and Norway), the 
general level of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply is again slightly 
lower. These countries focus on parental leave and employment law and are 
characterized by, for instance, high part-time contract termination protection, a high 
first overtime premium, high minimum vacation and a medium length of workweek, 
by full maternity leave and by full sick child leave, although all four countries do not 
provide paternity leave arrangements. Apart from that, there is no legal entitlement 
for childcare and only low to medium public childcare spending, although private 
childcare costs range at a medium level. However, childcare by means of school 
schedules is higher than in any other country cluster. The lowest level of welfare 
state incentives for maternal labor supply can be found with regard to family 
allowances and taxation, since the level of family cash benefits is comparably high 
and the level of tax breaks is comparably low. 
 
The fifth country cluster (Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
Switzerland) can certainly be considered as a group of countries which only provides 
low incentives for maternal labor supply with no more than a slight emphasis on the 
field of school policy. Full maternity leave entitlements are not available in all 
countries in the cluster, there is almost no paternity leave and only a relatively low 
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share of the leave is paid, although most of the countries provide the possibility of 
sick child leave. There is no full legal entitlement to childcare and the care 
arrangements are mostly on a half day basis. The private childcare costs are high and 
the public spending for childcare is low, just as the childcare coverage for children 
below the age of three. Although the countries provide high part-time benefits and 
contract termination protection, they are characterized by some of the longest work 
weeks and comparably low minimum vacation. Furthermore, they mostly offer 
comparably high and therefore disincentive cash benefits in combination with a 
comparably low level of tax breaks.  
 
The sixth and last country cluster (United States and Japan) is, just like the fifth 
country cluster, characterized by a rather low level of welfare state incentives for 
maternal labor supply. These two countries focus on taxation and allowances and are 
characterized by a considerable distance to the other country clusters. Parental leave 
entitlements are limited, if not non-existent and there is no legal entitlement to public 
childcare and only low public spending on early childhood education and care. There 
is high part-time contract termination protection, but no paid holidays, a medium 
length of the workweek and a low level of minimum vacation. However, the level of 
cash benefits is low while the tax breaks range at a medium level.  
 
Analysis of Variance 
After having run an analysis of variance for the conventional country clusters in the 
foregoing subchapter, this method of analysis will be repeated to determine if the 
country groups established by the cluster analysis are better suited to explain the 
cross-national variation of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply. Table 
4.5. shows the means of the new country groups for every policy field and the results 
of the analysis of variance by means of single regressions of dummies for the country 
groups on the respective average level of welfare state incentives in the single policy 
fields. The cluster analysis suggested six groups of countries, leading to the creation 
of six country group dummies of which the group consisting of France, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland is used as a reference category. Again, the mean of the reference 
group is the regression constant while the coefficients of the other country groups 
indicate the difference of their mean compared to the mean of the reference group. A 
comparison of the amount of explained variance of these regressions to the results of 
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the analysis of variance for the conventional country clusters reveals that for three of 
the five policy fields, the share of explained variance is considerably higher when the 
countries are grouped according to the established clusters. The amount of explained 
variance in the field of parental leave doubled and it increases more than threefold in 
the fields of employment law and taxation and allowances.  
 
Table 4.5. Analysis of Variance for New Country Clusters 
Countries Parental Leave Childcare School 
Schedules 
Employment 
Law 
Taxation and 
Allowances 
 
Mean β Mean β Mean β Mean β Mean β 
 
Group 1 
(Reference 
Group) 
Australia 
Austria 
Luxembourg 
Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
.69 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.48 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
.78 
  
  
 
 
 
.74 
 
  
 
 
 
.08 
 
 
 
Group 2 
France 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Finland 
 
 
 
 
.78 
 
 
 
 
.085 
 
 
 
.80 
 
 
 
 
.319** 
 
 
 
.61 
 
 
 
-.17* 
 
 
 
.73 
 
 
 
-.007 
 
 
 
.28 
 
 
 
.195 
 
Group 3 
Belgium  
Italy 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
.57 
 
 
 
 
-.128 
 
 
 
.6 
 
 
 
 
.117 
 
 
 
 
.73 
 
 
 
-.045 
 
 
 
.58 
 
 
 
-.157* 
 
 
 
.41 
 
 
 
 
.331** 
 
Group 4 
Germany 
Ireland 
Switzerland 
New Zealand 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
.48 
 
 
 
 
 
-.215** 
 
 
 
 
.47 
 
 
 
 
-.011 
 
 
 
 
.76 
 
 
 
 
-.023 
 
 
 
 
.54 
 
 
 
 
-.2** 
 
 
 
 
.26 
 
 
 
 
.177 
 
Group 5 
Portugal 
Spain 
Greece 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
.62 
 
 
 
-.08 
 
 
 
.45 
 
 
 
-.028 
 
 
 
.73 
 
 
 
-.05 
 
 
 
.69 
 
 
 
-.045 
 
 
 
.51 
 
 
 
.427*** 
 
Group 6 
USA 
Japan 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
-.695*** 
 
 
.49 
 
 
.012 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
.41 
 
 
-.325** 
 
 
.75 
 
 
.667*** 
Constant .695*** .483*** .6*** .74*** .082 
R² .841 .653 
 
.336 .57 .583 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B), own calculations. 
Note: Countries are arranged according to the clusters established by the foregoing analysis.   
Averages for each policy field are generated from the values of the single indicators in 
each policy field. 
*** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
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Even though the amount of explained variance remain approximately constant in the 
field of childcare and is slightly lower in the field of school policy, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the here established country clusters prove to be more appropriate to 
explain the cross-national variance of incentives for maternal labor supply than 
conventional welfare state typologies.  
 
 
4.1.3. In-Depth Country Studies for Norway, Canada and Germany 
 
Although the comparison of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply across 
countries can be very insightful and although explorative cluster analyses can give an 
indication about how countries might have to be classified, it hardly reveals why the 
emerging country clusters are different from conventional and partly also from 
gender-sensitive welfare state typologies. A detailed review for every country 
included in the present study would go beyond its scope, but detailed reviews for a 
selection of countries which do not display the expected performance will give some 
indication of underlying causes. By means of the cases of Norway, Canada and 
Germany, the following subsections will show in more detail why these countries 
differ from other welfare state classifications. What makes Norway different from 
the other social-democratic welfare states? Why does Canada group with two more 
conservative welfare states and not with other liberal welfare states? And what 
classifies Germany with a number of liberal and so-called late female mobilization 
welfare states? The subsequent country studies intend to provide some insight into 
these questions by tracing some country-specific developments and characteristics 
that make them different from their traditional welfare state families.  
 
Norway 
It is true that with regard to many aspects of the political system and of the social 
policy orientation, Norway closely resembles the other social-democratic welfare 
states. Just like Sweden and Denmark, the country is a monarchy with a 
parliamentary government. The general social policy orientation is based on 
egalitarianism and universalism, i.e. the welfare state mainly provides equal benefits 
for all citizens or residents and welfare services are mainly financed through high 
taxation of incomes and goods (Bø 1993). However, a closer look at the data on 
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welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply reveals that Norway differs in 
some decisive respects. This finding is especially important since even gender-
sensitive welfare state typologies generally assume that all social-democratic welfare 
states do not only provide universal and equal social benefits for all their citizens, but 
also are the most supportive states with regard to services for families and with 
regard to female and maternal employment (cp. Siaroff 1994). In the case of Norway, 
the most significant deviations can be found in the policy fields of parental leave and 
public childcare. For instance, Norway is the only Scandinavian country that does 
not provide full paternity leave. That means that although there is a legal entitlement, 
the leave for fathers is unpaid. Furthermore, although Norway offers the maximum 
number of 36 months of general parental leave, only a third of this period is paid (cp. 
Moss and Wall 2007: 66).  
 
With regard to early childhood education and care, Norway bears resemblances to 
the other social-democratic countries in several respects. The childcare institutions 
predominantly provide full-time care and the private childcare costs do no exceed 
eight percent of the average family income. The childcare coverage for children 
below the age of three and for children aged three to five is just about as high as or 
even slightly higher than in other Scandinavian countries. However, Norway is the 
only Scandinavian country that does not provide a legal entitlement to infant care, 
kindergarten or pre-school and that does not spend more than one percent of the 
gross domestic product on the public provision of childcare. This is considerably less 
than the amount spent by the other social-democratic welfare states whose childcare 
expenditures equal or exceed 1.3 percent of the gross domestic product. Deviations 
can also be found in the field of employment law where Norway does not provide a 
protection of part-time employees with regard to benefits that is as extensive as it is 
in the other social-democratic welfare states.  
 
In turn and not surprisingly with regard to the findings of the cluster analysis, 
Norway shares a range of characteristics with the countries that the cluster analysis 
performed in the present study has identified as least dissimilar – Australia, Austria 
and Luxembourg. Generally, this cluster has been identified as one that provides a 
level of welfare state incentives towards maternal labor supply that is lower than in 
the cluster comprising the other Scandinavian welfare states. Just like Austria, 
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Norway provides full maternity and sick child leave. Australia, Austria and Norway 
offer full part-time contract termination protection and high premiums for the first set 
of overtime hours and in all three countries, the maximum number of working hours 
per week amounts to 40. The three other countries in the cluster spend about the 
same or less on early childhood education and care and the family tax breaks as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product do not exceed 0.20 percent in any of the 
countries.  
 
Apparently, Norway shares a considerable amount of characteristics with these 
welfare states when the focus is on welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply. 
No matter if conventional or gender-sensitive welfare state typologies are taken as a 
basis, the countries which cluster with Norway do normally all belong to different 
welfare state types. Norway’s deviations from other social-democratic welfare states 
with regard to welfare state incentives for maternal employment and its similarities 
with Australia, Austria and Luxembourg lead to the question which country-specific 
developments and characteristics make Norway more dissimilar from its traditional 
welfare state family than from the country cluster identified in the present study.  
 
Existing research has pointed out that there are some Norway-specific developments 
that make the country different from its Scandinavian counterparts and that make its 
effort with regard to welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply less distinct. 
A study by Anttonen and Sipilä (1996) deals with the division of responsibilities 
between the state and the family with regard to the care for children below the age of 
three and for the elderly population. The authors establish a typology of so-called 
caring regimes that separates Norway from the other Scandinavian welfare states. 
While Sweden, Denmark and Finland cluster together and represent welfare states 
which offer extensive public care for children below the age of three and for the 
elderly population, Norway is assigned to one country group with Great Britain and 
the Netherlands – countries in which public services for the elderly are equally 
comprehensive, but in which the availability of public services for early childhood 
care is insufficient (Anttonen and Sipilä 1996: 93).  
 
Other studies confirm that Norway seems to be the only Scandinavian country in 
which, for a long time, the demand for public childcare significantly exceeded the 
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supply. Henriksen and Holter (1978) argue that in general, Norwegian government 
intervention in family issues has been lagging behind actual changes in family life. In 
Sweden, for instance, the 1930s had been the decade of reforms in the field of family 
policy while these kinds of innovations did not start in Norway before the postwar 
period. This can partly be explained by the fact that until the 1960s, family relations 
in Norway were considered comparably stable and that divorce rates and the number 
of children born out of wedlock had been relatively low. During the 1960s, these 
patterns started to change and they were accompanied by an increase in female labor 
force participation. However, it was not until the 1970s that the Norwegian 
government started to adjust its family policy to the emerging changes.  
 
The observations on Norway as a welfare state that is lagging behind with regard to 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply have also been discussed by Bø 
(1993: 392) who explains that the connection between the entry of Norwegian 
women and mothers into the labor force – which has taken place slightly later than in 
Denmark or Sweden - and the public provision of early childhood education and care 
has not been as explicit in Norway as it has been in other Scandinavian countries. In 
Norway, the expansion of childcare services has not been a concomitant 
development to female labor force participation, a condition that has led to a high 
demand in combination with a level of supply that was lagging behind. And even 
though public childcare provision has improved during the last years, its expansion 
has still been slower than in other social-democratic countries. Bø also refers to the 
works of Leira (1987) who concludes that there are three reasons for Norway being a 
public childcare laggard and these reasons are of course related to each other. Having 
a predominantly agricultural economy, the relatively late industrialization and 
urbanization of Norway have resulted in public childcare services which mainly 
cover urban areas, but not the rural parts of the country. The second reason refers to 
the afore-mentioned increase in female and maternal labor force participation which 
has taken place at a later stage than in other Scandinavian countries. Third, and even 
though gender equality and women’s rights do play an important role in today’s 
Norwegian politics, traditions with regard to the importance of the family in 
children’s early socialization can also have influenced the slower expansion of public 
childcare services. 
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This is in line with the works of Henriksen and Holter who suppose that even if 
Norwegian politics started to consider family matters also being of public concern, 
family policy has not necessarily been focusing on the situation of women and 
mothers. What had indeed become a matter of public concern very early were the 
legal protection of women within marriages, divorce rights and mother-child related 
health issues, but for a long time, family policy had not been directed towards 
maternal labor force participation and towards enabling mothers to maintain 
autonomous households. To the contrary, "[t]he view that children need their 
mothers at home was strongly advocated in most political parties, also within the 
Labor Party […]" (Henriksen and Holter 1978: 57). This view is supported by a 
study by Crompton and Harris (1997) who find that although Norway is 
characterized by more liberal attitudes towards gender roles and relations, the 
country turns out to be more conservative with regard to the effect of women’s 
employment on family life (ibid: 186).  
 
Further studies dealing with the similarities between Norway and Australia, two 
countries which have also been assigned to the same cluster in the present analysis, 
seem to support this assumption. Eriksen and Lindsay (1999) compare unmarried 
cohabitation and family policy across the two countries and find large-scale 
similarities despite the general assumption that Norway is supposed to belong to the 
social-democratic welfare regime while Australia is supposed to belong to the liberal 
welfare regime. They argue that both countries have tended towards rather 
conservative attitudes towards the family. The afore-mentioned observations about 
the rather ambiguous opinions about gender roles and female employment in Norway 
also apply to Australia, although the political discourse has been even slightly more 
conservative in the latter country. Eriksen and Lindsay describe that Norwegian and 
Australian early family policies have been very similar in diverse respects. In the 
1950s and 1960s, family policy focused on the traditional nuclear family, favoring 
one-breadwinner families by means of tax rules in Norway and by means of family 
wages and lower wages for women in Australia. Childcare facilities were 
underdeveloped in both countries. Slight differences can be found in the field of 
support for unmarried mothers which has been provided in Norway, but not in 
Australia. Party rhetoric points to further similarities, showing that comparable to 
Norway (see above), "[…] the [Australian] conservative political parties have tended 
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to emphasize traditional family values in their policy-making […]" (ibid: 92). 
Furthermore, both countries provide or have provided a form of allowance paid to 
mothers who stay at home to take care of their children. In Australia, this measure 
had been introduced by the conservative coalition government elected in 1996 which 
has also implemented cuts in the program of childcare subsidies introduced by the 
former Labor government. In Norway, a similar allowance for mothers who stay at 
home had been introduced by the center government elected in 1997.  
 
Canada 
The cluster analysis that has been performed in the present study groups Canada with 
Italy and Belgium and this cluster has been considered the one with the truly 
moderate level of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply. At first sight, 
this combination of countries seems unusual, since both conventional and gender-
sensitive typologies are far from assuming that these countries should cluster 
together. While conventional welfare state research assumes Canada to be a liberal 
welfare state with only residual and means-tested social benefits, gender-sensitive 
typologies assign Canada to the type of welfare state which does indeed provide only 
minimal family welfare, but is concerned about gender equality with regard to labor 
force participation. In turn, Belgium and Italy are considered being more 
conservative or late female mobilization welfare states respectively, depending on if 
the conventional or a gender-sensitive perspective on welfare state performance is 
applied. However, both lines of research assume Belgium and Italy to be welfare 
states in which the family embodies the main pillar of welfare provision and in which 
incentives for female and maternal employment are not developed very strongly.  
 
Again, a closer look at the raw data reveals in which respect Canada is very different 
from its conventional welfare state family and in which respect it is very similar to 
Belgium and Italy. Compared to the other (protestant) liberal countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia, the United States and New Zealand, Canada generally 
provides a higher level of incentives for maternal labor supply. The level of family 
cash benefits is comparably low which is considered being an incentive for labor 
force participation. Furthermore, Canada provides better childcare quality than most 
of its liberal counterparts, especially when the child-staff ratio in kindergartens and 
preschools is considered. Also, Canada is the only liberal welfare state that offers full 
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maternity leave provision whose length of twelve months is almost fully paid. It is 
especially these last two characteristics that Canada shares with Italy and Belgium. 
These two countries also offer full maternity leave entitlements in combination with 
financing the full leave period which adds up to between nine and thirteen months. 
Consequently, the length of leave is also something that these three countries have in 
common. Further similarities can be established in the field of employment law. Just 
like Belgium and Italy, Canada provides full part-time contract termination 
protection, no premium for the second set of overtime hours and a standard 
workweek of 40 hours.  
 
Finding similarities between the (protestant) liberal Canada and the conservative 
Belgium and Italy can surprise, especially when the historic development of Canada 
as a country is considered and when the existing literature on welfare state 
comparisons is taken into consideration. In this respect, Canada is much closer to its 
usual welfare state counterparts than it is to Italy and Belgium. Historically, Canada 
is a country whose current population emerged due to large immigration movements 
from Europe, mainly from the United Kingdom and France. Between 1951 and 1971, 
a quarter of the population growth could still be assigned to immigration (Armitage 
1978). These immigration movements also involved large-scale contact and conflict 
with indigenous people and this characteristic of state development is certainly 
shared with many other liberal nations, such as the United States and Australia. 
Furthermore, Canada is considered a country that "[…] has felt regional, linguistic, 
intergovernmental, and cultural tensions […] and […] competing pressures of 
centripetal and centrifugal force […]" (Pence 1993: 61). In contrast to other 
immigrant countries, Canada has been considered a nation "[…] that embraced the 
idea of a multicultural mosaic rather than the idea of a melting pot of different 
cultures […]" and until the 1970s, it has not been possible to actually "[…] class 
one’s ethnic origin as "Canadian" in the Canadian census […]" (Armitage 1978: 
373).  
 
After the end of World War II, Canada had been one the few developed countries 
which had not been directly affected by the war and which experienced a period of 
economic growth and prosperity. This era has also been the heyday of the traditional 
male-breadwinner family and until then, family policy had not been a major field of 
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interest of Canadian social policy. But just like in many other Western countries, 
these structures began to change by the end of the 1960s and "[l]iving as part of the 
traditional two-parent nuclear family with children […]" became part of the life of a 
considerably smaller share of the Canadian population (ibid: 371). Since then, the 
labor force participation of women and mothers increased considerably, families 
became less stable and, comparable to the developments in Norway,  "[t]he welfare 
oriented childcare system "[…] was not able to keep up with the greatly enhanced 
demand for child care spaces […]" (Pence 1993: 62 et seqq.). Despite the increasing 
acknowledgment of this situation by the Canadian governments from the 1970s 
through to the 1990s, there had not been any federal legislation directly dealing with 
the issue of public childcare by the turn of the century. Also due to the highly 
provincial or regional character of the country, Canada is mainly characterized by a 
"[…] collection of dissimilar policies and programs […]" (ibid: 79).  
 
Generally, it seems that it is more the dissimilarities to the other liberal welfare states 
that lead Canada to be classified differently from Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. A study by O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999) 
points out that even though in Canada, the level of social spending and the character 
of social programs appears to be similar to the situation in the United States, Canada 
has also been more successful in fighting poverty among families with children and, 
most importantly, the country has established a universal health care system. 
Furthermore, Canada seems to pursue a less liberal approach in the sense that public 
intervention in social issues is not necessarily associated with negative connotations. 
Canada offers paid maternity and parental leave and despite the problematic situation 
in the field of childcare outlined above, Canada has been less reluctant in financially 
supporting non-profit childcare providers (O’Connor et al. 1999: 5 et seqq.). Even 
though in Canada, the private responsibility for setting up childcare arrangements is 
still very high and the use of informal or non-licensed care considerably exceeds the 
use of formal and licensed services, Canada has had a National Childcare Strategy 
that planned to improve the tax relief for childcare and to create new childcare spaces 
in cooperation with the provinces. However, it cannot be ignored that not every 
element of the strategy has been implemented and that in the end, the goals had to 
give way to other social policy concerns, such as child health, child abuse and child 
poverty (ibid: 81 et seqq.).  
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Nevertheless, the entire Canadian social security system appears to more similar to 
the systems established in Europe than to the system established in other liberal 
countries, such as the United States. Despite cutbacks and retrenchment, this still 
holds true for the arrangements in the fields of family allowances, retirement plans 
and health care (ibid: 128). Furthermore, single mothers in Canada seem to be better 
off in terms of income inequality and poverty and their caregiving work was 
supported under the Canada Assistance Plan. The Canada Assistance Plan had been 
replaced by the in some respects less generous Canada Health and Social Transfer in 
1995, but support for single parents has mostly continued in the context of provincial 
welfare programs (ibid: 132 et seqq.). And even though the general level of the 
services for the working population with caring responsibilities is lower than in some 
European countries, "[…] the range of support services for labor market participants 
is consistent with the [Canadian] policy orientation towards gender sameness in the 
labor market […]" (ibid: 193).  
 
A study by Gauthier (1996) is in line with the observations made by O’Connor et al. 
Her comparative analysis of family policies across a range of industrialized nations 
finds that the number of task forces, initiatives and committees which have been set 
up in by Canadian governments to deal with the public childcare question are rather 
unusual for a country belonging to the liberal welfare state family. Additionally, 
there are large-scale similarities between the pro-natalist orientation and policy of the 
francophone part of Canada and the pro-natalist programs implemented in France 
which is, again, underlining the similarities with European welfare states and the 
differences from other liberal welfare states.  
 
Germany  
No matter if conventional or gender-sensitive typologies are applied, Germany is 
almost always the ideal-typical case of the conservative, Christian-democratic state 
in which the family is considered the central provider of welfare and in which 
welfare state incentives for female and maternal labor supply are not very 
pronounced. However, the cluster analysis performed in the present study does not 
group Germany with its usual conservative counterparts, but with countries which 
are usually assigned to (protestant) liberal and late female mobilization regimes, such 
as the United Kingdom, Ireland and New Zealand. A closer look at the data show 
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that Germany does indeed share more characteristics with the (protestant) liberal and 
late female mobilization states than with its conventional conservative counterparts. 
Unlike other conservative welfare states, Germany is characterized by a very high 
level of family tax breaks of one percent of the gross domestic product. This is, 
however, the almost only case in which Germany provides a higher level of welfare 
state incentives for maternal labor supply than the other countries in its traditional 
welfare state family. Apart from that, Germany provides the lowest level of public 
spending for early childhood education and care of only 0.40 percent of the gross 
domestic product. Furthermore, in Germany, the standard work week is longer than 
in any other conservative welfare state with a legal maximum of 48 hours per week. 
In addition, there are no paternity leave arrangements at the time point that has been 
chosen for data collection and with 14 paid months out of 36 total months, the share 
of paid leave is lower than in any other conservative welfare states.  
 
In turn, it is mostly these characteristics which unify Germany with the countries in 
the cluster identified in the present analysis. The countries in this cluster only 
provide a limited legal entitlement to childcare and offer mostly half day care 
services. Furthermore, they are all characterized by low levels of public spending for 
early childhood education and care and they do all provide only limited paid shares 
of the total period of parental leave. Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom only 
pay about a third of the period of parental leave – 14 out of 36 months in Germany, 
4.5 out of 14 months in Ireland and 6 out of 18 months in the United Kingdom. The 
countries are further associated with each other by the level of welfare state 
incentives in the policy field employment law. While they do all provide full part-
time benefits and part-time contracts termination protection, the number of paid 
holidays per year is at a medium level and there is no premium for the second set of 
overtime hours. 
 
Generally, the former cluster analysis has shown that the country cluster that 
Germany belongs to is one that only provides a low level of incentives for maternal 
labor supply with no more than a slight upward tendency. Considering with which 
countries Germany clusters, there are two possible logics behind this classification. 
Germany is clustering with countries which are usually assigned either to late female 
mobilization welfare states or to (protestant) liberal welfare states. Applying the late 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
103 
 
female mobilization logic in combination with the Christian-democratic background 
of the country, it could be assumed that it is the high significance of the family as a 
welfare provider and as the main institution in charge of early childhood 
socialization that leads to a limited provision of welfare state incentives for maternal 
labor supply. A closer look at the situation of family policy in Germany after World 
War II reveals that for a long time after the end of the war, the family was seen as a 
natural institution that should be as unaffected as possible by state intervention. From 
the ideological Christian perspective, the only goal of family policy was to protect 
this natural institution from destructive societal influences, so "[…] that 
governmental activities, besides affirming the family as a central element, 
concentrated on providing direct cash benefits […]" for child rearing and housing 
(Neidhardt 1978: 219). At least until the 1960s, this view on family policy could 
easily prevail because family relations remained stable, including high marriage and 
low divorce rates and a stabilized birth rate.   
 
Having said that, it is doubtless that Germany has undergone some significant 
changes in its social and family structures. Female and maternal labor force 
participation have increased and after the reunification with the former German 
Democratic Republic, the differences between East and West Germany with regard 
to female employment and public childcare services became apparent, since the GDR 
had always put considerably more effort on the facilitation of employment for 
women and mothers (Pettinger 1993). These changes have certainly reinforced the 
debate about the importance of the family as a central societal institution and about 
the importance of mothers for the early socialization of children. However, at least 
until the turn of the century, changes in, for instance, the public provision of 
childcare can hardly be observed. Early childhood education and care institutions for 
children below the age of three have seemed to be "[…] unable to shake off their 
origins as provisions for families in distress […]" and they still resemble their 
historic predecessors which were mainly directed at "[…] the neglected children of 
the poor, working population […]" (ibid: 212 et seqq.).  
  
A study by Daly (1999) compares the relationship between Catholicism and social 
policy in Ireland and Germany and her study confirms the important role that 
religious traditions play with regard to the orientation of German and Irish family 
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policy, even though their social Catholic policy approaches have had different 
results. With regard to general family policy, public support is more extensive in 
Germany than it is in Ireland. On the one hand, Daly finds a diversified range of 
policies in Germany, including general cash transfers and tax allowances for all 
families. On the other hand, the range of policies is rather limited in Ireland, mostly 
supporting low earner families with children, providing targeted benefits and a level 
of financial support that is generally lower than the one provided in Germany. 
Furthermore, the policy objectives differ from each other, since Irish family policy is 
mostly directed at the alleviation of child poverty while German family policy is 
designed to support traditional family structures. Therefore, German family policy 
mostly targets the traditional male breadwinner family with children while low-
income families are the target of Irish family policy. Additionally, while Germany 
provides at least part-time childcare services for children above the age of three, 
public childcare in Ireland has mostly been limited to the provision of services for 
children who are considered to be at risk (ibid: 113).  
 
However, with regard to gender-related questions, the situation is slightly different. 
Daly takes a closer look at questions concerning the receipt of benefits by married 
women and mothers at their own right, concerning the differentials in the value of 
male and female benefits and concerning the size of tax incentives for a non-
employed spouse and here, Ireland performs better. In Ireland, mothers are the 
general recipients of benefits, the differences in the value of benefits are low and 
there are no tax incentives for couples in which one spouse is not employed or only 
employed at a low income (ibid: 115). These observations can lead to the conclusion 
that social Catholic traditions are persistent and influential in both Ireland and 
Germany, although they manifest themselves in different ways and that welfare state 
research has reasonable causes to assume that religious motives play an important 
role in determining the role of the state with regard to the support of families and the 
employment of mothers. 
 
Accrediting Germany’s lack of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply to 
its conservative Christian tradition is in line with existing conventional and gender-
sensitive research. In turn, applying the logic of liberalism can lead to the assumption 
that it is more the role of the market that determines the role of the welfare state. This 
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can be assumed to have similar consequences on welfare state behavior as religious 
traditions, since it also leads to as few state intervention in social and employment 
questions as possible, even though the rationale behind this reluctance is different. 
From this perspective, the labor market participation of mothers and incentives for 
their labor supply is a relevant question as well and recent developments in German 
labor market policy show considerable similarities with liberal welfare states like the 
United Kingdom. The idea of a so-called Third Way in social policy has originated in 
the United Kingdom and it was surrounded by a resurgent debate about the functions, 
responsibilities and duties of welfare states and their citizens. The works of Anthony 
Giddens (1998) emphasize that social rights should not be unconditional, but that 
they should depend on the acceptance of responsibility and obligations on the part of 
the citizens. Keywords like labor market flexibilization, active labor market policies, 
training and education have determined the debate and underlined the contrast 
between the conventional welfare state providing universal entitlements, the 
protection of labor and social services and the new, enabling welfare state which 
emphasizes a more efficient delivery of social welfare services and goods by private 
agencies, the promotion of work also by means of sanctions and a selective targeting 
of benefits instead of universal entitlements (cp. Gilbert 2002 / Surender 2004). In its 
extreme form, the welfare state of the Third Way has also been understood as a kind 
of workfare state, an idea that is linked to an increased conditionality of rights, more 
obligations for the benefit recipient and a stronger compulsion to accept a job offer, 
even if this implies an employment in the low-wage sector (cp. Dingeldey 2007). 
 
The ideas of the Third Way logic have also found their way into the feminist debate. 
For instance, Lewis (2002) assumes that the Third Way perspective on family policy 
would include an increase in gender neutrality, leading to a generalization of the 
male-oriented model of employment and welfare to women. Furthermore, Daly 
(2004) explains that with regard to family policy, Third Way ideas manifest 
themselves in measures such as a decrease in unconditional support for unemployed 
(lone) mothers and in a decreasing legitimacy of care as the full-time activity of 
mothers. By contrast, the significance of fostering if not compelling employment 
increases, since according to the Third Way logic, social inclusion equals inclusion 
in the labor markets. A Third Way approach towards families would include the 
encouragement of working among parents by facilitating leaves from employment, 
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by reforms of tax and benefit provisions and by expanding the public support of 
childcare. However, a Third Way approach towards family policy would also imply a 
conditionality of financial support and other family benefits on parental behavior and 
a revaluation of motherhood in the sense that mothers are more strongly expected to 
combine it with paid employment.  
 
Even though the literature on Third Way politics attempts to illustrate that these 
kinds of reforms do not imply that responsibilities only lay with the citizens, the 
implementation of these liberal reforms conveys the impression that they have not 
necessarily led to an even involvement of both state and individuals. In Germany, the 
first important reform was the adoption of the so-called Job-AQTIV Law in 2002. 
This abbreviation stands for activation, qualification, training, investment and job 
placement and it has been considered as an important step of reorientation in the field 
of labor market policy, equaling a break with the conservative welfare state regime 
and a move towards Anglo-American policy traditions in the sense of the so-called 
New Deal (Fleckenstein 2008). It was meant to lead to an improvement of the quality 
of placement and an increase of further education offers, for the creation of job 
applicant profiles and a stronger cooperation with the unemployed person. 
Furthermore, it was supposed to strengthen the preventive character of labor market 
policy and facilitate a faster reaction to unemployment. The implementation of this 
law has been notably characterized by key words that are very comparable to the 
debate in the United Kingdom, emphasizing that the new German labor market 
policy is supposed to be supportive and demanding at the same time. These key 
words can easily be linked to their British equivalents of No Rights without 
Responsibilities. Furthermore, key concepts like proactiveness and individual 
responsibility, especially in the field of further education and training, have played a 
prominent role in the both the German and the British rhetoric and debates around 
the new labor market legislations. 
 
Summary 
The cluster analysis performed in the present study has indicated that with regard to 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply, countries seem to be classified 
differently from existing conventional and even from gender-sensitive welfare state 
typologies. By means of the cases of Norway, Canada and Germany, the foregoing 
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exemplary country studies have attempted to show which country-specific 
characteristics and developments have contributed to the deviations from existing 
welfare state classifications. The case of Norway has shown that even though the 
country resembles other social-democratic welfare states in many respects, such as 
the political system and the general universal and egalitarian features of social 
policy, it is showing less pronounced welfare state incentives for maternal labor 
supply. Industrialization and the increase in female labor force participation have 
taken place at a slightly later stage than in Norway’s Scandinavian counterparts and 
the creation of welfare state incentives for female labor supply has developed more 
slowly. The country study has shown that in comparison to other Scandinavian 
countries, Norway has proven to be characterized by considerably more conservative 
attitudes towards family structures and maternal employment. The fact that Norway 
shares this characteristic with Australia, a country that it has been grouped with in 
the present cluster analysis, further supports the fact that the more traditional 
attitudes towards family life have been one of the significant driving forces behind 
Norway falling behind.  
 
A more detailed look at the situation in Canada has also given some insights about 
how and why the country performs differently from its traditional liberal welfare 
state family. It can most certainly be said that Canada provides a higher level of 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply than other liberal welfare states. It 
also appears that it is more the differences from other liberal welfare states than the 
distinct comparability with non-liberal welfare states that leads Canada to cluster 
away from its traditional welfare state family. Nevertheless, both the historical 
similarities with other liberal welfare states and the European origins of the country 
have to be taken into consideration. A closer examination of the development of 
Canadian social policy shows that it cannot be ruled out that the country has 
maintained a higher proximity to its European roots than other typical immigration 
countries and that the influence of its liberal neighbors has not manifested itself in 
every field of social policy.  
 
In the present analysis, Germany has been clustered with liberal welfare states like 
the United Kingdom and late female mobilization welfare states like Ireland. This 
country cluster shows a relatively low level of welfare state incentives for maternal 
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labor supply and in the case of Germany, the combination of two more or less 
subsequent developments can be held accountable for that. Just like Ireland, 
Germany has started off as a welfare state that has been heavily influenced by 
religious traditions, leading to limited welfare state intervention in family issues and 
a promotion of traditional family structures. But the promotion of traditional family 
structures has not prevented female labor force participation rate from increasing. In 
this sense, Germany has undergone the same societal changes as many other 
European countries. However, the original conservative attitude towards welfare 
state intervention in family structures has recently been joined by a more liberal 
attitude towards social policy. This type of move towards Anglo-American politics 
has not led to more welfare state intervention either. By contrast, it is characterized 
by an emphasis of individual responsibilities and a conditionality of rights. Limited 
welfare state intervention due to religious traditions in combination with a turn 
towards more liberal social policies can be considered one possible cause for 
Germany’s low level of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply.  
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4.2. The Relationship between Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor 
Supply and the Labor Market Participation of Individual Mothers 
 
The foregoing analysis of the cross-national variation of welfare state incentives 
towards maternal labor supply has revealed that the support of maternal employment 
is shaped differently across countries and that patterns of support seem to be different 
from conventional and other gender-sensitive typologies. Since the country level 
analysis has shown that labor supply incentives are partly characterized by 
considerable differences, it is worth investigating if this variation is reflected by the 
labor supply behavior of mothers, i.e. if higher levels of welfare state incentives are 
positively associated with higher average levels of maternal labor supply. This 
procedure is in line with the development of welfare state research. The theoretical 
chapter has pointed out that welfare state research has moved from explaining 
welfare state development and variation to the analysis of the effects of welfare state 
policies on societies and individual lives. While early studies dealing with the effects 
of welfare state policy mostly focused on aggregate economic well-being like GDP 
per capita, absolute and relative measures of poverty as well as measures of 
subjective poverty perception, more recent work has started to focus on the effects of 
social policy on specific population groups. The effects of welfare state policies on 
the living situation of women have been of particular interest for this line of research. 
Just as the gender-neutral lines of welfare state research, studies which take the 
gender dimension into account underwent a shift towards the consideration of not 
only the evaluation and comparison of welfare state policies, but also of welfare state 
effects, especially when it comes to female labor market participation. The studies by 
Gornick et al. (1996b), Platenga and Hansen (1999), Gornick and Meyers (2003) and 
Pettit and Hook (2005 / 2009) are a few prominent examples of an analysis of the 
relationship between welfare state policies and individual outcomes. All these studies 
provide useful starting points for the development of a valid selection of welfare state 
incentives for maternal labor supply. With the FEMMES Dataset, the present study has 
assembled central indicators for public support of maternal employment identified in 
previous research and has extended this selection by adding further explanatory 
factors which are, from a theoretical point of view, considered as incentives for 
maternal labor supply. The selection of explanatory factors used for the present study 
is strictly limited to labor supply incentives and is combined with the necessary 
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individual and country level control variables to test their association with the 
individual labor supply behavior of mothers by means of hierarchical logistic 
models. The first subsection of this chapter presents information on the dependent 
variable on the individual level and the independent variables on the country level. 
The second subsection of this chapter describes the selection of individual and 
country level control variables included in the hierarchical logistic models. The third 
subsection presents and discusses the results of the multi-level analyses.  
 
 
4.2.1. The Association between Individual Labor Supply and the Explanatory 
Variables on the Country Level 
 
Chapter 3.1. has already provided the most central information on the source and the 
coding of the individual level variables of which one is the dependent variable, i.e. 
the basic activity status of mothers. The subsample of the EU SILC 2005 used for the 
present study consists of 42.789 women with children from 15 European countries7. 
Graph 4.1. shows the share of employed mothers (as opposed to mothers who do not 
supply labor to the market) by country in ascending order. These descriptive numbers 
document that maternal labor force participation differs considerably across countries 
and gives further justification on why the welfare state determinants of maternal 
labor supply are still worth investigating. While the share of employed mothers does, 
for instance, not exceed 60 percent in some Southern European countries, it amounts 
to more than 60 percent in the United Kingdom and it exceeds the 70 percent 
threshold in France. In some of the Scandinavian countries, it amounts to more than 
80 percent. The order of countries does not seem to be very striking or different from 
what could have been expected from earlier empirical findings. The Southern 
European countries and the countries with a strong Christian tradition are 
characterized by lower female employment rates than the social-democratic welfare 
states. One exception is the case of Portugal which is characterized by a relatively 
high share of employed mothers compared to other Southern European welfare 
states, but existing research has shown that this unusually high female employment 
rate can be traced back to the specific historic and economic development of the 
former dictatorship (cp. Cardoso 1996).  
                                                 
7Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom 
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Graph 4.1. Share of Employed Mothers 
 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
 
 
The selection of labor supply incentives that are assumed being a possible 
explanation for this cross-national variation covers the five different policy fields of 
parental leave, childcare, school policy, employment law and taxes and benefits. 
While the theoretical argumentation in favor of those policy fields and of the single 
indicators from each field has been presented in further detail in chapter 2.3., chapter 
3.2. has provided the main information on the data sources and the coding procedures 
for the explanatory variables on the country level. All country level variables take on 
values ranging from 0 to 1. Higher values always imply a higher degree of welfare 
state incentives for maternal labor supply. Consequently, a positive relationship 
between (the indicators from) all five policy fields and maternal labor supply is 
expected. For the coding of the macro level variables, this approach implies, in turn, 
that some variables, such as, for instance, the level of childcare fees, had to be 
recoded to assign countries with a high level of private childcare costs a lower value 
than countries with a low level of private childcare costs. Another important example 
for which this kind of recoding has been applied are the family cash benefits, since 
low benefits are actually considered having a more incentivizing effect on labor 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
112 
 
supply than high family cash benefits. Providing a lower level of cash benefits is, 
hence, positively connoted and leads to ascribing higher values to countries which 
provide a lower level of benefits. The variables whose values were already ranging 
between 0 and 1 (or 0 and 100 respectively) and where higher values already implied 
a higher level of welfare state incentives, such as, for instance, childcare coverage, 
were simply applied in their original form. When meaningful, some policies were 
recoded into categorical variables, for instance with regard to the information on 
entitlement to and replacement rates during parental leave. For other variables, the 
highest actual value was used as a maximum and assigned the value 1 while the other 
values were transformed to a percentage share of it. Table 4.6. shows the average 
levels of welfare state incentives across countries which are used as a starting point 
for the hierarchical logistic analysis.  
 
 
 Table 4.6. Average Levels of Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply  
(2004-2010) 
Country Average Incentive Level 
 
 Parental 
Leave 
Childcare School 
Policy 
Employment 
Law 
Taxation and 
Allowances 
 
AT 0.72 0.31 0.68 0.79 0.05 
BE 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.69 0.38 
DE 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.55 0.75 
DK 0.60 0.93 0.64 0.69 0.13 
ES 0.66 0.48 0.68 0.61 0.60 
FL 0.82 0.79 0.57 0.86 0.25 
FR 0.92 0.61 0.67 0.58 0.60 
GR 0.50 0.47 0.82 0.67 0.38 
IE 0.42 0.50 0.74 0.59 0.10 
IT 0.50 0.51 0.72 0.45 0.38 
NL 0.60 0.59 0.76 0.66 0.58 
NO 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.56 0.23 
PT 0.70 0.48 0.66 0.84 0.48 
SE 0.77 0.88 0.71 0.80 0.13 
UK 0.43 0.56 0.82 0.49 0.20 
Mean  0.63 0.58 0.70 0.63 0.40 
Source:  FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B), own calculations. 
Note:  Averages for each policy field are generated from the values of the single indicators in 
each policy field. 
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In two cases, there were no or not enough data available for the single welfare state 
incentives to calculate meaningful and comparable averages for the respective policy 
fields. For Denmark, the information on school policies is missing and for Spain, the 
data on early childhood education and care is incomplete. For these two cases, the 
respective average levels of welfare state incentives have been calculated by using 
the average of the values of the countries that Denmark and Spain are usually 
grouped with. Both conventional and gender-sensitive welfare state typologies as 
well as the cluster analysis performed in the present study have shown that Denmark 
is most similar to Sweden and Finland while Spain is most similar to Portugal and 
Greece. It is not unreasonable to assume that with regard to school policy and 
childcare, these similarities exist as well. Therefore, the average values for school 
policy in Sweden and Finland have been used to calculate the average level of school 
policy for Denmark. The average values for childcare in Portugal and Greece have 
been used to calculate the average level of early childhood education and care for 
Spain respectively.  
 
The variables from the policy field of parental leave mainly cover legal entitlements, 
regulations of length and payments. Policy instruments from this field regulate the 
relationship between employer and employee in the period after childbirth and with 
regard to questions of caregiving for children at home. It has been argued before that 
parental leave with a legislated job guarantee avoids the decrease of the value of 
market time that would normally be caused by the interruption of employment 
although parental leave implies an actual employment discontinuity. If parents in 
general and mothers in particular have the possibility to take up a period of paid 
maternity leave, they can return to their workplace and they are not at risk of 
considerable financial losses during or after the employment break. In this sense, the 
advantages of a regulated leave from employment outweigh the disadvantages of the 
virtual interruption of work that is associated with the leave.  
 
Previous research has also shown that childcare responsibilities are one of the main 
factors which prevent mothers from carrying out uninterrupted full-time employment 
(cp. Platenga and Hansen 1999). In the present study, the variables on public 
childcare cover the legal, the monetary and the infrastructural dimension of welfare 
state intervention. With regard to the effect of school schedules on maternal labor 
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supply, this relationship can be compared to the case of public childcare. In a large 
part of the developed world, a certain amount of school years is compulsory for 
every child. In contrast to public childcare provision for children below school age, 
school education is normally institutionalized and available to every child without 
specific legal entitlement. However, the configuration of certain features of school 
education can be assumed to influence the possibility of reconciliation of work and 
family life for parents of school-aged children and in this way also affect the labor 
supply decision of mothers.  
 
The policy field of employment law basically captures the (temporal) flexibility at the 
workplace, even though its potential effects on the financial situation cannot be 
denied. Generally, working time policy protects the employee from inappropriately 
high working hours, regulates overtime conditions and compensation, provides for 
sufficient vacation and protects from discrimination of part-time employees. 
Working conditions can be assumed to affect maternal labor supply because they 
indicate the possibility of reconciliation of work and family life without substantial 
income losses. Labor supply incentives from the policy field of taxes and allowances 
refer more directly to the influence of social policy on the financial situation of 
families. Since in most cases, earnings from employment are the kind of income that 
is subject to taxation (compared to, for instance, some social benefits), family tax 
breaks are an important policy instrument to increase the effective market wage of a 
working mother. Family cash benefits can actually have a negative effect on maternal 
labor supply by increasing the reservation wage. For the present purpose, family cash 
benefits will therefore be understood as a disincentive to labor supply and the level 
of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply will be rated higher when the 
share of the GDP spent on family cash benefits is lower. The following scatterplots 
of the share of employed mothers per country and the average level of welfare state 
incentives in the five different policy fields already give some indication on how 
maternal labor force participation can possibly be associated with social and family 
policies and if the assumption that a higher level of incentives leads to a higher level 
of maternal labor supply can hold true. 
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Graph 4.2. Parental Leave and Labor Supply  
 
Correlation coefficient: r = 0.57 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
Note: Averages for each policy field are generated from the values of the  
single indicators in each policy field. 
 
 
 
Graph 4.3. Early Childhood Education and Care and Labor Supply 
 
Correlation coefficient: r = 0.78 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
Note: Averages for each policy field are generated from the values of the  
single indicators in each policy field. 
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Graph 4.4. School Policy and Labor Supply 
 
Correlation coefficient: r = - 0.51 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
Note: Averages for each policy field are generated from the values of the  
single indicators in each policy field. 
 
 
 
Graph 4.5. Employment Law and Labor Supply 
 
Correlation coefficient: r = 0.49 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
Note: Averages for each policy field are generated from the values of the 
single indicators in each policy field. 
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Graph 4.6. Taxes and Allowances and Labor Supply 
 
Correlation coefficient: r = -0.46 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
Note: Averages for each policy field are generated from the values of the  
single indicators in each policy field. 
 
 
 
Graph 4.2. and 4.3. show relatively strong and positive associations between parental 
leave and maternal labor supply and childcare and maternal labor supply 
respectively. Graph 4.4., in turn, shows a negative correlation between the average 
incentive level in the field of school policy and the share of employed mothers. Also 
the scatterplots shown in graphs 4.5. and 4.6. only partly confirm the assumption of a 
positive association between the level of incentives and the share of employed 
mothers. While the correlation between employment law and labor supply is positive, 
but less strong than the one between parental leave and maternal labor supply, the 
correlation between the average incentive level in the field of taxation and benefits 
and the average maternal labor force participation is negative.  
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4.2.2. Individual Level and Country Level Control Variables 
 
In the theoretical remarks on the origins of labor supply theory, it has become 
apparent that in its beginnings, it has mainly been individual factors that have been 
taken into account to explain labor market behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to 
include a number of individual level characteristics into the analysis. Detailed 
information on the theoretical argumentation and operationalization can be found in 
chapters 2.3. and 3.1. Table 4.7. shows the distribution of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the mothers per country. On average and across countries, the 
women in the sample are 39,7 years old, with a minimum of 38,1 years in the United 
Kingdom and a maximum of 41,9 in Finland. One of the main explanatory factors for 
labor supply on the individual level is the market wage of a person, assuming that 
with an increasing market wage, the opportunity costs of not supplying labor to the 
market rise and therefore, the labor supply probability increases. Here, information 
on the monthly cash income from employment has been used to operationalize the 
market wage of a person. Since especially the market wage is often subject to a 
selection bias because it can only be observed for persons who are actually in 
employment, missing wages have been estimated by means of the Heckman 
correction method which had to be pursued for about 16.000 mothers in the sample 
(cp. chapter 3.3.). With an average monthly income of about 1.000 EUR in Portugal 
and an average income of about 2.500 EUR in Denmark, the differences in the 
monthly cash income from employment are considerable.  
 
Labor supply theory suggests that not only the individual wage from employment, 
but also other sources of income have to be taken into account for an analysis of 
labor supply. It is assumed that there can be a trade-off between non-labor income 
and income from employment because some social benefits can be connected to not 
being employed. Furthermore, the one partner’s income from employment can 
decrease due to a necessary reduction of market time when the other partner decides 
to supply labor to the market as well. If both partners decide to allocate some time to 
the labor market, there is a possibility that they each supply less labor to the market 
than they would, individually, if the respective other partner would decide to 
specialize in non-market work.  
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  Table 4.7. Socio-Economic Characteristics Across Countries 
Country Share of 
Employed 
Mothers 
Average 
Age 
Average 
Gross 
Monthly 
Income from 
Employment 
In EUR 
Average 
Monthly Non-
Labor Income 
in EUR 
(Household 
Income minus 
Income from 
Employment) 
 
Education 
no education 
beyond 
compulsory 
schooling 
education 
beyond 
compulsory 
schooling 
AT 59.68 38,6 1496 2671 20.4 79.6 
BE 67.17 39 1850 2071 19.3 80.7 
DE 55.12 40,7 1514 2545 6.3 93.7 
DK 84.70 40 2556 2345 15.8 84.2 
ES 52.50 39,6 1387 1739 48.5 51.5 
FL 74.36 41,9 1703 2557 10,3 89,7 
FR 74.54 39,2 1650 2130 13.1 86.9 
GR 58.02 38,5 1361 1597 35.8 64.2 
IE 56.76 40,7 1745 3157 33.5 66.5 
IT 52.35 39,6 1511 2352 42.7 57.3 
NL 54.10 39,7 1489 2224 22.5 77.5 
NO 79.63 39,6 2051 3506 5.7 94.3 
PT 67.25 39,3 1016 1373 71 29 
SE 73.53 40,3 1654 2067 9.5 90.5 
UK 63.54 38,1 1766 2820 13.4 86.6 
Average 62.42 39,7 1616 2336 25,9 74.1 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
 
 
Therefore, it can be assumed that with increasing non-labor income, the trade-off 
between supplying labor to the market and not supplying labor to the market 
increases as well. For the purpose of the present study, the monthly non-labor income 
has been calculated by subtracting the individual mother’s market income from the 
total disposable household income. Just like the average individual wages, the 
monthly non-labor income is characterized by considerable differences across 
countries, ranging from an average of about 1.300 EUR in Portugal to an average of 
more than 3.000 EUR in Norway.  
 
Apart from direct financial determinants of labor supply, there is also a number of 
more indirect factors that have to be considered. It is assumed that average earnings 
rise with the level of education and that individuals with a higher level of education 
are more likely to supply labor to the market than individuals with a lower level of 
education because the opportunity costs are higher for them. With regard to 
educational achievement, the sample of women has been subdivided into those who 
have no education beyond compulsory schooling, i.e. who have finished no more 
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than lower secondary education, and those who have achieved educational degrees 
beyond compulsory schooling. On average, only a quarter of the women have not 
achieved more than compulsory education. However, the minimum amounts to only 
five or six percent in Norway and Germany and to more than 40 percent in Spain and 
Italy. In Portugal, the share of women with no education beyond compulsory 
schooling amounts to more than 70 percent.  
 
 
Graph 4.7. Average Income from Employment and Labor Supply 
 
Correlation coefficient: r = 0.69 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
 
 
The exemplary scatterplot in graph 4.7. shows the relation between the share of 
employed mothers per country and the average monthly income from employment 
per country. The correlation between those variables is clearly strong and positive 
and should also be reflected in the logistic regressions. Table 4.8. gives information 
on the different types of households the women in the sample live in. According to 
labor supply theory, this information is essential since, for instance, the number of 
children and the associated potential costs for childcare outside the home can be 
considered as an effective decrease of the market wage. On average, about 50 percent 
of the women live in households with one dependent child while only 15 percent live 
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in households with three dependent children or more. However, the shares of the 
respective households show that it is more common for families in Finland, Ireland 
Norway or Sweden to have three or more children than it is for families in Spain, 
Italy or Portugal.  
 
 
Table 4.8. Family Composition Across Countries 
Country Number of Children Marital Status Parenting Status 
 At least one 
child 
Two 
children 
Three or more 
children 
Share of married 
mothers 
Share of single 
mothers 
AT 55.08 31.45 13.48 80.51 7.93 
BE 46.68 35.11 18.21 76.18 9.90 
DE 53.36 35.39 11.25 76.47 16.74 
DK 39.92 43.72 16.35 78.40 4.18 
ES 57.90 34.96 7.13 81.66 3.91 
FL 42.01 35.19 22.81 78.57 5.39 
FR 43.00 39.79 17.21 72.09 7.81 
GR 53.77 35.98 10.25 89.69 3.63 
IE 47.90 29.04 23.06 75.16 13.21 
IT 58.17 34.17 7.67 82.55 5.25 
NL 36.26 44.61 19.13 81.89 6.59 
NO 39.82 38.44 21.47 69.70 6.54 
PT 64.65 28.62 6.73 83.14 4.61 
SE 40.35 39.15 20.50 64.88 6.62 
UK 52.77 33.72 13.51 66.33 19.54 
Mean  49.79 36.07 14.14 77.92 7.88 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). 
 
 
From the perspective of labor supply theory, it is also important to take into account 
whether an individual is married or whether they pursue the parenting task alone. 
According to the assumptions about specialization and exchange, lower wage rates 
for women and traditions of socialization can increase the probability that the wife 
allocates more time to domestic work because she is considered being more 
productive in this field and the family forgoes less market earnings and goods than if 
the husband would opt for domestic work. Being married can hence be assumed to 
decrease the probability of labor supply. On average, three quarters of the women in 
the sample are married.  
 
The share of married women is, however, considerably lower in the United Kingdom 
and in Sweden than it is, for instance, in Greece or in the Portugal. The data on the 
share of single mother families reveal that a low share of married mothers does not 
necessarily imply a high number of single mother families or vice versa. On average, 
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about eight percent of the women in the sample live in a single adult household with 
children. In some countries, the share is, however, considerably higher, amounting to 
over 13 percent in Ireland, to over 16 percent in Germany and to almost 20 percent in 
the United Kingdom while it is lower than the average in Sweden. 
 
The control of certain factors is not only advisable on the individual level, but also 
on the country level. By including information on the overall female employment-
population ratio, the present study takes the general labor market situation for women 
into account. Since simple unemployment rates only measure the ratio of those 
individuals in a country which are registered as unemployed in relation to the 
national labor force, the present study uses data on the female employment-
population ratio which "[…] relates the level of employment to the working-age 
population (those aged 15 – 64), regardless of whether or not (individual) people are 
officially considered to be in the labor force […]" (Siaroff 1994: 86; Leon 1981).   
 
Furthermore, a control variable for the predominance of conservative attitudes 
towards the role of women and mothers is included, even though the present study 
assumes that these attitudes can just as well be influenced and shaped by the degree 
of state support for female employment. However, the relationship between public 
support for female employment and private attitudes towards the role of women can 
also be subject to reverse causality, implying that the state aligns its own policies 
with the traditions and attitudes that are prevalent in its society to, for instance, 
ensure the support of voters. Since the EU SILC 2005 does not provide information 
on attitudes, the corresponding data have been gathered from the European Values 
Study 2008. The EVS 2008 provides a variable that asks for the relationship between 
working mothers and their children or, more specifically, if the respondents think 
that working mothers can establish a relationship with her children that is just as 
warm and secure as the relationship that non-working mothers can potentially 
establish with their children. For the purpose of the present study, the respondents 
who have (strongly) disagreed with that statement have been summarized and are 
used as a representation of the share of the population that holds more conservative 
values towards the role of mothers. 
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Graph 4.8. Predominance of Conservative Attitudes and Labor Supply 
 
Correlation coefficient: r = - 0.86 
Source: EU SILC, women with children, 2005 (n = 42.789). EVS 2008 for the  
predominance of conservative attitudes. 
 
 
The scatterplot in graph 4.8. shows the relationship between the share of employed 
mothers and the predominance of conservative attitudes towards the role of women 
and mothers and the relationship is indeed considerable. A high and negative 
correlation coefficient of – 0.86 indicates that it is indeed important to control for the 
cultural aspects related to questions of female employment.  
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4.2.3 Hierarchical Logistic Regressions 
 
The Influence of the Average Level of Welfare State Incentives on Maternal Labor Supply 
The foregoing descriptions have already given some preliminary insights into the 
question which welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply could be positively 
associated with maternal employment decisions and how strong these relations can 
be. In a next step, the influence of the individual level determinants and of the 
average levels of welfare state incentives have been tested by means of a hierarchical 
logistic regression to provide a much clearer picture of the impact of individual and 
policy factors on maternal labor force participation. From a methodological 
perspective, a total number of fifteen countries for the multi-level analysis implies 
that the number of independent variables on the country level has to be limited as 
well. Therefore, the analysis starts by using the average levels of welfare state 
incentives across policy fields as independent variables on the country level.  
 
Table 4.9. presents seven different models. The first model refers to the common 
intercept only model whose residual error variances on the individual and on the 
country level are used to calculate the so-called intra class correlation coefficient ρ. 
The intra class correlation coefficient is used to determine if individuals from the 
same country are more alike than individuals from different countries. If this is the 
case, it is assumed that the explanatory variables on the country level can indeed be 
held accountable for the variation between the countries. The intra class correlation 
coefficient ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values implying a higher share of the 
variance being located on the country level. For the present calculations, the intra 
class correlation coefficient amounts to ρ = 0.13 which indicates that at least to a 
certain extent, country level factors are responsible for the variation between the 
countries.  
 
The second model tests the effects of the individual level variables on the odds of 
maternal labor force participation. The effects of the individual level variables are 
allowed to be random, i.e. to vary across countries, since it cannot necessarily be 
assumed that their impact is equal across countries. Furthermore, all continuous 
independent variables on the individual level (age, wage and non-labor income) have 
been centered around their grand mean. All individual level effects prove to be 
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congruent with the basic assumptions of labor supply theory and apart from the 
effects of wage and marital status, all effects are significant. Age and education are 
positively associated with the probability of labor force participation. Compared to 
mothers who have no education beyond compulsory schooling, the odds of being 
employed are more than four times higher for mothers with more than lower 
secondary education (education = 1). In turn, an increasing number of children and 
being a single parent are negatively associated with maternal labor supply. The same 
applies to the non-labor income whose association with the employment status is 
negative as well.  
 
The following five models show how the average levels of welfare state incentives in 
the five different policy fields are associated with the odds of maternal employment. 
Adding the respective explanatory variable and the control variables for culture and 
the general employment situation for women does not change the individual level 
effects. Only the average level of incentives in the field of parental leave is positively 
and significantly associated with maternal labor supply. This can be understood as a 
confirmation of the strand of welfare state research that assumes leave regulations to 
have a rather positive effect on maternal employment as opposed to the strand of 
literature that assumes it to be rather detrimental (cp. Gornick et al. 1996a: 5; Pettit / 
Hook 2005; Mandel / Semyonov 2006). Since previous research has, however, 
established reasonable cause to believe that also policies from the other fields are 
positively associated with maternal labor supply, the following sections will present 
analyses of the single indicators from the five policy fields. In this manner, it can be 
determined to what extent the effects have possibly been concealed by using average 
levels across policy fields and it can also be shed more light on the specific issue of 
parental leave policies.     
 
 
 
Table 4.9. Hierarchical Logistic Regression of the Average Levels of Welfare State Incentives on Maternal Labor Supply 
 
 Model 1 
Intercept Only 
Model 2 
Individual Level 
Model 3 
Childcare 
Model 4 
Parental Leave 
Model 5 
School Policy 
Model 6 
Taxation & Allowances 
Model 7 
Employment Law 
 
       
 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β  
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β  
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
Individual 
Level  
              
 
              
Intercept 
 
 
0.65***  
(0.13) 
1.91 -0.09  
(0.32) 
0.91 -0.28  
(0.93) 
0.75 -1.37*  
(0.68) 
0.25 1.45*  
(0.80) 
4.26 -0.33 
 (0.73) 
0.72 -0.56  
(0.73) 
0.57 
Age 
 
 
  0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 
Married 
 
  -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 
Education beyond Conpulsory 
Schooling 
 
 
  1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.03 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.03 
No. of Children 
 
  -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 
Single Mother 
 
  -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.47*  
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48*  
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48*  
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48*  
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48*  
(0.23) 
0.62 
Market Wage 
 
  0.53 
 (0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
 (0.47) 
1.54 
Non- 
Labor Income 
  -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 
               
               
Country Level               
 
              
Child- 
care  
 
    -0.43 
 (0.64) 
0.65         
Parental Leave 
 
      1.26*** 
(0.32) 
3.53       
School Policy         -2.23  
(0.76) 
0.11     
Taxation            -0.23 
 (0.24) 
0.79   
Labor  
Law 
            0.12  
(0.43) 
1.12 
 
              
Culture     -1.72  
(1.48) 
0.18 0.48 
 (0.81) 
1.61 -1.20  
(0.83) 
0.30 -1.62  
(0.86) 
0.20 -1.20 
 (0.89) 
0.30 
Employment-Population Ratio      1.24  
(0.83) 
3.46 0.66  
(0.68) 
1.93 0.42 
 (0.75) 
1.52 1.01 
 (0.86) 
2.75 1.01 
 (0.84) 
2.74 
 
              
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient  0.13             
Likelihood Ratio     1.39***  1.32***  1.34***  1.48***  1.41***  
Note: Level 1: n = 42.789; Level 2: n = 15; *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
Marital Status: 0 = not married; 1 = married / Education: 0 = no more than lower secondary education; 1 = educational achievement beyond compulsory education / Number of Children: 1 = one dependent child; 2 = two  
dependent children; 3 = three or more dependent children / Parenting Status: 0 = two-parent household; 1 = single-parent household 
A Likelihood Ratio Test has been pursued to compare the fit of the individual level model (model 2; null model) with every other model containing country-level factors (alternative model). It is used to establish  
how many times more likely the data are under the alternative model than the null model. The Likelihood Ratio has been used to compute a p-value to decide whether to reject the null model in favor of the alternative model  
with *** = P ≤ 0.01, **  = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10. 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
127 
 
The Influence of Parental Leave Policies on Maternal Labor Supply 
The preceding findings which left the average level of parental leave policies to be 
the only welfare state incentive that is positively and significantly associated with the 
maternal employment probability lead to the further question which single incentives 
behind the average level of support could be the critical ones. The underlying 
assumption is that policy instruments from the field of parental leave regulate the 
relationship between employer and employee in the period after childbirth and when 
it comes to questions of caregiving for children. These instruments are supposed to 
avoid the decrease of the value of market time that would normally be caused by the 
interruption of employment although parental leave implies an actual employment 
discontinuity. Without parental leave, mothers possibly tend to opt for a complete 
withdrawal from the labor market after childbirth and this can call their re-entry into 
question. If mothers have the possibility to take up a period of paid maternity leave, 
they can return to their workplace and they are not at risk for considerable financial 
losses during or after the employment break. 
 
Table 4.10. presents the values of the six single incentives in the field of parental 
leave which cover the legal entitlements, the duration and payments. The information 
on the statutory entitlement to maternity leave takes into account if there is any 
existing statutory entitlement, if it is paid and to what extent it is paid. Likewise, a 
variable on the statutory entitlement to paternity leave is included, assuming that the 
possibility for fathers to withdraw temporarily from the labor market has a positive 
effect on maternal labor supply as well. Existing paternity leave entitlements can 
shorten the period of time that mothers take off for caregiving which, in turn, 
strengthens their labor market attachment and reduces income losses. Just as the 
variable on maternity leave, the variable on paternity leave takes into account if there 
is any existing statutory entitlement, if it is paid and to what extent it is paid.  
 
To cover different aspects of the duration of parental leave which have been 
inconsistently discussed in the literature (cp. Gornick et al. 1996a; Pettit and Hook 
2005), the maximum number of months of parental leave and the maximum number 
of paid months of parental leave are taken into account as well. Furthermore, the 
maximum number of paid months as a share of the maximum number of months is 
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included to analyze whether it is not the actual length of (paid) leave, but the share of 
the leave that is covered by wage replacement that affects maternal labor supply. 
 
Table 4.10. Level of Welfare State Incentives in the Field of Parental Leave (2007) 
Country Maternity 
Leave 
Paternity 
Leave 
Length of 
Leave 
Length of 
Paid Leave 
Share of Paid 
Leave 
Sick 
Child 
Leave 
 
AT 1 0 0.66 0.66 1 1 
BE 1 1 0.26 0.26 1 0.25 
DE 1 0 1 0.39 0.39 0.75 
DK 1 1 0.29 0.29 1 0 
ES 1 1 1 0.10 0.10 0.75 
FL 1 1 1 1 1 0 
FR 1 1 1 1 1 0.50 
GR 1 1 0.25 0.05 0.22 0.50 
IE 0.66 0 0.39 0.12 0.32 1 
IT 1 0 0.37 0.37 1 0.25 
NL 1 1 0.24 0.07 0.29 1 
NO 1 1 1 0.33 0.33 1 
PT 1 1 0.94 0.11 0.12 1 
SE 1 1 0.44 0.44 1 0.75 
UK 0.66 0.66 0.50 0.17 0.34 0.25 
Mean  0.95 0.71 0.62 0.36 0.61 0.60 
  Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
  Note: Recoded data.  
 
 
Finally, the option of leave in case of sickness of a child is included. The variable 
captures information on the existence of statutory entitlements to sick child leave, on 
the replacement rate during sick child leave and on the extent of this leave 
arrangement, i.e. on the existence of additional leave entitlements covering a wider 
range of family members other than young children and/or situations of serious 
illness. The possibility of sick child leave can positively affect maternal labor supply 
because it anticipates the option of taking time off from work when necessary 
without the risk of financial losses.  
 
The overview in table 4.10. shows that even though almost every country provides 
full maternity leave entitlements, there are considerable cross-national differences 
with regard to the other incentives. Full paternity leave is far less common and this 
also applies to the availability of leave in the case of a child’s sickness. Furthermore, 
only a small number of countries provides long leaves which are fully paid during 
the entire period, such as Finland or France, while other countries provide shorter, 
but fully paid breaks from employment, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark and 
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Sweden. Other countries like Greece and the Netherlands only provide comparably 
short periods of leave whose replacement rates only cover a fraction of the entire 
period.  
 
Table 4.11. shows the results of the six hierarchical logistic regressions testing the 
association of the single welfare state incentives from the field of parental leave on 
the individual labor supply of mothers. Again, the effects of the individual level 
variables are allowed to be random, i.e. to vary across countries, since it cannot 
necessarily be assumed that their impact is equal across countries. Furthermore, all 
continuous independent variables on the individual level (age, wage and non-labor 
income) have been centered around their grand mean. The effects of the individual 
level variables remain unchanged. They all prove to be congruent with the basic 
assumptions of labor supply theory and apart from the effects of wage and marital 
status, all effects are significant. Age and education are positively associated with the 
probability of labor force participation. Compared to mothers who have no education 
beyond compulsory schooling, the odds of being employed are more than four times 
higher for mothers with more than lower secondary education (education = 1). In 
turn, an increasing number of children and being a single parent are negatively 
associated with maternal labor supply. The same applies to the non-labor income 
whose association with the employment status is negative as well.  
 
In addition to a partial significance of the general labor market situation for women, 
only the availability of paternity leave, the length of paid leave in months and the 
fraction of the total leave that is covered by the wage replacement prove to be 
significantly and positively associated with maternal employment. In relation to the 
assumptions that previous research has made about the effect of parental leave 
arrangements on maternal labor supply, this finding can be considered potentially 
interesting. The effect of the entitlement to maternity leave, its duration (without 
considering payments) and the availability of leave in the case of a child’s sickness 
are not significantly associated with maternal labor supply.  
 
 
 
Table 4.11. Hierarchical Logistic Regression of the Single Incentives from the Field of Parental Leave on Maternal Labor Supply 
 Model 8 
Maternity Leave 
Entitlement 
Model 9 
Paternity Leave 
Entitlement 
Model 10 
Length of Leave 
Model 11 
Length of Paid Leave 
Model 12 
Share of Paid Leave / 
Total Leave 
Model 13 
Sick Child Leave 
 
      
 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β  
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
Individual Level              
 
            
Intercept 1.12  
(0.91) 
0.33 -0.92  
(0.75) 
0.40 -0.64  
(0.69) 
0.53 -1.43** 
(0.63) 
0.24 1.45*  
(0.80) 
4.26 -0.33 
 (0.73) 
0.72 
Age 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 
Married -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 
Education beyond Conpulsory Schooling 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.03 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 
Number of Children -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 
Single Mother -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.47*  
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48*  
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48*  
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48*  
(0.23) 
0.62 
Market Wage 0.53 
 (0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
 (0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53  
(0.47) 
1.54 
Non-Labor Income -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 
             
             
Country Level             
 
            
Maternity Leave Entitlement 0.63 
(0.42) 
1.87           
Paternity Leave Entitlement   0.29** 
(0.12) 
1.35         
Length of Leave     0.13 
(0.15) 
1.14    
 
   
Length of Paid Leave       0.61*** 
(0.15) 
1.84     
Share of Paid Leave / Total Leave         0.45*** 
(0.12) 
1.58   
Sick Child Leave           - 0.23 
(0.18) 
0.79 
 
            
Culture -0.86 
(0.91) 
0.42 0.17 
(0.99) 
1.18 -0.92  
(0.87) 
0.40 0.07 
(0.83) 
1.07 -1.74  
(0.85) 
0.17 -0.49  
(1.16) 
0.61 
Employment-Population Ratio 0.97 
(0.86) 
2.64 0.99 
(0.84) 
2.71 1.04  
(0.83) 
2.84 1.83** 
(0.71) 
2.26 1.92** 
(0.75) 
2.85 2.37** 
(1.07) 
3.74 
 
            
Likelihood Ratio 1.42***  1.29***  1.42***  1.36***  1.68***  1.43***  
Note:  Level 1: n = 42.789; Level 2: n = 15; *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
Marital Status: 0 = not married; 1 = married / Education: 0 = no more than lower secondary education; 1 = educational achievement beyond compulsory education / Number of Children: 1 = one dependent child; 2 = two  
dependent children; 3 = three or more dependent children / Parenting Status: 0 = two-parent household; 1 = single-parent household 
A Likelihood Ratio Test has been pursued to compare the fit of the individual level model (model 2; null model) with every other model containing country-level factors (alternative model). It is used to establish  
how many times more likely the data are under the alternative model than the null model. The Likelihood Ratio has been used to compute a p-value to decide whether to reject the null model in favor of the alternative model  
with *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10. 
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Hence, the present findings do not directly help to determine whether the option of 
parental leave is either detrimental or beneficial for maternal labor supply. However, 
the preceding analysis has shown that with the existence and with the increasing 
extent of paternity leave, the odds of maternal labor supply increase. This is in line 
with the argumentation that existing paternity leave entitlements can shorten the 
period of time that mothers take off for caregiving in the short run which, in turn, 
strengthens their labor market attachment and reduces income losses. This can, 
again, be seen as an argument in favor of the strand of literature that doubts the 
positive effects of parental leave for mothers.  
 
Furthermore, an increasing number of paid months of maternity leave and an 
increasing fraction of paid months of the total available leave are positively and 
significantly associated with maternal labor supply. This finding supports the idea 
that it is not the option of parental leave itself or a duration that is simply as long as 
possible that fosters the labor market attachment of mothers. In turn, long durations 
and fractions of leave that are paid are more important which indicates that mothers 
possibly tend to take up leave more often when these conditions are given which, 
again, increases their labor market attachment. In the case of long, but mostly unpaid 
leaves, mothers possibly tend not to opt for parental leave at all, but rather for a full 
withdrawal from the labor market. A complete drop-out of employment instead of a 
mere interruption of the employment relation by taking up leave after childbirth 
means that mothers forego the benefit that is generally related to parental leave – the 
guarantee of being able to return to their work place. This decreases their labor 
market attachment and their employment chances in the long run.  
 
The Influence of Childcare Policies on Maternal Labor Supply 
Previous research has established reasonable cause to believe that childcare 
responsibilities are one of the main factors which prevent mothers from carrying out 
uninterrupted full-time employment (cp. Platenga and Hansen 1999). However, 
testing the influence of the average level of welfare state incentives across the eight 
single indicators from the field of childcare on the odds of maternal employment did 
not show a significant effect. The following regressions attempt to explore if using 
the average level has potentially covered the effects of the single indicators which are 
presented in table 4.12. In the present study, the variables on public childcare cover 
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the legal, the monetary and the infrastructural dimension of welfare state 
intervention, because even though a legal entitlement to infant care and / or 
kindergarten / pre-school can be an important precondition, implemented provision, 
financial support and the quality of care can be central determinants of the maternal 
labor supply decision as well.  
 
 
Table 4.12. Level of Welfare State Incentives in the Field of Childcare (2003 – 2010) 
Country Legal 
Entitlement 
Length of the 
Childcare Day 
Childcare 
Coverage 
(0-2) 
Childcare 
Coverage 
(3-5) 
Private 
Costs 
Public 
Spending 
Child-
Staff-
Ratio 
(0-2) 
Child-
Staff-
Ratio 
(3-5) 
 
AT 0 0.33 0.09 0.81 0.85 0.37 0 0 
BE 0.50 0.66 0.39 1 0.96 0.50 0.50 0.50 
DE 0.50 0.33 0.09 0.80 0.92 0.25 0.50 0.50 
DK 1 1 0.62 0.90 0.92 1 1 1 
ES 0.50 0.50 0.21 0.99 0.96 0.34 0 0.50 
FL 1 1 0.35 0.68 0.93 0,87 1 0.50 
FR 0.50 1 0.26 1 0.89 0.75 0.50 0 
GR 0.50 0.66 0 0.46 0.95 0.25 0 0.50 
IE 0.50 0.33 0.15 0.65 0.71 0.16 1 0.50 
IT 0.50 0.66 0.06 1 0.96 0.34 0.50 0.50 
NL 0.50 0.33 0.39 0.68 0.88 0.34 1 0.50 
NO 0 1 0.44 0.85 0.92 0.62 0.50 1 
PT 0.50 0.33 0.24 0.78 0.96 0.53 0 0.50 
SE 1 1 0.40 0.87 0.94 0.81 1 1 
UK 0.50 0.33 0.26 0.79 0.67 0.37 1 0.50 
Mean  0.53 0.63 0.26 0.82 0.89 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
Note: Recoded data. 
 
 
Two variables on childcare coverage, i.e. the percentage share of children below the 
age of three and the percentage share of children aged three to five in childcare, are 
used to analyze the effect of actual welfare state provision on maternal labor supply. 
Information on the continuity of days in public childcare is included as well to 
approximate the actual support the welfare state provides since a more 
comprehensive childcare day provides mothers with a better possibility to supply 
more than part-time labor. Since the private costs of childcare are seen as a tax on the 
market income of a working mother, low childcare fees are seen as an equivalent to 
an effective increase in the wage rate and can therefore be expected to lead to an 
increase in female labor supply (Blau et al. 2006). Therefore, a variable on childcare 
fees as a percentage of the average wage is included with higher values implying 
less private childcare costs. Here, it is assumed that a high level of welfare state 
support with regard to the financial resources that are directed towards public 
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childcare, i.e. keeping the private childcare costs as low as possible, has a positive 
effect on maternal labor supply. The inclusion of a variable on the public spending 
on childcare as a share of the GDP points in the same direction by indicating how 
much financial support the welfare state allocates for the provision of childcare 
which can, in turn, indicate how much of the financial burden is passed on to the 
parents. Furthermore, previous research has suggested that childcare quality can play 
a role when parents make a decision about transferring a part of the caregiving task 
to childcare institutions and the parental decision about childcare can indirectly 
influence the labor supply decision. Therefore, the child-staff-ratio in childcare 
institutions for children below the age of three and for children aged three to five is 
included as a proxy for the quality of childcare institutions. 
 
The results in table 4.13. show that using the average level of welfare state incentives 
in the field of childcare has indeed concealed the effects of some of the single 
indicators. The results also show that is not the legal entitlement to infant care or 
preschool that is positively and significantly associated with the odds of maternal 
labor supply. In turn, a positive and significant association with maternal 
employment decisions is found for all the indicators referring to the infrastructural 
side of childcare. The length of the childcare day as well as the actual coverage rates 
for children of both age groups are significantly and positively associated with 
maternal labor supply. Furthermore, the amount of resources invested by the state, 
operationalized by childcare expenditures as a share of the GDP, increases the odds 
of maternal labor supply as well. In turn, the child-staff ratios and also the private 
childcare costs do not show a significant association. 
 
 
 
Table 4.13. Hierarchical Logistic Regression of the Single Incentives from the Field of Childcare on Maternal Labor Supply 
 
 Model 14 
Legal 
Entitlement 
 
Model 15 
Length of the 
Childcare Day 
Model 16 
Childcare Coverage 
(0 – 2) 
Model 17 
Childcare Coverage 
(3 - 5) 
Model 18 
Private Costs 
Model 19 
Public Spending 
Model 20 
Child-Staff-Ratio  
(0 – 2) 
Model 21 
Child-Staff-Ratio 
 (3 – 5) 
 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
Individual Level          
         
Intercept 
 
 
- 0.33 
(0.73) 
0.72 -2.67 
(0.75) 
0.07 -0.34 
(0.65) 
0.71 -1.64** 
(0.67) 
0.19 -0.68 
(1.11) 
0.50 -0.93 
(0.55) 
0.39 -0.14 
(0.65) 
0.86 -0.61 
(0.60) 
0.54 
Age 
 
 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 
Married -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 
Education beyond Conpulsory 
Schooling 
 
 
1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.03 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 
No. of Children 
 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 
Single Mother -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.47* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 
Market Wage 
 
0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 
Non-Labor Income -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 
 
  
      
Country Level           
 
  
        
Legal Entitlement 
 
-0.40 
(0.19) 
0.66 
        
Length of  
the Childcare Day 
 
  0.98*** 
(0.21) 
2.66 
      
Childcare Coverage 
 (0 – 2) 
 
   
1.43** 
(0.51) 
4.19 
     
Childcare Coverage  
(3 - 5) 
 
    
0.97*** 
(0.29) 
2.64 
    
Private Costs 
 
     
0.09 
(0.62) 
1.10 
   
Public Spending 
 
      
1.49*** 
(0.21) 
4.43 
  
Child-Staff-Ratio (0 – 2) 
 
       
-0.32 
(0.14) 
0.72  
Child-Staff-Ratio (3 – 5) 
 
       
 -0.59 
(0.17) 
0.55 
         
Culture 
 
 
-1.686 
(0.97) 
0.18 2.49 
(1.06) 
2.13 -0.89 
(1.01) 
0.40 -1.95 
(0.83) 
1.07 -1.13 
(0.95) 
0.32 0.08 
(0.79) 
1.08 - 1.95 
(0.85) 
0.14 -1.61 
(0.76) 
0.20) 
Employment-Population Ratio 1.26 
(0.81) 
3.53 2.51** 
(0.74) 
2.39 0.06 
(0.84) 
1.07 1.83** 
(0.72) 
2.22 1.16 
(0.93) 
3.22 0.15 
(0.54) 
1.16 0.97 
(0.79) 
2.64 1.85** 
(0.72) 
2.34 
 
                
Likelihood Ratio 1.39***  1.87**  1.44***  1.69**  1.44***  1.42***  1.36***  1.25***  
 Note: Level 1: n = 42.789; Level 2: n = 15; *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
Marital Status: 0 = not married; 1 = married / Education: 0 = no more than lower secondary education; 1 = educational achievement beyond compulsory education / Number of Children:  
1 = one dependent child; 2 = two dependent children; 3 = three or more dependent children / Parenting Status: 0 = two-parent household; 1 = single-parent household 
A Likelihood Ratio Test has been pursued to compare the fit of the individual level model (null model) with every other model containing country-level factors (alternative model). It is used to establish  
how many  times more likely the data are under the alternative model than the null model. The Likelihood Ratio has been used to compute a p-value to decide whether to reject the null model in favor of the  
alternative model with *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10. 
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The Influence of School Policy on Maternal Labor Supply 
With regard to the effect of school schedules on maternal labor supply, this 
relationship can be compared to the relationship between public childcare and 
maternal labor supply. From a certain age on, school education is normally available 
to every child without specific legal entitlement and it can be considered as a free 
(and usually also as a compulsory) opportunity to have a child taken care of for a 
certain amount of hours during the week and for a certain amount of days per year. 
However, the specific configuration of the school system differs across countries and 
just as in the case of childcare for children below school age, it can be assumed that 
the organization of school education influences the reconciliation of work and family 
life. In this manner, an early school starting age can have a positive effect on 
maternal labor supply, since an early transition to the guaranteed system of de facto 
childcare at school implies that mothers have to organize less or even no additional 
childcare. Furthermore, it is assumed that a larger scope of school schedules is more 
favorable for maternal employment. Therefore, information on the number of school 
hours per week (for school students in primary and secondary education) and on the 
number of school days per year is included to approximate the comprehensiveness of 
public school schedules. A high comprehensiveness of school week and school year 
decreases the need for childcare beyond the regular school schedules which will, in 
turn, is assumed to have a positive effect on maternal labor supply.  
 
Table 4.14. Level of Welfare State Incentives in the Field of School Policy (2010) 
Country School Starting 
Age 
 
School Hours Per 
Week  
(Primary Education) 
School Hours Per 
Week  
(Secondary Education) 
 
School Days Per 
Year 
AT 0.33 0.66 0.87 0.85 
BE 0.33 0.96 0.85 0.86 
DE 0.33 0.82 0.75 0.93 
DK 0.33 0.82 0.87 0.87 
ES 0.33 0.50 0.75 0.82 
FL 0 0.63 0.75 0.90 
FR 0.33 0.80 0.69 0.85 
GR 0.66 0.92 0.87 0.82 
IE 0.33 0.83 0.96 0.85 
IT 0.33 0.90 0.72 0.94 
NL 0.66 0.78 0.65 0.94 
NO 0.33 0.66 0.75 0.90 
PT 0.33 0.82 0.64 0.85 
SE 0 1 1 0.84 
UK 1 0.73 0.61 0.92 
Mean  0.37 0.79 0.78 0.88 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
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Note: Recoded data.Table 4.15. Hierarchical Logistic Regression of the Single Incentives from the Field of School 
Policy on Maternal Labor    
                   Supply 
 Model 22 
School Starting Age 
 
Model 23 
School Hours Per 
Week (Primary 
Education) 
Model 24 
School Hours Per 
Week (Secondary 
Education) 
 
Model 25 
School Days Per 
Year 
 
    
 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
Individual Level          
 
        
Intercept - 0.46 
(0.69) 
0.63 0.12 
(0.95) 
1.11 -0.47 
(0.81) 
0.63 1.65 
(0.84) 
3.66 
Age 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 
Married -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 
Education beyond 
Conpulsory 
Schooling 
1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.03 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 
Number of Children -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 
Single Mother -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.47* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 
Market Wage 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 
Non-Labor Income -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 
         
         
Country Level         
 
        
School Starting Age 
 
-0.19 
(0.22) 
0.82       
School Hours Per 
Week (Primary 
Education) 
  -0.69 
(0.51) 
0.49     
School Hours Per 
Week (Secondary 
Education) 
    -0.23 
(0.44) 
0.79   
School Days Per 
Year 
      -1.04 
(0.76) 
0.17 
 
        
Culture -1.02 
(0.94) 
0.36 -1.16 
(0.87) 
0.31 -1.08 
(0.89) 
0.34 -1.62 
(0.69) 
0.19 
Employment-
Population Ratio 
1.03 
(0.84) 
2.79 0.96 
(0.89) 
2.60 1.23 
(0.84) 
3.45 0.15 
(0.63 
1.17 
 
        
Likelihood Ratio 1.49***  1.37***  1.48***  1.56***  
Note: Level 1: n = 42.789; Level 2: n = 15; *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
Marital Status: 0 = not married; 1 = married / Education: 0 = no more than lower secondary 
education; 1 = educational achievement beyond compulsory education / Number of Children: 1 = 
one dependent child; 2 = two dependent children; 3 = three or more dependent children / 
Parenting Status: 0 = two-parent household; 1 = single-parent household 
A Likelihood Ratio Test has been pursued to compare the fit of the individual level model (null 
 model) with every other model containing country-level factors (alternative model). It is used to 
 establish how many times  more likely the data are under the alternative model than the null 
 model. The Likelihood Ratio has been used to compute a p-value to decide whether to reject the 
 null model in favor of the alternative model with *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10. 
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Table 4.15. shows the result of the hierarchical logistic regressions of the four single 
indicators from the field of school policy on maternal employment. Just as in the 
preceding models, the individual level effects remain unchanged and prove to be 
congruent with the assumptions of labor supply theory. However, none of the 
independent variables from the field of school policy shows a significant and positive 
effect. One possible explanation for this can be that, in a certain sense, school policy 
sets in too late. For mothers who decide to enter or return to the labor market before 
their children reach school age, the determining welfare state incentives are possibly 
located in other policy fields, such as parental leave and childcare. In turn, for 
mothers who postpone their return to the labor market until their children start 
attending school, even early school starting ages and comprehensive school 
schedules can not necessarily outbalance the weakened labor market attachment und 
the loss of human capital caused by a comparably long interruption of employment. 
Even though school policies can indeed be considered beneficial for the 
reconciliation of work and family life, they do not appear to be a significant factor 
for maternal labor supply.  
 
The Influence of Employment Law on Maternal Labor Supply 
Policies from the field of employment law basically capture the flexibility at the 
workplace and mostly refer to the protection of employees from inappropriately high 
working hours and discrimination, to the compensation of overtime and to the 
regulation of vacation time. These working conditions can be assumed to affect 
maternal labor supply because they indicate the possibility of the reconciliation of 
work and family life without substantial income losses. To cover the various aspects 
of this policy field, information on three working time related factors is included as 
well as information on two payment related factors. The working time related 
variables refer to the length of the standard full-time workweek where a short full-
time principle (less than 40 hours per week) is considered most beneficial. 
Furthermore, they refer to the amount of the of legally guaranteed vacation days per 
year and to the number of mandatory paid holidays which can give an indication on 
how feasible the reconciliation of work and family life is throughout the year. The 
payment related variables refer to the premiums for the first and the second set of 
overtime hours to capture to what extent the potential costs of overtime work, such as 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
138 
 
the need for additional childcare, are outweighed. Finally, two variables contain 
information on the treatment of part-time employees. If working full-time is not a 
feasible option for mothers, it is important that the welfare state provides for the 
possibility of part-time employment without the risk of discrimination with regard to 
the benefits enjoyed by the full-time workers, such as leaves, overtime premiums and 
social security and with regard to the legal rights to advance notice and separation 
fees for the termination of the employment contract.  
 
 
Table 4.16. Level of Welfare State Incentives in the Field of Employment Law (2004) 
Country Part-Time 
Benefit 
Protection 
 
Part-Time 
Contract 
Termination 
Protection 
First 
Premium 
for 
Overtime 
Second 
Premium 
for 
Overtime 
Maximum 
Weekly 
Working 
Hours 
 
Minimum 
Vacation 
Number 
of Paid 
Holidays 
AT 1 1 1 0 0.50 1 1 
BE 1 1 1 0 0.50 0.80 0.66 
DE 1 1 0.50 0 0 0.66 0.66 
DK 1 1 1 0 1 0.83 0 
ES 1 1 0 0 0.50 1 0.80 
FL 1 1 1 1 0.50 0.80 0.73 
FR 1 0 0.50 0.50 1 1 0.06 
GR 1 1 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.66 0.26 
IE 1 1 1 0 0 0.73 0.60 
IT 0 1 0 0 0.50 0.93 0.73 
NL 1 1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.46 
NO 0 1 1 0 0.50 0.83 0.60 
PT 1 1 1 0.75 0.50 0.80 0.80 
SE 1 1 1 0.60 0.50 0.83 0.66 
UK 1 1 0 0 0.50 0.93 0 
Mean  0.87 0.93 0.67 0.27 0.50 0.83 0.53 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
Note: Recoded data. 
 
Table 4.17. presents the results of the hierarchical logistic regressions of the single 
indicators from the field of employment law on maternal labor supply. The two 
measures against the discrimination of part-time employees do not show a significant 
effect and neither do the premium for the second set of overtime hours and the 
number of paid holidays. However, the three remaining variables are positively and 
significantly associated with maternal employment, suggesting that just as in the case 
of childcare policies, using the average level of welfare state incentives in the field of 
employment law has indeed concealed the effects of some of the single indicators. 
With a rising compensation for the first set of overtime hours, the odds of maternal 
labor supply increase which is congruent with the assumption that mothers are more 
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likely to supply labor to the market when they know that occasional overtime work is 
compensated well enough to cover the potential additional childcare costs and to not 
imply an effective decrease of their market wage. Apart from the premium for the 
first set of overtime hours, the length of the standard full-time workweek and the 
number of legally guaranteed vacation days per year have a positive and significant 
effect on the odds of maternal labor supply as well, indicating that, on the one hand, 
an existing concept of short full-time (less than 40 hours per week) and, on the other 
hand, an increasing amount of predictable time off from work helps reconciling work 
and family life and increases the probability of maternal employment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.17. Hierarchical Logistic Regression of the Single Incentives from the Field of Employment Law  on Maternal Labor Supply 
 
 Model 26 
Part-Time Benefit 
Protection 
 
Model 27 
Part-Time Contract 
Termination 
Protection 
Model 28 
First Premium for 
Overtime 
Model 29 
Second Premium for 
Overtime 
Model 30 
Maximum Weekly 
Working Hours 
Model 31 
Minimum Vacation 
Model 32 
Number of Paid Holidays 
 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
Individual Level         
        
Intercept 
 
 
-0.85 
(0.69) 
0.43 -0.84* 
(0.45) 
0.43 -0.23 
(0.61) 
0.79 -0.63 
(0.72) 
0.53 -0.96* 
(0.44) 
0.38 .1.68** 
(0.59) 
0.18 -0.46 
(0.66) 
0.63 
Age 
 
 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 
Married -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03 
(0.08) 
0.97 
Education beyond 
Conpulsory Schooling 
 
 
1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.03 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 1.39*** 
(0.28) 
4.02 
No. of Children 
 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 
Single Mother -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.47* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.61 
Market Wage 
 
0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
(0.47) 
1.54 
Non-Labor Income -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.91 
 
  
     
Country Level          
 
  
       
Part-Time Benefit 
Protection 
 
-0.25 
(0.13) 
0.77 
       
Part-Time Contract 
Termination Protection  
  -0.84 
(0.11) 
0.43 
     
First Premium for 
Overtime  
   
0.28.** 
(0.12) 
1.33 
    
Second Premium for 
Overtime  
    
0.07 
(0.15) 
1.07 
   
Maximum Weekly 
Working Hours  
     
0.85*** 
(0.08) 
2.34 
  
Minimum Vacation        1.22*** 
(0.30) 
3.39 
 
Numer of Paod 
Holidays  
       
-0.25 
(0.16) 
0.78 
        
Culture 
 
 
-0.79 
(0.87) 
0.45 0.24 
(0.54) 
1.27 -1.27 
(0.82) 
0.28 -0.78 
(0.96) 
0.46 -1.29** 
(0.44) 
0.27 -2.04** 
(0.65) 
0.13 -1.17. 
(0.86) 
0.31 
Employment-
Population Ratio 
1.84 
(0.83) 
3.33 2.43*** 
(0.49) 
4.31 0.29 
(0.73) 
1.33 1.09 
(0.85) 
2.99 1.11** 
(0.41) 
3.03 1.54** 
(0.62) 
3.66 1.18 
(0.79) 
3.28 
 
              
Likelihood Ratio 1.53***  1.27***  1.33***  1.40***  1.38***  1.63***  1.41***  
Note: Level 1: n = 42.789; Level 2: n = 15; *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
Marital Status: 0 = not married; 1 = married / Education: 0 = no more than lower secondary education; 1 = educational achievement beyond compulsory education /  
Number of Children: 1 = one dependent child; 2 = two dependent children; 3 = three or more dependent children / Parenting Status: 0 = two-parent household; 1 = single-parent household 
A Likelihood Ratio Test has been pursued to compare the fit of the individual level model (null model) with every other model containing country-level factors (alternative model). It is used  
to establish how many times more likely the data are under the alternative model than the null model. The Likelihood Ratio has been used to compute a p-value to decide whether to reject  
the null model in favor of the alternative model with *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10. 
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The Influence of Taxation and Allowances on Maternal Labor Supply 
The welfare state does not only provide legal entitlements and services, but also 
more direct financial benefits for families. It can indeed be argued that for the most 
part, the main intention of family cash benefits and family tax breaks is not related to 
the question of maternal employment, but rather to the question of the general 
financial well-being of families.  
 
 
Table 4.18.  Level of Welfare State Incentives in the Field of Taxation and 
Allowances (2007) 
Country Family Cash Benefits 
 
Family Tax Breaks 
AT 0 0.1 
BE 0.25 0.5 
DE 0.50 1 
DK 0.25 0 
ES 1 0.2 
FL 0.50 0 
FR 0.50 0.7 
GR 0.75 0 
IE 0 0.2 
IT 0.75 0 
NL 0.75 0.4 
NO 0.25 0.2 
PT 0.75 0.2 
SE 0.25 0 
UK 0 0.4 
Mean  0.43 0.26 
Source: FEMMES Dataset (Appendix B). 
Note: Recoded data. 
 
However, according to labor supply theory, family cash benefits can actually have a 
negative effect on maternal labor supply because they can increase the reservation 
wage which, in turn, lowers the utility of supplying labor to the market. For the 
purpose of the present study, family cash benefits are therefore understood as a 
disincentive for maternal labor supply and the level of welfare state incentives for 
maternal labor supply will be rated higher when the share of the GDP spent on 
family cash benefits is lower. The opposite is the case with regard to family tax 
breaks, since in most cases, earnings from employment are the kind of income that is 
subject to taxation (compared to, for instance, some social benefits). Therefore, 
family tax breaks are an important incentive and policy instrument to increase the 
effective market wage of a working mother and the present study includes a variable 
on tax breaks as a share of the GDP. 
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Table 4.19. Hierarchical Logistic Regressions of the Single Incentives from the Field of Taxation and   
                    Allowances on Maternal Labor Supply 
 
 Model 33 
Family Cash Benefits 
 
Model 34 
Family Tax Breaks 
 
  
 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
β 
(SE) 
Odds- 
Ratio 
Individual Level      
 
    
Intercept -0.45 
(0.77) 
0.64 -0.39 
(0.68) 
0.68 
Age 0.06*** 
 (0.01) 
1.06 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06 
Married -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 -0.03  
(0.08) 
0.97 
Education beyond Conpulsory 
Schooling 
1.39*** 
 (0.28) 
4.02 1.40*** 
(0.28) 
4.04 
Number of Children -0.14***  
(0.04) 
0.87 -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.87 
Single Mother -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 -0.48* 
(0.23) 
0.62 
Market Wage 0.53 
 (0.47) 
1.54 0.53 
 (0.47) 
1.54 
Non-Labor Income -0.09**  
(0.03) 
0.91 -0.09** 
 (0.03) 
0.91 
     
     
Country Level     
 
    
Family Cash Benefits 
 
-0.09 
(0.18) 
0.91   
Family Tax Breaks   -0.24 
(0.16) 
0.78 
 
    
Culture -1.47 
(0.88) 
0.23 -1.36 
(0.86) 
0.26 
Employment-Population Ratio 1.09 
(0.93) 
3.00 1.00 
(0.16) 
2.73 
 
    
Likelihood Ratio 1.46***  1.48***  
Note: Level 1: n = 42.789; Level 2: n = 15; *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10 
Marital Status: 0 = not married; 1 = married / Education: 0 = no more than lower secondary 
education; 1 = educational achievement beyond compulsory education / Number of Children: 1 = 
one dependent child; 2 = two dependent children; 3 = three or more dependent children / 
Parenting Status: 0 = two-parent household; 1 = single-parent household 
A Likelihood Ratio Test has been pursued to compare the fit of the individual level model (null 
 model) with every other model containing country-level factors (alternative model). It is used to 
 establish how many times  more likely the data are under the alternative model than the null 
 model. The Likelihood Ratio has been used to compute a p-value to decide whether to reject the 
 null model in favor of the alternative model with *** = P ≤ 0.01, ** = P ≤ 0.05, * = P ≤ 0.10. 
 
 
Table 4.19. shows the results of the hierarchical logistic regressions of the single 
indicators from the field of employment law on maternal labor supply. Just as in the 
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preceding models, the individual level effects remain unchanged and congruent with 
the assumptions of labor supply theory. However, none of the independent variables 
from the field of taxation and allowances shows a significant and positive effect on 
the odds of maternal labor supply.  
 
This finding can be understood as a confirmation of the general critique of welfare 
state research which found fault with the focus on the financial side on social policy 
and called for a more in-depth analysis of the specific configuration of welfare state 
policies (cp. Therborn 1987 / Gilbert and Moon 1988). In this manner, Gilbert and 
Moon have argued that mere expenditure data do not take actual need into account. 
In the case of family policy, high levels of public expenditure on cash benefits or tax 
breaks do not necessarily stand for extraordinary welfare state generosity, but can 
simply reflect a high number of recipients and the finding also underlines the 
assumption that the qualitative dimension of welfare state policy, such as services 
and legal entitlements, has to be taken into consideration.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply have been at the heart of the 
present study. Even early feminist welfare state research has already established 
reasonable causes to assume that the relationship between the welfare state and its 
female citizens could hardly be compared to the relationship between the welfare 
state and its male citizens. In this context, being able to supply labor to the market is 
especially important. In the absence of unconditional income guarantees, the utmost 
degree of financial independence from the spouse, the family and also from the state 
can only be achieved by being employed and while this has never been raised to 
question for men, it has only slowly become a permanent feature in women’s 
realities. And even though facilitating the access to paid work and creating incentives 
for labor force participation somehow implies commodification which has been 
established as a condition of which (the ideal-typical and male) worker seeks to be 
relieved from, it can be exactly this process of commodification which will also 
enable women and mothers to demand the same rights of decommodification that 
their male counterparts are already entitled to.  
 
However, and despite the vast amount of research that feminist welfare state research 
has directed towards female and maternal employment, the present study has 
attempted to fill a number of specific research gaps. Feminist welfare state research 
has provided a large number of very detailed studies which focus on the case of one 
specific country or small-n comparisons (cp. Peattie and Rein 1983; Shaver 1983; 
Lewis 1992; Lewis 2001; Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1999). Furthermore, existing 
gender-sensitive studies that cover a larger number of countries have often focused 
on politicy measures from the fields of early childhood education and care and 
parental leave schemes and they have often used a very condensed operationalization 
(Gornick et al. 1996a; Stier et al. 2001; Pettit and Hook 2005 / 2009). Other studies 
have focused on the financial or benefit side of social policies for women which can, 
in the context of the support of female employment, result in misleading findings 
because family welfare does not necessarily equal female welfare (cp. Siaroff 1994; 
Gauthier 1999; for an overview cp. Van der Lippe / Van Dijk 2002). 
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The attempt of the present study has been to overcome these research gaps by using a 
selection of 27 very specific incentives for maternal labor supply which cover 22 
OECD countries and five different policy fields – parental leave, childcare and 
taxation and allowances, but also employment law and school policy. This selection 
of indicators has been used to pursue two connected research purposes. The first 
research question has been directed at a comparison of these incentives at the country 
level to attain a more comprehensive picture of how welfare states can be classified 
according to their support of maternal employment. This purpose has been 
accompanied by a critical review and appreciation of existing welfare state 
comparisons. This review has shown how welfare state research has moved from 
explaining the emergence of the welfare state itself by means of the three dominant 
social expenditure based approaches - the structuralist, the institutionalist and the 
power resources approach - to more detailed and more in-depth conceptualizations of 
welfare state policy which can be found in the so-called welfare state regime 
literature. This review has also shown that both the traditional approaches and the 
early welfare state typologies have been widely criticized for their ignorance of the 
gender dimension and that feminist welfare state research has established reasonable 
cause to assume that gender-insensitive typologies have to be reassessed to establish 
gender-sensitive welfare state comparisons which take the specific relationship 
between the state and its female citizens into account. However, the review of this 
research reveals that feminist welfare state research has remained inconclusive about 
how and why countries can be assumed to cluster when the gender dimension is 
taken into account. Findings range from welfare state typologies with clusters that 
are very comparable to traditional regimes to the reassessment of the position of 
single countries and it is not unreasonable to assume that this has to be accounted for 
by the afore-mentioned potential shortcomings of the feminist line of welfare state 
research. 
 
Applying the selection of 27 incentives for maternal labor supply from the fields of 
childcare, parental leave, employment law, school policy and taxation and 
allowances, assembled in the FEMMES Dataset compiled for the purpose of the 
present study, to a comparison of welfare states at the country level has led to results 
that only partly confirm the findings of previous research. The country-level analysis 
Welfare State Incentives for Maternal Labor Supply 
 
 
146 
 
has presented descriptive information on cross-national variation of welfare state 
incentives for maternal labor supply across 22 OECD countries. This descriptive 
information has already given some indication that conventional welfare state types 
are likely not to be appropriate to classify countries according to their level of 
incentives for maternal labor supply. A subsequent cluster analysis revealed that 
countries are indeed likely to be classified in a way that is considerably different 
from traditional welfare state typologies. Analyses of variance have been used to 
underline the inappropriateness of traditional welfare state types and the better 
suitability of the country groups established by means of the cluster analysis. The 
here established country groups differ according to the level and the policy focus of 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply8. In this way, for instance, France 
has been found to cluster with a number of Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands 
show a high degree of similarity with welfare states in Southern Europe, Germany 
has been found to group with countries from the liberal welfare regime and Canada 
has been found to cluster with a number of conservative welfare states. Since this 
mere result has, however, not revealed enough about its causes, the country analysis 
was followed by three in-depth country studies by means of the cases of Norway, 
Canada and Germany. As the only Scandinavian country that is not grouping with its 
usual counterparts, Norway has turned out to be characterized by less pronounced 
welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply, even though the country resembles 
other social-democratic welfare states in many respects, such as the political system 
and the general universal and egalitarian features of social policy. Industrialization 
and the increase in female labor force participation have taken place at a slightly later 
stage than in Denmark, Sweden and Finland and the creation of welfare state 
incentives for female labor supply has developed more slowly. The country study has 
shown that in comparison to other Scandinavian countries, Norway has proven to be 
characterized by considerably more conservative attitudes towards family structures 
and maternal employment. The fact that Norway shares this characteristic with 
Australia, a country that it has been grouped with in the present cluster analysis, 
further supports the fact that the more traditional attitudes towards family life have 
been one of the significant driving forces behind Norway falling behind.  
                                                 
8
 Cluster 1: France, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Cluster 2: Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Greece. Cluster 3: Belgium, Italy and Canada. Cluster 4: Australia, Luxembourg, Austria and Norway. 
Cluster 5: Germany, Ireland, UK, New Zealand and Switzerland. Cluster 6: USA and Japan. 
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A more detailed look at the situation in Canada has given some insights about how 
and why the country performs differently from its usual liberal welfare state family. 
It can most certainly be said that Canada provides a higher level of welfare state 
incentives for maternal labor supply than other liberal welfare states. It also appears 
that it is more the differences from other liberal welfare states than proximity to non-
liberal welfare states that leads Canada to cluster away from its traditional welfare 
state family. Nevertheless, both the historical similarities with other liberal welfare 
states and the European origins of the country have to be taken into consideration. A 
closer examination of the development of Canadian social policy shows that it cannot 
be ruled out that Canada has maintained a higher proximity to its European roots 
than other typical immigration countries like the United States and that the influence 
of its liberal neighbors has not manifested itself in every field of social policy.  
 
In the present analysis, Germany has been clustered with liberal welfare states like 
the United Kingdom and late female mobilization welfare states like Ireland. This 
country cluster shows a relatively low level of welfare state incentives for maternal 
labor supply and in the case of Germany, the combination of two more or less 
subsequent developments can be held accountable for that. Just like Ireland, 
Germany has started off as a welfare state that has been heavily influenced by 
religious traditions, leading to limited welfare state intervention in family issues and 
a promotion of traditional family structures. But the promotion of traditional family 
structures has not prevented the German female labor force participation rate to 
increase. In this sense, Germany has undergone the same societal changes than many 
other European countries. However, the original conservative attitude towards 
welfare state intervention in family structures has recently been joined by a more 
liberal attitude towards social policy. This type of move towards Anglo-American 
politics has not led to more welfare state intervention either. By contrast, it is 
characterized by an emphasis of individual responsibilities and a conditionality of 
rights. Limited welfare state intervention due to religious traditions in combination 
with a turn towards more liberal social policies can be considered one possible cause 
for Germany’s low level of welfare state incentives for maternal labor supply.  
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The second research question has been directed at a validation of feminist welfare 
state research that has dealt with the actual effects of welfare state policy on the labor 
market situation of women. Again, this purpose has been accompanied by a critical 
review of existing studies. When reviewing the vast amount of welfare state 
literature, it cannot go unnoted that welfare state research has not only moved to an 
incorporation of the gender perspective, but also to explaining the actual effects of 
social policy on societies and individual lives. Early studies of this line of research 
have been criticized for their focus on questions of poverty and income inequality 
and feminist welfare state research has contributed to a more in-depth analysis of the 
effects of welfare state policy on the specific living situation of women and mothers. 
In the present study, the selection of 27 welfare state incentives for maternal labor 
supply has also been applied to the analysis of individual employment decisions of 
mothers and it presents a combination and extension of factors that have been 
established as meaningful determinants of maternal labor supply in earlier research.  
 
This multi-level analysis has led to further insights. Introducing individual level data 
from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 2005 (EU 
SILC) for over 40.000 mothers from 15 European countries has shown that under 
control of their individual characteristics, such as age, the educational background, 
market wage, the non-labor income, the number of children and the marital and 
parenting status, and under control of other country level characteristics, such as the 
extent of conservative attitudes towards working mothers and the general labor 
market situation for women, the average level of incentives in the field of parental 
leave turned out to be the only welfare state incentive that, on average, has proven to 
be significantly and positively associated with maternal labor supply. However, since 
condensed measurements can be assumed to conceal the effects of the single 
indicators hidden by the average value for each policy field, further analyses have 
used the single indicators from each policy field as explanatory variables in separate 
models.     
 
Further analyses using the six single indicators from the field of parental leave show 
that the availability of paternity leave, the length of paid leave in months and the 
fraction of the total leave that is covered by the wage replacement prove to be 
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significantly and positively associated with maternal employment. This is in line 
with the argumentation that existing paternity leave entitlements can lead mothers to 
reduce the period of time that they take off for caregiving which, in turn, strengthens 
their labor market attachment and reduces income losses. This can, again, be seen as 
an argument in favor of the strand of literature that doubts the positive effects of 
parental leave for mothers, since the opportunity of sharing parental leave with the 
fathers, i.e. taking up less leave themselves, is positively associated with maternal 
employment. Additionally, the length of the paid leave and the paid fraction of the 
total leave being significantly associated with maternal labor supply can be seen as 
an argument in favor of a configuration of parental leave that represents a favorable 
option for mothers. Existing and long, but only partially paid leave and the 
concomitant income losses can be so unattractive for mothers that they rather opt for 
a complete withdrawal from the labor market after childbirth which decreases their 
labor market attachment and their employment chances in the long run.  
 
A detailed analysis of the effect of the single incentives from the field of early 
childhood education and care has shown that using the average level of welfare state 
incentives has indeed concealed the effects of some of the single indicators. More 
importantly, the results have shown that it is not the legal entitlement to care which is 
positively and significantly associated with maternal labor supply. Positive and 
significant associations with maternal employment decisions are found for all the 
indicators referring to the infrastructural side of childcare. The length of the childcare 
day as well as the actual coverage rates for children of both age groups are 
significantly and positively associated with the odds of maternal labor supply. 
Furthermore, the amount of resources invested by the state, operationalized by 
childcare expenditures as a share of the GDP, increases the odds of maternal labor 
supply as well. In turn, the child-staff ratios and also the private childcare costs do 
not show a significant association. 
 
Keeping this result in mind, it can appear surprising that none of the single indicators 
from the field of school policy is positively and significantly associated with 
maternal labor supply, since school schedules can be considered as institutionalized, 
guaranteed and free childcare. One possible explanation for this can be that, in a 
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certain sense, school policy sets in too late. For mothers who decide to enter or return 
to the labor market before their children reach school age, the important welfare state 
incentives are possibly located in other policy fields, such as parental leave and 
childcare. In turn, for mothers who intend to postpone their return to employment 
until their children start attending school, even early school starting ages and 
encompassing school schedules can not necessarily compensate for the weakened 
labor market attachment und the loss of human capital caused by a comparably long 
interruption of employment.  
 
Just as in the case of childcare, however, a detailed analysis of the seven single 
indicators from the field of employment law has shown that using the average level 
of welfare state incentives has covered the positive and significant effects of the 
length of the standard workweek, the minimum number of vacation days per year 
and the compensation for the first set of overtime hours. These findings are 
congruent with the assumptions that mothers are more likely to supply labor to the 
market when they know that occasional overtime work is compensated well enough 
to cover the potential additional childcare costs. It is also congruent with the 
assumption that less working time per week and year increases the probability of 
maternal employment because an existing concept of short full-time (less than 40 
hours per week) and an increasing amount of predictable time off from work helps 
reconciling work and family life. Eventually, the analysis of the effects of the two 
single indicators from the field of taxation and allowances has shown that neither the 
public expenditures for family cash benefits nor for family tax breaks are related to 
the odds of maternal labor supply. This can be understood as a confirmation of the 
critique of traditional and also gender-sensitive welfare state research demanding the 
careful use of expenditure data and of financial indicators for welfare state effort 
(Therborn 1987 / Gilbert and Moon 1988).  
 
Which lessons can be learned from the present study and which open questions 
remain for future research? On the one hand, the findings have shown that using a 
strict and comprehensive set of single incentives for labor supply from the fields of 
childcare, parental leave, employment law, school policy and taxation and 
allowances for a welfare state comparison across a larger number of countries leads 
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to the establishment of welfare state types which are different from traditional and 
even existing feminist welfare state typologies. However, the case studies for 
Norway, Germany and Canada have also shown that the underlying potential causal 
mechanisms are strongly depending on the individual country’s history and politics. 
While in the case of Norway, the onset of events like the industrialization of the 
economy and the conservative attitudes towards the specific role of mothers (as 
opposed to the liberal attitudes towards cohabitation of unmarried couples) appear to 
have played a role, Canada seems to have kept a stronger proximity to its European 
roots than other liberal immigration countries like the United States and New 
Zealand. In turn, the combination of a strong religious tradition and a strong liberal 
turn within social policy has moved Germany closer to the liberal welfare states than 
other typical conservative countries. This variety of possible causes for the extent of 
state support for maternal employment indicates that an investigation beyond the 
scope of the present dissertation, i.e. for a larger number of countries than the three 
present cases, could lead to further insights. In this manner, an investigation of these 
causes could even help clarify whether the classification of welfare states into types 
is even appropriate on the basis of quantifiable policy data or if in the case if welfare 
state incentives for maternal labor supply, qualitative historical data have to be taken 
more into consideration. A detailed retracement of the individual country’s causes 
for a certain policy configuration can also lead to suggestions of reform and 
improvement that are adjusted to the country’s history.  
 
On the other hand, the establishment of a number of crucial factors from the field of 
employment law points in the direction that feminist welfare state research should 
not only focus on the most obvious policy fields, such as parental leave and 
childcare. Additionally, since the preservation of the labor market attachment 
appears to be a crucial factor, further research should also be directed at other 
measures that help new mothers maintain their human capital and their relation to 
their workplace, measures which are, for instance, rather to be found in the field of 
active labor market and education policy. Further research could also turn towards 
analyzing the effect of the school system in relation to incentives from other policy 
fields to examine if comprehensive school systems could actually prove to be a 
significant factor in combination with policies that set in before children reach school 
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age. Here, also the continuity of the school day or possibilities of out-of-school care 
could be taken into account. Apart from suggestions for future research, the present 
findings also point to certain practical policy implications. If policy makers are truly 
interested in increasing the financial independence of women by rising their 
probability of labor supply, irrespective of potential underlying attitudes in society, 
this study points to a few steps that can be taken. It appears that maternal labor 
supply highly depends on preserving the labor market attachment even after 
childbirth. Parental leave arrangements that are a favorable option by being fully 
paid, i.e. that keep women from dropping out of the labor market completely, seem 
just as important as the provision of paternity leave that increases the probability that 
both parents take time off from work after childbirth. The probability of more or less 
uninterrupted employment is also increased by the actual provision and support of 
full time childcare services. Legal entitlements alone are not crucial when the states 
do not turn rhetoric into action. Furthermore, many states can improve the 
employment chances of mothers by introducing the long claimed standard workweek 
of less than 40 hours which has to date only become reality in very few European 
countries. Additionally, this regulation could create more employment opportunities 
for the entire society and would not only be beneficial for working mothers. 
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Appendix A: Brief Overview of the Individual and Country Level Variables 
 
Individual Level Variables (EU SILC 2005 / n = 42.789) 
 
(1) basic activity status 
dichotomous variable measuring if the individual is unemployed (0) or 
employed (1) 
 
(2) individual market income  
yearly gross cash income in EUR from employment including additional 
payments, such as overtime premiums, commissions and thirteen month 
payments before the deduction of social security contributions and taxes 
(gross monthly earnings in EUR for Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) 
 
information for women without own income or earnings from employment 
has been imputed by means of the Heckman correction for about 16.000 
women in the sample  
 
(3)  non-labor income 
total disposable household income (income from employment for all 
household members, income from capital and property, social benefits) in 
EUR minus the individual market income of the woman living in the 
household (see (2)) 
 
(4)  age 
originally measured in years from 0 to 80; limited to women between 25 and 
54 years for the purpose of the present study 
 
(5) education 
originally subdivided into six categories; broken down into two categories (0 
= no education beyond compulsory schooling / 1 = education beyond 
compulsory schooling) for the purpose of the present study 
 
(6) number and age of children 
originally measuring the composition of households; broken down into three 
categories (1 = living in a household with one dependent child, 2 = living in a 
household with two dependent children, 3 = living in a household with three 
or more dependent children) for the purpose of the present study 
 
(7)  marital status 
dichotomous variable measuring if the individual has never been married, is 
separated, divorced or widowed (0) or if the individual is currently married 
(1) 
 
(8) parenting status 
originally measuring the composition of households; broken down into two 
categories (0 = two-parent household, 1 = single-mother household) for the 
purpose of the present study 
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FEMMES Dataset (Female and Maternal Employment Support) 
All variables range between 0 and 1. Higher values always imply a higher level 
of incentives. 
 
 
PARENTAL LEAVE 
 
(1/2) statutory entitlement to maternity / paternity leave 
existence of statutory entitlement to leave and extent of replacement rate (0 = 
no statutory entitlement / 0.33 = statutory entitlement, but unpaid / 0.66 = 
statutory entitlement, but low flat rate or < 50 % of earnings or not universal 
or not paid for the full period / 1 = statutory entitlement and > 50 % of 
earnings) 
 
(3) length of leave in months 
equals 1 when length of leave = 36 months (maximum length) 
countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share 
 
(4) length of paid leave in months 
 equals 1 when length of paid leave = 36 months (maximum paid length) 
countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share 
 
(5) share of paid period of leave 
paid period of leave (4) as a share of the total length of leave (3) 
equals 1 when 100% of leave is paid 
 
(6) sick child leave 
existence of statutory entitlement and extent of replacement rate plus 
additional leave entitlements covering a wider range of family members other 
than young children and/or situations of serious illness 
 
 
EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE 
 
(1) legal entitlement to infant care and / or kindergarten / pre-school care 
equals 1 when legal entitlement to both infant care and kindergarten exists, 
equals 0.50 when legal entitlement to either one of them exists and equals 0 
when there is no legal entitlement at all 
 
(2/3) childcare coverage for children aged 0 to 2 / 3 to 5 
 percentage share of children in childcare in the respective age groups 
 
(4) private childcare costs 
 private expenditures for childcare as a share of the family net income 
 
(5) public childcare spending 
public expenditures on infant care and pre-primary education as a share of the 
GDP 
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(6) length of the childcare day 
equals 1 when mostly full-time, equals 0.66 when there is a mixture of part-
time and full-time offers and equals 0.33 when mostly part-time 
  
(7) child-staff ratio for children aged 0 to 2 
equals 1 when child-staff-ratio is ≤ 5.5, equals 0.5 when child-staff ratio is ≥ 
6 and ≤ 8.5 and equals 0 when child-staff ratio is ≥ 9 
 
(8) child-staff ratio for children aged 3 to 5 
equals 1 when child-staff-ratio is ≤ 12, equals 0.5 when child-staff ratio is ≥ 
13 and ≤ 16 and equals 0 when child-staff ratio is ≥ 16.5 
 
 
SCHOOL POLICY 
 
(1) school starting age 
start of institutionalized, compulsory and guaranteed public education (equals 
1 when start of compulsory schooling is at age 4, equals 0.66 when start of 
compulsory schooling is at age 5, equals 0.33 when start of compulsory 
schooling is at age 6 or 6.5 and equals 0 when start if compulsory schooling is 
at age 7) 
 
(2) length of the school week in primary education 
 equals 1 when number of school hours per week = 30 (maximum value) 
 countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share 
 
(3) length of the school week in secondary education 
equals 1 when number of school hours per week = 40 (maximum value) 
 countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share 
 
(4) length of the school year 
 equals 1 when number of school days per year = 212 (maximum value) 
countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
(1) part-time benefits 
equals 1 when part-time workers receive at least half of the benefits enjoyed 
by the full-time worker (leaves, overtime premium, social security) 
 
(2) part-time contract termination 
equals 1 when part-time workers enjoy at least half of the legal rights to 
advance notice and separation fees for the termination of the employment 
contract of full time workers 
 
(3) number of paid holidays per year 
 equals 1 when the number of paid holidays per year = 15 (maximum value) 
countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share 
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(4)  premium for the first set of overtime hours 
equals 1 when the premium is at least 150% of the normal wage, equals 0.50 
when the premium is at least 125% of the normal wage and equals 0 when the 
premium is less than 125% of the normal wage 
 
(5) premium for each hour after the first set of overtime hours a week 
equals 1 when the premium for the second set of overtime is at least 200% of 
the normal wage and equals 0 when there is no additional premium for a 
second set of overtime hours; the values in between reflect the actual 
additional wage increase in relation to the normal wage 
 
(6) maximum number of working hours per week 
length of the standard full-time workweek (short full-time = less than 40 
hours (1), normal full-time = 40 hours (0.5), long full-time = more than 40 
hours (0)) 
 
(7) minimum number of vacation days per year 
 equals 1 when the number of paid holidays per year = 30 (maximum value) 
countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share 
 
 
TAXATION AND ALLOWANCES 
 
(1) family cash benefits  
public expenditures for family cash benefits as a share of the GDP 
 
(2) family tax breaks  
public expenditures for family tax breaks as a share of the GDP (the value of 
the maximum tax break is 1%; countries with a lower value are assigned their 
actual share of the GDP) 
 
 
COUNTRY LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
(1)  female employment-population ratio 
 share of women of working age (15 – 64) in employment as a percentage 
 share of the entire female population of working age 
 
(2) culture 
 share of the poplation that shows (strong) disagreement with the statement 
 that working mothers can establish a relationship with her children that is just 
 as warm and secure as the relationship that stay-at-home mothers can 
 potentially establish with their children as a percentage share of the entire 
 population 
Appendix B: Original and Recoded Data (FEMMES Dataset – Female and Maternal Employment Support) 
 
Employment Law (2004) 
 
Country Variables Part-Time 
Benefits 
Part-Time 
Contract 
Termination 
No. of Paid 
Holidays 
Premium for 
Overtime I 
Premium for 
Overtime II 
Max. Hours / Week Minimum Vacation 
(2009) 
    Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Austria 1 1 15 1 1.5 1 0 0 40 0.50 30 1 
Belgium 1 1 10 0.66 1.5 1 0 0 40 0.50 24 0.80 
Denmark 1 1 0 0 1.5 1 0 0 37 1 25 0.83 
Finland 1 1 11 0.73 1.5 1 2.0 1 40 0.50 24 0.80 
 
France 1 0 1 0.06 1.25 0.50 1.5 0.50 39 1 30 1 
Germany 1 1 10 0.66 1.25 0.50 0 0 48 0 20 0.66 
Greece 1 1 4 0.26 1.25 0.50 1.75 0.75 40 0.50 20 0.66 
Ireland 1 1 9 0.60 1.5 1 0 0 48 0 22 0.73 
Italy 0 1 11 0.73 1.1 0 0 0 40 0.50 28 0.93 
Netherlands 1 1 7 0.46 1.25 0.50 1.5 0.50 40 0.50 20 0.662004 
Norway 0 1 9 0.60 1.5 1 0 0 40 0.50 25 0.83 
Portugal 1 1 12 0.80 1.5 1 1.75 0.75 40 0.50 24 0.802004 
Spain 1 1 12 0.80 1 0 0 0 40 0.50 30 1 
Sweden 1 1 10 0.66 1.5 1 1.6 0.60 40 0.50 25 0.83 
UK 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 40 0.50 28 0.93 
 
Australia 1 1 10 0.66 1.5 1 2.0 1 40 0.50 28 0.93 
Canada 1 1 5 0.33 1.5 1 0 0 40 0.50 14 0.46 
Japan 0 1 0 0 1.25 0.50 0 0 40 0.50 10 0.33 
Luxembourg           25 0.83 
New Zealand 1 1 11 0.73 1 0 0 0 40 0.50 14 0.46 
Switzerland 1 1 9 0.60 1.25 0.50 0 0 45 0 20 0.662004 
USA 1 1 0 0 1.5 1 0 0 40 0.50 0 0 
 
Source:  Botero, Juan C. , Djankov, Simeon , La Porta, Rafael,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei. 2004. The Regulation of Labor. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 119 (4). 1339 – 1382: (cp. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/Regulation%20of%20Labor-
All/Regulation%20of%20Labor.xls) 
 
Part-Time-Benefits: 1 = Part-time workers receive at least half of the benefits enjoyed by the full-time worker (leaves, overtime premium, social security). 
 
Part-Time Contracts: 1 = Part-time workers enjoy at least half of the legal rights to advance notice and separation fees for the termination of the employment  
 
contract of full time workers. 
 
No. of Paid Holidays: 15 is the maximum and equals 1, countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share. 
 
Overtime Premium I: Premium for the first set of overtime hours a week 
Equals 1 when the premium is at least 150% of the normal wage, equals 0.50 when the premium is at least 125% of the normal wage and equals 0 when 
the premium is less than 125% of the normal wage. 
 
Overtime Premium II: Premium for each hour after the first set of overtime hours a week  
Equals 1 when the premium for the second set of overtime is at least 200% of the normal wage and equals 0 when there is no additional premium for a 
second set of overtime hours; the values in between reflect the actual additional wage increase in relation to the normal wage. 
 
Max. Hours/Week: Equals 1 when threshold ≤ 39; equals 0.5 when threshold = 40; equals 0 when threshold ≥ 41. 
 
Minimum Vacation: 30 is the maximum and equals 1, countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share. 
Source: ILO (1996 – 2011; http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/travmain.home). Information for the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland come from the days 
of annual leave with pay in manufacturing variable in Botero et al. (2004) which is not used for the remaining countries because the ILO data cover more 
than the manufacturing sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Child Care Services (Different Inquiry Periods and Data Sources) 
 
Country Variables Legal 
Entitlement  
Length 
of  Day 
 
Childcare 
Coverage  
0 - 2 
(2002-2005) 
Childcare 
Coverage  
3 - 5 
(2002-2005) 
Childcare Cost in % of 
Family Net Income  
(2004) 
Public Spending  on 
Childcare as a % of 
GDP 
(2003) 
Child-Staff-Ratio 
Ages 0 - 2 
Child-Staff-Ratio 
Ages 3 - 5 
      Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Austria 0 0.33 0.09 0.81 15 0.85 0.60 0.37 9 0 16.5 0 
Belgium 0.50 0.66 0.39 1 4 0.96 0.80 0.50 7 0.50 16 0.50 
Denmark 1 1 0.62 0.90 8 0.92 1.60 1 5 1 7 1 
Finland 1 1 0.35 0.68 7 0.93 1.40 0,87 5 1 13 0.50 
France 0.50 1 0.26 1 11 0.89 1.20 0.75 6.5 0.50 19 0 
Germany 0.50 0.33 0.09 0.80 8 0.92 0.40 0.25 6.5 0.50 14 0.50 
Greece 0.50 0.66 0 0.46 5 0.95 0.40 0.25 11 0 13 0.50 
Ireland 0.50 0.33 0.15 0.65 29 0.71 0.25 0.16 4.5 1 14 0.50 
Italy 0.50 0.66 0.06 1 4.5 0.96 0.55 0.34 7 0.50 13 0.50 
Netherlands 0.50 0.33 0.39 0.68 12 0.88 0.55 0.34 5 1 15 0.50 
Norway 0 1 0.44 0.85 8 0.92 1.00 0.62 8 0.50 12 1 
Portugal 0.50 0.33 0.24 0.78 4 0.96 0.85 0.53 11 0 15 0.50 
Spain 0.50 0.50 0.21 0.99 4.5 0.96 0.55 0.34 11 0 14 0.50 
Sweden 1 1 0.40 0.87 6 0.94 1.30 0.81 5.5 1 12 1 
UK 0.50 0.33 0.26 0.79 33 0.67 0.60 0.37 5 1 16 0.50 
 
Australia 0 0.66   8 0.92 0.40 0.25 7.5 0.50 16 0.50 
Canada 0.50 0.33   22 0.78   7 0.50 12 1 
Japan     14 0.86 0.35 0.22 4.5 1 17 0 
Luxembourg     6 0.94 0.90 0.56     
New Zealand     28 0.72 0.35 0.22 5.5 1 10 1 
Switzerland     30 0.70 0.30 0.19 6 0.50 18 0 
USA 0 0.33   28 0.72 0.60 0.37 5 1 14 0.50 
 
Legal Entitlement to Infant Care and / or Kindergarten / Pre-School:  Equals 1 when legal entitlement to both infant care and kindergarten exists, equals 0.50 when legal 
entitlement to either one of them exists and equals 0 when there is no legal entitlement at all. 
Source: Bennett, John. 2008. Early Childhood Services in the OECD Countries: Review of the 
Literature and Current Policy in the Early Childhood Field. UNICEF Innocenti Working Paper IWP-
2008-01 
  
Childcare Coverage for children aged 0 – 2 and 3 – 5:   Values correspond to the actual percentage share of children in childcare 
Source: Moss, Peter and Wall, Karin (eds.). 2007. International Review of Leave Policies and 
Related Research 2007. Employment Relations Research Series No. 80 
Source for Austria: Statistik Austria. 2010. Bildung und Kultur. Formales Bildungswesen. 
Kindertagesheime und Kinderbetreuung. Kinderbetreuungsquoten nach Altersgruppen 1995 bis 2009. 
 
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bildung_und_kultur/formales_bildungs 
wesen/kindertagesheime_kinderbetreuung/index.html (04/01/2011) 
 
Childcare Cost in % of Family Net Income:     1 minus the actual value (the higher the value, the less families have to pay) 
        Source: OECD Family Database (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/11/42004407.pdf; p. 3) 
 
Public Expenditures for Childcare (Infant Care and Pre-Primary Education): 1.60 % of the GDP is the highest value and equals 1. Countries with a lower value are assigned a 
percentage share. 
Source: OECD. 2007. Babies and Bosses. Reconciling Work and Family Life. A Synthesis of 
Findings for OECD Countries. (p. 135) 
 
Length of the Day: Equals 1 when it is mostly full-time, equals 0.66 when there is a mixture of part-time and full-time 
offers and equals 0.33 when it is mostly part-time. 
 Source: Data for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway and Sweden 
come from OECD (2007). Data for Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom 
and the United States come from Bennett (2008). Data for Germany and Greece come from the 
Eurydice Database (http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education /eurydice/eurybase_en.php) 
 
Child-Staff-Ratio Ages 0 – 2: Indicator for childcare quality. Equals 1 when child-staff-ratio is ≤ 5.5, equals 0.5 when child-staff 
ratio is ≥ 6 and ≤ 8.5 and equals 0 when child-staff ratio is ≥ 9 
 Source: OECD (2007, p. 144) 
 
Child-Staff-Ratio Ages 3 - 5: Indicator for childcare quality. Equals 1 when child-staff-ratio is ≤ 12, equals 0.5 when child-staff 
ratio is ≥ 13 and ≤ 16 and equals 0 when child-staff ratio is ≥ 16.5.  
 Source: OECD (2007, p. 144) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parental Leave (2007) 
 
Country Variables Maternity Leave Paternity Leave Length of Leave Length of Paid Leave Share of Paid Period of Leave Sick Child Leave 
  
  
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data   
Austria 1 0 24 0.66 24 0.66 1 1 
Belgium 1 1 9.5 0.26 9.5 0.26 1 0.25 
Denmark 1 1 10.5 0.29 10.5 0.29 1 0 
Finland 1 1 36 1 36 1 1 0 
France 1 1 36 1 36 1 1 0.50 
Germany 1 0 36 1 14 0.39 0.39 0.75 
Greece 1 1 9 0.25 2 0.05 0.22 0.50 
Ireland 0.66 0 14 0.39 4.5 0.12 0.32 1 
Italy 1 0 13.5 0.37 13.5 0.37 1 0.25 
Netherlands 1 1 8.5 0.24 2.5 0.07 0.29 1 
Norway 1 0.33 36 1 12 0.33 0.33 1 
Portugal 1 1 34 0.94 4 0.11 0.12 1 
Spain 1 1 36 1 3.5 0.10 0.10 0.75 
Sweden 1 1 16 0.44 16 0.44 1 0.75 
UK 0.66 0.66 18 0.50 6 0.17 0.34 0.25 
 
Australia         
Canada 1 0.33 12 0.33 11.5 0.32 0.96 0.50 
Japan         
Luxembourg         
New Zealand         
Switzerland         
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: Moss, Peter and Wall, Karin (eds.). 2007. International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research 2007. Employment Relations 
Research Series No. 80 
 
Maternity Leave / Paternity Leave: 0 = no statutory entitlement / 0.33 = statutory entitlement, but unpaid / 0.66 = statutory entitlement, but low flat rate or < 50 % of 
earnings or not universal or not paid for the full period / 1 = statutory entitlement and > 50 % of earnings 
 
Length of Leave:    In months. Equals 1 when length of leave = 36 months (maximum length), countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share. 
 
Length of Paid Leave: In months. Equals 1 when length of paid leave = 36 months (maximum length), countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage 
share. 
 
Share of Paid Period of Leave:   Paid period of leave as a share of the total length of leave (equals 1 when 100% of leave is paid) 
 Sick Child Leave: 0 = no statutory entitlement / 0.25 = statutory entitlement, but unpaid / 0.50 = statutory entitlement, but low flat rate or < 50 % of 
earnings or not universal or not paid for the full period / 0.75 = statutory entitlement and > 50 % of earnings / 1 = 0.75 + additional leave 
entitlements covering a wider range of family members other than young children and/or situations of serious illness (any value ≥ 0.50 
can also be a combination of the entitlement and payment regulations plus the additional leave regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School Policy (2010) 
 
Country School Starting Age School Hours per Week (Primary 
Education) 
School Hours per Week (Secondary 
Education) 
School Days per Year 
 Original 
Value 
Recoded 
Data 
Original Value Recoded Data Original Value Recoded Data Original Value Recoded Data 
Austria 6 0.33 20 0.66 35 0.87 180 0.85 
Belgium 6 0.33 29.5 0.96 34 0.85 182 0.86 
Denmark 6,5 0.33 24.5 0.82 35 0.87 184 0.87 
Finland 7 0 19 0.63 30 0.75 190 0.90 
France 6 0.33 24 0.80 27.5 0.69 180 0.85 
Germany 6 0.33 24.5 0.82 30 0.75 198 0.93 
Greece 5 0.66 27.5 0.92 35 0.87 175 0.82 
Ireland 6 0.33 25 0.83 38.5 0.96 181 0.85 
Italy 6 0.33 27 0.90 29 0.72 200 0.94 
Luxembourg 4 1     212 1 
Netherlands 5 0.66 23.5 0.78 26 0.65 200 0.94 
Norway 6 0.33 20 0.66 30 0.75 190 0.90 
Portugal 6 0.33 24.5 0.82 25.5 0.64 180 0.85 
Spain 6 0.33 25 0.83 30 0.75 175 0.82 
Sweden 7 0 30 1 40 1 178 0.84 
UK 4 1 22 0.73 24.5 0.61 195 0.92 
 
Source:  Eurydice Database (http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education /eurydice/eurybase_en.php) 
 
School Starting Age:  Equals 1 when start of compulsory schooling is at age 4, equals 0.66 when start of compulsory schooling is at age 5, equals 0.33 
when start of compulsory schooling is at age 6 or 6.5 and equals 0 when start if compulsory schooling is at age 7. 
 
School Hours per Week (Primary Education): Maximum no. of hours equals 30, countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share. 
 
School Hours per Week (Secondary Education): Maximum no. of hours equals 40, countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share. 
  
 
School days per Year:  Maximum no. of school days equals 212, countries with a lower value are assigned a percentage share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxation and Allowances (2007) 
 
Country Family Cash Benefits as % of the GDP Family Tax Breaks as a % of the GDP 
 Original Value Recoded Data  
Austria 2.5 0 0.1 
Belgium 1.8 0.25 0.5 
Denmark 1.6 0.25 0 
Finland 1.5 0.50 0 
France 1.5 0.50 0.7 
Germany 1.3 0.50 1 
Greece 1 0.75 0 
Ireland 2.3 0 0.2 
Italy 0.7 0.75 0 
Netherlands 0.8 0.75 0.4 
Norway 1.9 0.25 0.2 
Portugal 0.8 0.75 0.2 
Spain 0.4 1 0.2 
Sweden 1.6 0.25 0 
UK 2.3 0 0.4 
Australia 2.7 0 0.1 
Canada 1 0.75 0.2 
Japan 0.4 1 0.4 
Luxembourg 3.6 0 0 
New Zealand 2 0 0 
Switzerland 1.2 0.50 0 
United States 0.2 1 0.6 
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2007. Babies and Bosses. Reconciling Work and Family Life. A Synthesis 
of Findings for OECD Countries. Paris:  OECD Publishing, p. 72 
 
Family Cash Benefits as % of the GDP: Equals 1 when the share of the GDP spend for family cash benefits is ≤ 0.5, equals 0.75 when the share of the GDP spend for family 
cash benefits is ≥ 0.6 and ≤ 1, equals 0.50 when the share of the GDP spend for family cash benefits is ≥ 1.1 and ≤ 1.5, equals 0.25 when 
the share of the GDP spend for family cash benefits is ≥ 1.6 and ≤ 2 and equals 0 when the share of the GDP spend for family cash 
benefits is ≥ 2.1. 
 
Family Tax Breaks as % of the GDP: Since the maximum tax break is 1% (Germany), the values correspond to the actual share of the GDP.  
 
 
 
 
 
Country Level Control Variables: Female Employment-Population Ratio (2005) and Cultural Attitudes (2008) 
 
Counntry Female Employment-Population Ratio 
2005 
Cultural Attitudes  
2008 
 Original Value Recoded Data Original Value Recoded Data 
Austria 62 0.62 28 0.28 
Belgium 54.1 0.54 14 0.14 
Denmark 70.8 0.71 8 0.08 
Finland 66.5 0.67 2 0.02 
France 58 0.58 13 0.13 
Germany 59.6 0.60 21 0.21 
Greece 46.2 0.46 24 0.24 
Ireland 57.9 0.58 22 0.22 
Italy 45.3 0.45 30 0.30 
Luxembourg 53.7 0.54   
Netherlands 64.8 0.65 18 0.18 
Norway 72 0.72 9 0.09 
Portugal 61.7 0.62 24 0.24 
Spain 51.9 0.52 25 0.25 
Sweden 71.8 0.72 8 0.08 
UK 66.7 0.67 19 0.19 
 
Sources:     Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2010b. OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social  
     Statistics. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-factbook-2010_factbook-2010-en 
     European Values Study EVS. 2008. Tilburg University, Netherlands. http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/contact.html 
 
Female Employment-Population Ratio: Share of women of working age in employment in % 
Cultural Attitudes:   Share of the population that holds a more conservative attitude towards the role of mothers 
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